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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an examination of the relationship between the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the Orange Order in Northern Ireland since 2001. 
 
A series of twenty one semi structured interviews took place with three distinct 
interview groups; the PSNI’s first three permanent Chief Constables, a number of its 
senior officers, and senior members of the Orange Order. The subsequent data was 
analysed using a qualitative paradigm.  
 
Despite the extensive amount of literature regarding policing, parading, and the loyal 
orders in Northern Ireland, this study is believed to be the first that asks the question, 
‘What is the current relationship between policing and Orangeism since 2001?’ It is 
also believed to be the first study that captures the views of senior members of both 
the PSNI and the Orange Order in such detail and regarding a single issue. 
 
The literature review puts the current relationship between the PSNI and the Orange 
Order into the context of the Orange Order’s historic relationship with the Royal Irish 
Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). It describes how policing 
changed from its early non-partisan form to become closely entwined with unionism 
and orangeism. Until political and policing changes gradually put distance between 
these groups. These changes culminated in, but were no means finished by, the 
formation of the PSNI.  
 
The thesis considers the relationship at both the local and organisational levels, the 
various factors that influence this, including the Parades Commission, the rural and 
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urban “divide” in the Orange Order and the legacy of the RUC. It suggests that the 
local relationship is a pragmatic and broadly positive one driven by a need to manage 
large numbers of peaceful and lawful parades. The organisational relationship is more 
difficult to characterise but it is one more prone to the influence of events and faces a 
number of challenges, some of which are beyond the gift of either organisation.  
 
The thesis concludes with a number of recommendations.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is an examination of the relationship between the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland  (PSNI) and the Orange Order since 2001.  The 
researcher is a serving PSNI Superintendent with operational experience of managing 
Orange parades and the daily relationship with orangeism. Like many from the 
researcher’s protestant and unionist background he has distant and historic 
connections to orangeism.  
The genesis of the thesis reflects a number of areas of professional interest for 
the researcher, policing disorder, the PSNI relationship with loyalism and also how 
the PSNI’s “policing with the community” strategy is operationalised in challenging 
environments. It is also the researcher’s view that the relationship between the PSNI 
and Orange Order is important. This is evidenced in the frequent and sometimes 
extensive deployments of PSNI to manage parades (Belfast Telegraph 19/05/14), and 
the damage that contentious parades do to community relationships and Northern 
Ireland’s fragile reputation and economy (Belfast Telegraph, 05/07/14). It is however 
not the purpose of these thesis to offer a solution to the parading issue. If such a 
solution exists it is more complex and much wider than the relationship between the 
PSNI and Orange Order.  
The thesis explores the relationship between two distinct organisations. The 
PSNI is approximately 6800  (PSNI, 02/05/15) sworn officers strong. It was formed 
on 4th November 2001 as a result of the Northern Ireland peace process and the 
Independent Commission on Policing In Northern Ireland (Patten) Report. PSNI is 
distinguished as a United Kingdom police service by both its governance 
arrangements and the operational challenges of historic community tensions and 
paramilitary violence. Due to severe financial pressures the PSNI is reducing in size 
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and undergoing fundamental restructuring (Northern Ireland Policing Board [NIPB], 
2/10/14).  
 In June 2014 the Northern Ireland Policing Board appointed George Hamilton 
Chief Constable (UTV, 29/05/14). Hamilton succeeded two Chief Constables 
appointed from England and is the PSNI’s first permanently appointed Northern Irish 
Chief Officer.  In the course of the research Hamilton has indicated that he intends to 
put the relationship with the Orange Order on a stronger footing. His first two 
summers as Chief Constable while far from incident free provide a reasonable 
backdrop against which to achieve this aim 
Although the Orange Order is a worldwide body (Evangelical Truth, ND), its 
Irish branch is primarily explored in this thesis. The Order’s precise size is unknown 
but it is likely to have between 25,000 – 30,000 members across Ireland. Formed in 
1795, this Protestant fraternal order exists to defend Protestantism, along with its 
historical and cultural principals. The Orange Order uses parading to express much of 
its heritage, christian witness and claim to britishness. It is the largest of the Protestant 
fraternal orders and also has a small representation in the Irish Republic. It is 
governed by the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland and a supporting 12 County (4 
counties are in the Irish Republic) and 125 District structure. The real power base of 
this democratic organisation is the private lodges (Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland 
[GOLI], n.d.). No matter where an Orangeman sits in the hierarchy each remains a 
member of a private lodge. There are 1334 private lodges approximately. (GOLI, 
n.d.). 
The number of contentious parades in Northern Ireland is extremely small 
(Parades Commission [PC], 2014, p. 3), and this figure includes the weekly Drumcree 
protest parades that have taken place since 1998 (PC, 2014, p. 8).  In July 2013 the 
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Parades Commission prevented three North Belfast lodges, the Ligoniel Combine, 
completing their return route on the 12th of July past the Ardoyne shop-fronts (BBC 
News, 10/07/13), an interface between local Catholic and Protestant communities. 
There have been nightly protests about this by the Orange Order since 2013, which 
have required extensive PSNI deployments.  At time of writing the Twaddell situation 
remains unresolved and is a key factor in the current PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship (GOLI, 05/11/2013). The 2015 12th July Parades Commission 
determination replicated that of 2013 and 2014. 
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter reviews the literature 
on the relationship between Irish policing and orangeism and highlights an increasing 
distance between the two bodies, particularly from the end of the Stormont era. The 
literature review also identifies a clear lacuna in knowledge of this relationship. The 
second chapter presents the methodological choices made in the thesis and the 
selection of a qualitative paradigm. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 consider the PSNI and 
Orange Order relationship from the perspective of three sources. These are Chief 
Constables, senior PSNI officers and senior Orangemen. The sixth and final chapter 
concludes the thesis and makes some proposals as to how the relationship between the 
PSNI and the Orange Order could be improved.  
 The challenges of improving the relationship between the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland and the Orange Order are complex, not least because it is influenced 
by many factors outside the control of both organisations. Indeed simply moving to a 
point where the Orange Order and the PSNI can deal with the annual challenges of 
parades and Parades Commission determinations requires a new way of doing 
business. One of the challenges in changing this relationship is that it exists within the 
context of the PSNI’s relationship with the Protestant, Unionist and Loyalist  (PUL) 
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and also the Catholic, Nationalist and Republican (CNR) communities. These 
challenges accepted if this thesis is the basis for a constructive conversation between 
policing and orangeism it will have been worthwhile. 
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Chapter 1 - Literature Review 
1.1 Introduction 
There is no shortage of material, both academic and grey dealing with the 
Northern Ireland “Troubles” (Neumann, 2003, p. 366). Among this wealth of writing, 
policing and the Orange Order receive considerable attention, as does the matter of 
parades and their impacts.  Interestingly this material does not extend to 
criminological consideration of the “Troubles” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 191) (Ellison & 
Mulcahy, 2001, p. 243), and it is suggested that criminology’s serious academic study 
of the Troubles is a relatively new phenomenon and primarily from a historical 
perspective (James W McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p.35). In contrast, the post-ceasefire 
period has attracted diminishing academic attention, particularly of policing, which 
for a considerable period had been viewed as one of the causes of the “Troubles” and 
its reformation part of the conflict’s solution (Ellison, 2007, p. 244).  What unites the 
pre and post-ceasefire period is the absence of any academic engagement with the 
relationship between the Orange Order and the PSNI, or indeed the Orange Order and 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).   
The above assessment is based on a search of academic databases using 
consistent search terms (Appendix A), and also a review of print and online media. 
These search terms cover the period of Irish policing from the Royal Irish 
Constabulary’s formation in 1837, and include RUC and PSNI, the main Protestant 
Orders; the Orange Order, the Royal Black Preceptory (RBP), the Apprentice Boys of 
Derry (ABOD) and the Independent Orange Order. The search terms did not include 
the Association of Loyal Orangewomen  (McCausland, 2010) or Junior Grand Orange 
Lodge, as neither body has a distinct relationship with policing. In addition the 
Parades Commission was a separate search term due to its role in determining 
	 17	
sensitive parade routes. Although Orangeism exists in England and Scotland, these 
bodies are separate from the Grand Lodge of Ireland and neither has a history, 
significance, or contemporary influence to make comparison with Irish orangeism 
relevant to this study.  
Existing literature does provide themes from which reasonable deductions can 
be made about the relationship between the Orange Order and police in Ireland, 
particularly during the RUC’s existence (1922 – 2001). There are fewer themes that 
can be deduced from the material regarding the RIC or the PSNI. This is likely due to 
the historical context of each organisation. The richest source of material regarding 
the PSNI and Orange Order relationship is the Orange Order’s newspaper, the 
“Orange Standard”.  Other academic material provides detail of wider political 
changes that altered the relationship between unionism and Government, creating a 
very different political environment in which the Orange Order had to operate and 
relate to both State and police. These changes, among them the imposition of direct 
rule in 1972, the Anglo Irish Agreement of 1985, the 1994 and 1997 ceasefires, and 
the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement of 1998 shifted the balance of power from 
unionist dominance (Pehrson, Gheorghiu, & Ireland, 2012, p. 112)  (Southern, 2007, 
p. 166) (Wilson & Stapleton, 2005, p. 635) to the current situation where an 
increasingly confident nationalist community (A. White, 2007, p. 29) is electorally 
represented in a power-sharing administration.   
 
1.2 Chapter Structure 
The chapter is divided into sections. First, the Orange Order’s initial hundred 
years, its uneasy relationship with the State (Bryan, 1997, p. 380) and the creation of 
the RIC as a non-partisan force (Griffin, 1999, p. 26), will be examined. This is 
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followed by a discussion of the “golden era” of Orangeism and the tripartite 
relationship between the RUC, Orange Order and the Stormont administration.  Third, 
the period of transition from Stormont to direct rule will be considered and 
subsequently the post 1972 “Troubles” period when the RUC and Orange Order 
relationship was influenced by political change, police professionalisation and 
internal changes in Orangeism. The final sections of the Chapter will examine the 
impact of the Drumcree dispute, the creation of the Parades Commission, and the 
Patten Report.  It will conclude with a consideration of the Orange Order’s reaction to 
the creation of the PSNI, and assess their relationship with the new service as it 
delivers civic policing and upholds the determinations of the Parades Commission.  
 
1.3 The Birth of Orangeism and Foundations of Irish Policing. 
The Orange Order was founded in 1795 following the Battle of the Diamond 
on September 21st (GOLI, n.d.) (Batista, 2009, p. 7).  This was in effect a skirmish 
between Catholic Defenders and Protestant Peep O’Day Boys (Brewer & Higgins, 
1998, p. 45). At the conclusion of this “battle” the victorious Protestants went to the 
home of James Sloan to form a defensive organisation (Bryan, 2000, p. 32 & 33), the 
Orange Society (Kennaway, 2007, p. 3)  later to be known as the Loyal Orange 
Institution of Ireland.  A Grand Lodge of Ulster was formed in 1796 (Bryan, 2000, p. 
35).  Prior to 1795 a tradition of Protestants banding together already existed.  
Kennaway (2007, p. 2) describes the formation of the Orange Institution as a coming 
together of various groups, such the Boyne and Enniskillen Societies, formed to keep 
alive the Williamite tradition. The type of parading which was to become intrinsic to 
the Orange Order predates their formation and was one element of the yearly 
celebrations of William III’s birthday since 1690 (Bryan, 2000, p. 31).  
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The genesis of the Orange Order in communal strife provides an instructive 
backdrop to its first century and early relationship with law and order which was still 
local and without national structure (Malcolm, 2006, p. 18). The Order struggled to 
attain early respectability. It drew its membership predominantly from the labouring 
and artisan classes.  The gentry and professionals were reluctant to join (Dewar, 1967, 
p. 102) (GOLI, n.d.), possibly on account of orangeism’s links to Protestant agrarian 
societies and the agrarian troubles of the period (Roberts, 1971, p. 269).  Bryan points 
to  “respectability” challenges for the Orange Order, the political Establishment’s 
difficulty with the Order’s behaviour, and also the Establishment’s conundrum of how 
to use Orange popular culture to its own advantage (Bryan, 2000, p. 35 & p. 36). The 
Dublin Evening Post catches the nature of the early Orange Order in a description of a 
1796 parade, “a motley group of turncoats, Methodists, Seceders and High 
Churchmen accompanied by a multitude of boyos and country trolls cheering their 
lagging heroes” (Bryan, 2000, p. 31).  
An early connection between parading and disorder (Bryan, 2000, p. 36) led 
successive Governments to either ban orangeism and other “Unlawful Societies”  
(Kennaway, 2007, p. 6)  (Haddick-Flynn, 1999, p. 226) or place constraints on “Party 
Processions” (Jarman, 2001, p. 6) (GOLI, n.d.). Despite the Grand Lodge acquiescing 
to the legislation (Kennaway, 2007, p. 6) an element of the rank and file was prepared 
to parade in defiance of both Government and Grand Lodge (Bryan, 2000, p. 36 & 
37). This was an early indicator of a willingness to defy attempts to curb parading and 
also the marginal ability of Grand Lodge to impose its will on the private lodges 
A confrontational relationship with Government continued until the latter part 
of the 19th century. However by the 1870s 12th of July celebrations had gained 
increasing importance, to the point where these became “central to the new unionist 
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hegemony among Protestants in Ulster” (Bryan, 2000, p. 47).  As unionist politicians 
strove to defeat Home Rule proposals, the first Irish Home Rule Bill was defeated in 
1886; the Orange Order became a resource for unionist leaders to harness opposition 
(Bryan, 2000, p. 60). As a result orangeism earned a place in the unionist 
establishment. Prior to this period Boyce (2010) describes the Orange Order as a 
“relatively marginal phenomena” (p. 30). It is also worth noting that during this 
period Ulster began to industrialise and as power was transferred from the country 
land owner to the industrialist and from the tenant farmer to the labour aristocracy 
(Bryan, 2000, p. 58) a similar change was reflected in Orangeism (James W McAuley 
& Tonge, 2007, p. 36).  As well as this transfer of influence to urban orangeism, 
urban orangeism became more overtly political due to an increasing fear of the 
Catholic community’s exercise of political, and social power (James W McAuley & 
Tonge, 2007, p. 36). In contrast rural Orangeism was less politcised and experienced a 
less confident and competitive Catholic community.  
 As the Orange Order evolved and began to display traits that would have 
significance for its future, the foundations were being laid for the ‘colonial’ style Irish 
national police force (Smyth, 2002a, p. 110)  (McGloin, 2003, p. 125) (Brady, 1974, 
p. 2).  Following previous efforts to formalise policing, (Malcolm, 2006, p. 22) 
(McGloin, 2003, p. 124) an Irish Constabulary, later Royal Irish Constabulary, was 
formed in 1836. Three features of the newly created constabulary had implications for 
the development of the relationship between policing and orangeism in Ireland.  
First, the RIC was set up as a non partisan police force in contrast to its predecessor 
the County Constabulary (Brady, 1974, p. 8) (O’Sullivan, 1999, p. 36). Second, again 
in contrast to the County Constabulary, RIC members were forbidden to join secret 
societies including the Orange Order (Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 2) (Allen, 1999, p. 
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10) (O'Sullivan, 1999, p. 48), although there  is evidence of RIC members joining the 
Orange Order, especially in Belfast. Bryan (2000) writes “The local police [in 
Belfast] were predominantly Orangemen (p. 40).  Third the RIC was genuinely 
representative of the populace.  By 1860, 76% of the force was Catholic, a rising 
figure (O'Sullivan, 1999, p. 136) (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 16) (Brewer, 1989, p. 
83).  This representativeness is partly due to the relatively low number of Protestants 
across the whole Island.  It also led the RIC to be viewed with suspicion among some 
of the unionist community. Dawson Bates, sometime Minister of Home Affairs 
described the RIC as both “anti Protestant and completely infiltrated by republicans” 
(Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 3)  (Doherty, 2004, p. 13) and untrustworthy (Ryder, 
2004, p. 30). Griffin (1999) summarises his view of the difference between the RIC 
and the RUC as follows, 
“The most important [difference] concerned their handling of sectarian 
issues. Throughout its history the RIC strove to avoid sectarianism within 
its ranks and partisanship towards any political or religious groupings” 
(p. 26). 
 
1.4 Stormont and a Protestant Police 
Despite earlier attempts to create a non-partisan force the RUC became during 
the Stormont era (1922-1972) predominantly Protestant and unionist.  It was 
controlled by a unionist Minister of Home Affairs and provided, in the views of many 
commentators, with wide ranging powers to protect both the unionist hegemony and 
its orange culture.  Up to the mid 1960s, three themes emerged which both elucidate 
the RUC and Orange relationship of the time and also form part of the backdrop 
against which the Orange Order and the PSNI relate to each other.   
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First the RUC was a Protestant dominated force during the Stormont era. This 
was despite “remarkable” (Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 3) attempts by Dawson Bates, 
Home Affairs Minister, to recruit a 1000 Catholics among the 3000 strong force 
(Brewer & Magee, 1991, p. 3) when it was established. This complement of 1000 was 
to be drawn from former RIC, Special Constabulary, Dublin Metropolitan Police 
members and the general public as necessary (Ryder, 2004, p. 35 & p. 36). Dawson 
Bates’s ambition was not realised and the number of Catholic’s in the RUC peaked at 
23%, a figure which declined as former RIC members retired (Ryder, 2004, p. 71).  
By 1969 Catholic membership of the RUC hovered around 11% (B. P. White, 2000, 
p. 222). Hunt in his 1969 Report commented “the great majority [Catholic RUC 
members] are probably men whose fathers had served in the police” (Mulcahy, 2006, 
p. 7). A further factor in determining the complexion of the RUC and a predisposition 
towards unionism was the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC). The USC was 
established in October 1921 at the insistence of James Craig, unionist parliamentary 
and financial secretary to the Treasury (Hezlet, 1972, p. 19), to support the regular 
police (Doherty, 2004, p. 13). Its size outstripped the regulars (Ryder, 2004, p. 29) 
and they carried out separate duties (Doherty, 2004, p. 21).  Similar proposals to 
recruit Catholics to the USC came to nothing (Hezlet, 1972, p. 25) and the Special 
Constabulary also became an overwhelmingly Protestant force (Brewer & Magee, 
1991, p. 3) (Leavy, 1973, p. 414) (Bryan, 1997, p. 382) (B. P. White, 2000, p. 221) 
(Cameron, Biggart, & Campbell, 1969, p. 183) (Griffin, 1999, p. 27) (Mulcahy, 2006, 
p. 8).  Bryan (2000) describes the USC as a “part time armed police force drawn from 
the UVF and the Orange Order” (p. 61) and Hunt commented, 
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“In practice we are in no doubt that it is almost if not wholly impossible 
for a Roman Catholic recruit to be accepted. We certainly were given no 
instance in which this had occurred”  (par. 183). 
Second RUC members were permitted to join the Orange Order.  The previous 
prohibition on membership was lifted by Dawson Bates within three months of the 
RUC’s formation and in January 1923 the “Sir Robert Peel Memorial Temperance 
Loyal Orange Lodge, 1334” (Ryder, 2004, p. 77) was founded for the RUC. It is 
difficult to assess the numbers of RUC members who joined the Orange Order 
(Haddick-Flynn, 1999, p. 333) but Bryan quoting Weitzer (1995) suggests, “It is clear 
that many….policemen were in the Orange Order” (Bryan, 2000, p. 60). Griffin 
(1999) estimates LOL 1334 had about 300 members.  Hezlet (1972), who writes one 
of the few favourable commentaries on the USC suggests, “A considerable number of 
the USC did belong to the Orange Order, but this organisation has absolutely no say 
in the organisation or recruitment of the force” (p. 240). Other commentators less well 
disposed to the USC echo the links.  (Bryan, 1997, p. 382) (Ryder, 2004, p. 29).  
Prime Minister Craig remarked, “It is also from the ranks of the Loyal Orange 
Institution that our splendid Specials have come” (B. P. White, 2000, p. 223). 
The third theme of the Stormont era is the close relationship between the 
unionist government, the Orange Order, and the RUC. This close relationship gave 
the Orange Order a considerable degree of influence in Northern Irish society and 
created conditions in which they could fulfil their parading aspirations. Haddick 
Flynn (1999) suggests, “The heyday of the Order was between 1921 and 1968 when it 
ruled the roost in Northern Ireland” (p. 331). The relationship between the Orange 
Order and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) is well documented. Kaufmann (2007) 
describes the unionist political elite as “organically linked with the Order” (p. 21). 
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The Orange Order had a “leading role” (GOLI, n.d.-b) in the formation of the Ulster 
Unionist Council in 1905 and continued to enjoy significant representation on the 
Party’s governing body (Evans & Tonge, 2007, p. 158). Of the 95 Stormont MPs who 
did not attain cabinet rank, 87 were Orangemen, as were all but 3 cabinet members. 
Every eligible senator, 1921 – 1968, and Prime Minister was an Orangeman (Bryan, 
2000, p. 60) (Racioppi & See, 2000, p. 7).  Consequently until 1965 when the political 
crisis began, the aspirations of the Orange Order and the government broadly 
coincided, both standing for the preservation of the Protestant way of life and the 
Union.   It is argued a mutually beneficial relationship was thus created. The Order 
assisted in creating unity (D. Cairns, 2001, p. 87) among the Protestant working 
classes diverting them from social and labour concerns (James W McAuley & Tonge, 
2007, p. 39)  and  the twelfth became a “ritual of State” (Bryan, 2000, p. 60)  (D. 
Cairns, 2001, p. 87) (Wilson & Stapleton, 2005, p. 636). McAuley and Tonge (2007) 
describe the relationship, 
“From the partition of Ireland in 1921 the Orange Order was a crucial 
instrument by which the Unionist Party maintained itself in power for 
over 50 years as politics stratified along ethnic rather than class lines”    
(p. 39). 
In return the Orange Order was afforded considerable influence in the 
Unionist Party (Ryder, 2004, p. 74) ( (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 122), access 
to the most senior levels of power  (Haddick-Flynn, 1999, p. 332), and the ability to 
influence government policy, particularly on education (Brewer & Higgins, 1998, p. 
91). Although tensions did arise between the Order and Government there was little 
of substance to trouble the relationship, particularly up to World War Two (Bryan, 
2000, p. 67),  and any opposition was expressed under the strict control of Grand 
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Lodge (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 23). It is not unreasonable to describe this 1922-1965 
period as a golden age for Orangeism (Wilson & Stapleton, 2005, p. 636) . Bryan 
(1997, p. 381) argues that although Farrell’s  (1990) description of the Stormont era 
as the “Orange State” misses much of the complexity of the Orange and Unionist 
Party relationship, it has some truth.  
The RUC was the third element of the Orange Order and Unionist Party 
relationship. White (2000), among others (Lawther, 2010, p. 457) (Murphy, 2013, p. 
10),  characterises the relationship in these terms: 
“The Orange Order, the government, and the RUC became closely 
connected. Laws passed by the unionist-controlled government had the 
desired effect of rendering the Catholic minority socially and politically 
powerless. The Orange Order maintained Protestant working class 
support of the government, in exchange for a system that favoured 
Protestants over Catholics. And the RUC, susceptible to anti Catholic 
sentiment, made sure Catholics accepted the arrangement” (p.227). 
This close relationship was a by-product of the arrangement by which the RUC 
Inspector-General reported directly to the Minister of Home Affairs (McGloin, 2003, 
p. 129). There was no concept of the operational independence of the Chief Constable 
(Ellison, 2000, p. 89) (Doherty, 2004, p. 93) (Mark & Charlton, 1978, p. 104) (Smyth, 
2002b, p. 299). Patten (1999) said, “The RUC was in practice subject to direction by 
the Minister of Home Affairs in the former unionist government.”  (p.23).  Equally 
there was no accountability to oversight bodies which could temper the successive 
Ministers of Home Affairs (Ryder, 2004, p. 101) committed to maintaining the 
institutional advantage of the Protestant community. Ellison and Martin (2000) 
summarise the arrangement and suggest,   
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“The subordination of the RUC to direct political control by the  
unionist Minister for Home Affairs meant that they represented in a very 
concrete sense the umbilical cord of unionism” (p.  691).  
Ryder (2004) summarises his view of these impacts, 
“There could have been no worse architect for the development of 
policing in Northern Ireland or more unfortunate mentor for the RUC 
than Richard Dawson Bates. …For many years he imposed his deeply 
partisan and discriminatory values on…the police and the way they 
exercised their varied powers and responsibilities” (p. 33). 
This perceived lack of political independence, the “evil of the political control of the 
RUC” (Callaghan, 1973, p. 90) was compounded, particularly in the late 1960s,  by  
concerns regarding both RUC leadership (p. 56) and discipline (p. 12) . Cameron in 
his 1969 Report says, 
“The nature of the relationship of the RUC to the Minister of Home 
Affairs makes it easy for the criticism to be put forward the RUC is 
essentially an instrument of party government” (par 230). 
Operationally the RUC was provided with what has been described as a 
“remarkable width” of powers (Cameron et al., 1969, par. 9) designed to favour 
unionism and to allow the RUC to carry out the Unionist Party’s bidding (Smyth, 
2002b, p. 299) (White, 2000, p. 220).  It is argued chief among these powers was the 
1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act, “a legal authority that is unexceeded in 
the non-totalitarian world” (Leavy, 1973, p. 415).  In an unsympathetic account of 
Faulkner’s premiership, Boyd (1972) claims “The Special Powers Act…the unionist 
Government promised, would never be used against members of the Orange Order..’ 
(P.74). Public order legislation was also drafted in favour of Orangeism. The Public 
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Order Act (1951) Act (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 39) exempted the organisers of 
parades “customarily held along a particular route” from notifying the RUC 48 hours 
in advance (Nagle, 2009, p. 138),  in effect exempting Orangemen from notification 
(Jarman & Scullion, 2013, p. 8). Also in 1954 (Farrell, 1976, p. 95) Stormont, 
contrary to the Inspector General’s advice (Doherty, 2004, p. 55), enacted the ‘Flags 
and Emblems Act’ which made it an offence to interfere with a union flag or raise any 
flag which might cause a breach of the peace. Although the Irish tricolour was not 
specified in the legislation, it represented further legislation designed to maintain the 
status quo.  
In contrast to later years there was little to trouble this tripartite relationship 
other than the occasional parading dispute. Parades were briefly restricted in 
nationalist Coalisland in 1932 (Bryan, 2000, p. 66) and surprisingly Dawson Bates 
established a week long parading ban in 1935, which the RUC enforced inconsistently 
(Bryan, 2000, p. 67).  The most controversial parading disputes of the period focused 
on the Longstone Hill in County Down and Dungiven in County Londonderry (D. 
Cairns, 2001, p. 90)  (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 67) where in 1952, 1953, and 1959 
(Robinson, 2012, p. 390) a number of parade bans were enforced by the RUC 
(Weitzer, 1995, p. 49) sometimes in the face of violence.  These bans aside during this 
period the RUC typically provided physical security for the Orange Order to parade 
(Cairns & Smyth, 2002, p. 152. Jarman and Bryan (1997) characterise the situation as 
follows,  
“Put simply, unionist control of the legislature and Protestant domination 
of the police force was reflected in the ability of the Protestant community 
to hold parades and demonstrations” (p. 31). 
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 Although the Orange Order were at times critical of Government security policy, 
(Kaufmann, 2007, p. 25) the IRA border campaign of 1956 – 1962 heightened Orange 
vigilance for threats to their way of life (Robinson, 2012, p. 384) and reinforced 
dependence on the RUC and USC as a bulwark against republicanism.  
 
1.5 Transition to Troubles, Hunt and Direct Rule  
The period from the mid 1960s to the imposition of direct rule in 1972 were 
tumultuous and began to change the relationship between the Orange Order, state and 
the RUC. As the Orange Order increasingly lost influence at Stormont and won no 
favour with Westminster, it is suggested that its “rights” were progressively curtailed 
by both the state and the RUC.  Key to the Orange Order beginning to lose its 
influence was the appointment of Terence O’Neill as prime minister in 1963. 
Although an Orangeman O’Neill began to wrestle with some of the economic and 
other pressing problems besetting Northern Ireland (Bryan, 2000, p. 78)  (Purdie, 
1990, p. 13) (Coogan, T,  p. 474) (Parkinson, A & Phoenix, E, 2010, p. 173) as 
opposed to focusing on the  question of national sovereignty. Partly with an eye to 
Westminster he took steps previously unthinkable for a unionist prime minister 
including meeting with the Irish Taoiseach in 1965 (Callaghan, 1973, p. 5)  
(O'Callaghan & O'Donnell, 2006, p. 205). Kaufmann (2007) suggested the visit 
“exhausted O’Neill’s stock of Orange capital” (p. 26). This stock declined even 
further as O’Neill responded inadequately, in Orange Order terms, to the marking of 
the 1916 rising by nationalists and republicans (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 
125).  
 In all likelihood as a consequence of the shift in unionist leadership the 
Orange Order also began to change. Its patrician leadership, guaranteed to moderate 
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more radical elements, is described as slowly being replaced by more “populist” 
voices (Kaufmann, 2007p. 27 & p. 37) and the middle classes began to leave the 
Order. The change was reflected in “Twelfth” [July] platform speeches (Kaufmann, 
2007, p. 28) (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 125)  (Robinson, 2012, p. 393) and a 
Twelfth platform became a hostile place for the “unionist elite.”  (Bryan, 2000, p. 78). 
A newspaper editorial of the time commenting on the expulsion of O’Neill’s cousin 
from the Order captured the situation well, “this landmark vote represents a watershed 
moment in which rebel unionism first came to dominate over the traditional Orange 
elite” (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 25). Orange Order pressure contributed to O’Neill’s 
resignation in May 1969 and ended a “seemingly inextricable link based upon warm 
empathy, the political and shared wealthy patrician background of party and Orange 
leaders” (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 126).  
The direction of travel that O’Neill had begun in banning parades continued 
with his successors, Chichester Clark and Faulkner (O'Callaghan & O'Donnell, 2006, 
p. 217) (Boyd, 1972, p. 84). The political situation began to worsen and the unionist 
government tried to tackle the rising levels of popular unrest and the resulting 
confrontation and disorder from August 1968 onwards (Ellison & Smyth, 2000, p. 56 
& 57) (McCluskey, 1989, 109).  In August 1969 Chichester Clark imposed a ban on 
all parades (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 53). While he retained the support of Grand Lodge 
he faced the anger of the Orange rank and file.  The ban was lifted in early 1970 but 
revived on 23rd July 1970 and “met with fury and indignation in Orange Order ranks” 
(Kaufmann, 2007, p. 61). Grand Lodge in December that year signalled to the private 
lodges that they were legally entitled to defy the ban (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 63), and 
they joined with the other Loyal Orders in an effort to overturn it (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 
64). Chichester Clark’s resignation on March 23rd 1971 brought no comfort to the 
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Order and his successor, and last prime minister of Northern Ireland, Brian Faulkner, 
again an Orangeman, continued to impose parade bans (James W McAuley et al., 
2011, p. 126)  (Boyd, 1972, p. 84) in spite of unionist and Orange Order reaction 
(Kaufmann, 2009, p. 69).  
The Orange Order’s loss of political power, their inability to influence 
government policy or RUC operations was hastened by the increasing intervention of 
the Westminster Government (Boyd, 1972, p. 84), the army’s deployment and finally 
the imposition of direct rule in March 1972.  It is interesting to note that the then 
Home Secretary, James Callaghan, refers to Westminster making private plans to 
prorogue Stormont from 1968 (Callaghan, 1973, p. 23) such was their concern at the 
inability of the Northern Ireland Government or their under-resourced and over-
stretched RUC (Callaghan, 1973, p. 18 & 29) to deal with the escalating trouble. 
Those who held the levers of power in Westminster had no bias towards the Orange 
cause and as Westminster tightened its grip on Stormont (Warner, 2005, p. 17)  the 
corridors of power, it is suggested, were closed to the Orange Order (Kaufmann, 
2007, p. 98) (Cairns & Smyth, 2002, p 154) . Bryan (1997) suggests, “The British 
State was interested in controlling Northern Ireland but it would not necessarily do so 
utilising orangeism ” (p. 382). 
Undoubtedly these political dynamics were having an impact on the RUC and 
Orange Order relationship. As parading bans took effect the RUC were no longer in 
their traditional role of the protector of orange space and at times the Orange Order 
and its supporters were coming into direct confrontation with the RUC. For example, 
in 1971 in Dungiven, (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 69) the RUC used irritants and impact 
rounds to enforce a ban on an orange parade. It is not suggested that the Orange Order 
supported violence but it demonstrated a willingness to confront parade bans. 
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Kaufmann, (2007) points out the Orange Order now had to deal with a Chief 
Constable whose terms of reference “were set by the British and not a unionist 
Government” (p. 98). 
This period also saw the first attempt to reform the RUC.  In August 1969 a 
Government Committee chaired by Lord Hunt drafted  “The Report of the Advisory 
Committee on Police in Northern Ireland.” Hunt (1969) described its 
recommendations as,  
“framed with a view to enabling both the police and the citizens of Ulster 
to move towards a better relationship with one another in order to 
achieve this common need and purpose”  (p. 4). 
The purpose of the report was to remove the RUC’s paramilitary role (Brewer, 1991, 
p. 5) and create a better-resourced and managed force with greater levels of public 
accountability and broader community contact (Hunt 1969, p. 4).  Hunt also proposed 
the USC’s disbandment and replacement with part-time RUC and military forces 
(Hunt, 1969, p.6). Other than the disbandment of the USC, Hunt’s short lived and 
partially fulfilled recommendations (McGloin, 2003, p. 132) (Ryder, 2004, p. 216) 
had little impact on the RUC and Orange Order relationship. The Orange Order 
opposed two of Hunt’s recommendations in particular  (Kaufmann, 2007, P. 57), the 
USC’s disbandment and the disarming of the RUC. Orange Order opposition to Hunt 
was articulated in Twelfth of July speeches of the time (Bryan 2000, p. 88) and 
prefigured their later opposition to the Patten reforms.  
 
1.6 Troubles 
Parading controversies became increasingly important from the mid 1960s. 
However as security concerns progressively took centre stage for the Orange Order, 
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these concerns determined largely the basis on which they judged the RUC.  From the 
Trouble’s outset Orange leaders encouraged their members to join the RUC (regular 
and part-time) and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and avoid paramilitarism 
(Kaufmann, 2007, p. 290). In 1972 Grand Lodge maintained their brethren were ready 
to defend Northern Ireland and encouraged individual Orangemen to take up this call 
to defeat what they regarded as Ulster’s enemies (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 75).  As a 
consequence 332 members of the Orange Order died during the Troubles. Of the total 
300 RUC officers murdered during the Troubles “around one in five were members of 
the Orange Order” (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 105) (BBC News, 2010)  
(G.O.L.I. 02/06/2015). 
  In effect the Orange Order developed a strong emotional bond with the RUC 
and viewed its members contribution to the security forces as part of the continuum of 
Orange service to the crown through the years (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 
104) (GOLI, 2007b, p. 1) (Batista, 2009, p. 15).  This emotional bond ensured the 
RUC remained as “their” (O’Rawe, 2002, p. 123) Protestant dominated police force 
(Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 81) (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 2) and that of the broader 
unionist community,   
“From the formation of the Northern Ireland State the RUC has assumed 
an iconoclastic “sacred status” in the unionist psyche. For many unionists 
the RUC is more than just a police force – it is their police” (Ellison & 
Martin, 2000, p. 692).   
This strong attachment later informed the Orange Order reaction to the Patten 
reforms. It was also the backdrop against which they formed their relationship with 
the PSNI. 
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 This bond between the Orange Order and the RUC is key to understanding 
their relationship during the troubles. The Force was overwhelmingly Protestant, but 
the RUC culture was not necessarily Orange. Brewer’s 1991 study of the RUC paints 
a picture of an organisation that reflected Protestant values (p. 247), but did not 
exhibit a partisan occupational culture (p. 246). 
While the importance of the bond between the RUC and Orange Order should 
not be underestimated, a number of changes began to take place in policing in the mid 
1970s that started to redefine the relationship. The basis for these changes were RUC 
efforts to deliver a more impartial service and are primarily associated with the 
tenures of Sir Kenneth Newman (1976-1980) and Sir John Hermon (1980- 1989) as 
Chief Constables. Both built on the efforts of former colleagues to “professionalise” 
the RUC and, 
“shift the basic mission of the RUC away from the defence of specifically 
Protestant interests toward winning broad-based popular consent, 
impartially combatting crime and upholding the rule of law”  (Weitzer, 
1985, p. 45). 
 The effectiveness of their approach may be disputed by some, but the RUC as a 
consequence of the 1976 “Way Ahead” Report (Doherty, 2004, p. 128) set about to 
reclaim primacy for internal security (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 32).  While RUC primacy 
was driven by a number of factors, chief was a recognition that a structural response 
to terrorism had to be accompanied by impartiality, accountability, consent and 
legitimacy (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 34). Hermon championed RUC professionalisation 
commenting that it  “must rest alongside genuine service to the community and 
enlightened membership of the community” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 35). 
	 34	
There were operational consequences of the professionalisation approach, not 
least an increasing willingness by the RUC to deal with loyalism and to tackle some 
parading issues. The revised approach was first seen in the RUC reaction to the Ulster 
Workers Council (UWC) strike of 3rd May 1977, where a combined group of loyalist 
interests tried to paralyse essential services in protest at Government security policy. 
In contrast to the similar 1974 stoppage, during which it is argued the “clear 
unwillingness” of RUC to tackle loyalist strikers was evident and their action did 
“little to convince the nationalist that the ‘reformed”  RUC’ were willing to defend 
their interests as much as it defended those of loyalists” (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 31), the 
RUC took a strong line. The RUC prevented power outages and cleared disorderly 
loyalists off the streets (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 36). Ryder (2004) suggests,  
“This incident was a decisive turning point, for it showed a new RUC in 
the making, one that was prepared and competent to deal energetically 
with trouble on the streets whether the culprits were Catholics or 
Protestants…Newman hoped this demonstration of strict impartial 
policing would begin a process of healing the long fractured relationship 
with the Catholic community (p. 250) 
RUC resolve in tackling loyalist violence continued to be tested during the 
period, not least after the signing of the Anglo Irish Agreement on the 15th of 
November 1985. Its signing was greeted with fury by the unionist community and 
(Mulcahy, 2006, p. 36) provoked a wave of violence that lasted for a considerable 
duration (Doherty, 2004, p. 196).  The RUC response was robust and greeted angrily 
by many sections of unionism. Hermon (1997) notes the significance of the RUC 
response,  
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“On later reflection I regarded that day  [3rd March 1986] as the turning 
point: it marked the emancipation of the RUC from the yoke whether real 
or imagined of unionist/loyalist influence”  (p. 191). 
 It left the unionist community in little doubt of RUC will to tackle civil disorder, 
regardless of the source. Brewer (1991) notes that the RUC senior management’s 
response to the Anglo Irish agreement had,  
“done a great deal to enhance the RUC reputation for professionalism, 
both intentionally through the redirection of Orange marches…and 
unintentionally through the policing of Protestant marches of protest” (p. 
141) and  
“With Protestant politicians hurling abuse at the force as a consequence 
of the Anglo Irish agreement it demonstrated to RUC management the 
“utility of political independence” (p. 270). 
Also by the early 1980s some argue the RUC became “less willing to facilitate 
loyal Order parades in predominantly nationalist areas” (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 
67) (Bryan, 2001, p. 48). Early in his tenure, Hermon had signalled concern at the 
levels of communal violence caused by parading. He reflected,  
“It is worth noting that all too often large numbers of police personnel 
have to be deployed to deal with politically inspired parades and 
demonstrations many of which pose a threat to public order. It is 
unfortunate after the experience of more than a decade of violence and 
civil disturbance that such activities have not been abandoned in favour 
of less inflammatory forms of political expression” (Benington & Turbitt, 
2007, p. 379).  
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Accordingly Hermon took decisive action by re-routing Orange parades away from 
the Catholic Obins Street in Portadown, among other places. (Benington & Turbitt, 
2007, p. 379).  These re-routings were important in themselves but had an additional 
significance particularly as Portadown holds a special place in Orangeism as its 
birthplace. This fact will not have been lost on Hermon in the decision making 
process nor the Orange Order. The reaction from the Orange Order and unionism was 
angry; from loyalists, violent (Bryan, 2001, p. 48) (Hermon, 1997, p. 201) (Doherty, 
2004, p. 200). Hermon (1997) believed that through his decision “the independence of 
the police had been clearly manifested” and he writes in his autobiography, 
“By mid May 1985 the Force was fully prepared to address the 
smouldering problem of loyalist parades. Over almost a century these had 
been given a special position in Northern Ireland and appeared to have 
acquired a sort of temporal sanctity. Participants believed they could 
parade almost wherever and whenever they chose. ……I was not alone in 
believing that the superior attitude of the loyalists in respect to their 
marches had to be changed” (p. 171). 
 Hermon’s willingness to tackle loyalism and orangeism had a number of 
impacts on the RUC and Orange relationship. It recast the traditional impression of 
the RUC as the protector of Orange Order rights. The levels of violence also led to 
new public order legislation. The Public Order (1987) Order removed the notion of 
customary parades. It is also suggested the legislation “moved decisively against the 
Orange Order” (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 158). Finally the period saw the start of attacks 
on RUC homes by loyalist mobs (Ryder & Kearney, 2002, p. 84). Leaving aside the 
physical impacts of these attacks, a process was started in which RUC officers no 
longer saw the unionist community as uniformly benign. To a degree loyalism 
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became part of the threatening environment in which RUC officers and their families 
existed. Ryder (2004) describes this process, 
“The wider RUC family soon came to see itself as a third community in 
divided Northern Ireland. Virtual police ghettoes developed in some parts 
of the Lagan Valley and North Down where officers and their families 
clustered together for mutual security” (p. 253). 
As the policing landscape was beginning to change and the wider Protestant 
community was forced to reconsider its place in Northern Ireland due particularly to 
the Anglo Irish Agreement (Southern, 2007, p. 165) (O'Neill, 2000, p. 28) it is argued 
changes were taking place in orangeism.  First the Orange Order began to expand the 
parading calendar (Cairns, 2001, p. 95), an indication of an increased willingness to 
assert the right to parade and to “flex muscles.”  Indeed Cairns (2001) suggests, “at a 
superficial level, in times of contestation, orangeism expands to meet ‘the threat’ ” (p. 
95).  Second it is suggested Orangeism, particularly in urban areas, began to lose 
some “respectability” as a result of regular confrontations with the RUC. It is argued a 
battle for the soul of Orangeism was underway as it reacted to the unfolding political 
situation,  
“ ‘Respectable’ Orangeism was caught between its support for the State 
and the rule of law and growing disenchantment with the 
State…’Respectable Orangeism’ of the 1950s was in retreat. ‘Respectable 
Orangeism’ was no longer hegemonic” (Bryan, 2000, p. 169). 
Third by the mid 1980s the Orange Order was in numerical decline and unable 
to attract young working class loyalists who were more attracted to the “blood and 
thunder” flute bands with their distinctive uniforms and limited musical repertoire 
(Kaufmann, 2007, p. 282) (Smithey, 2008, p. 14) (Bryan, 1997, p. 394) (Bell, 1987, p. 
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174) (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 74).  Bryan (2000) describes the bands as 
“without question, the most distinctive development in loyalist political culture since 
the 1960s” (p. 127). They were more aggressive in appearance than the Orange Order 
and more willing to confront the RUC (Bryan, 1997, p. 393) (Ryder & Kearney, 2002, 
p. 2). McKay (2007) describes the bands as representing the “rough side of unionism” 
(p.27). Although the Order made efforts to control the bands through conditions of 
engagement (Kennaway, 2007, p. 73), band and Orange interests did not always 
coincide,  
“Loyalist bands remain separate from mainstream with their own social 
dynamics and cultural practices and at times they offer a counter and 
alternative culture to rather than being part of it” (James W McAuley et 
al., 2011, p. 74).    
Despite this difference of tone, the Order became increasingly reliant on  “Kick the 
Pope” bands (McKay, 2007, p. 30) for their numerous parades. This reinforced the 
increased militancy, or at least appearance of militancy, of certain sections of 
particularly urban Orangeism.   
 The relationship between the loyalist bands, their supporters and the Orange 
Order is interesting and one of the dynamics in existing parading relationships. Its 
proper consideration is beyond the scope of this thesis however and merits fuller 
consideration than is possible here. However it is important to emphasise that the 
Orange Order, despite popular public perception of this situation, does not control the 
loyalist bands.  Loyalist bands are independent of the Orange Order and simply 
contracted by them to provide musical accompaniment to parades. As referred to 
previously when a band is contracted to play at an Orange event, terms of engagement 
are entered into (Kennaway, 2007, p. 73), these terms include, for example, 
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constraints on the type of music played (Montgomery & Whitten, 1995, p. 36). If a 
band chooses to breach the conditions of engagement this can lead to them being 
prohibited from playing at future Orange Order events. The conditions of engagement 
also cover the behaviour of band or parade followers (Montgomery & Whitten, 1995, 
0. 35).  It is a feature of Orange parades and indeed band parades that young people 
who have an association with a particular band often follow them. Radford (2001) 
describes these as “coat trailing band followers” (p.39) and suggests many are young 
females (p. 42). 
 As well as having no actual relationship with the Orange Order other than 
being contracted to play music (Kennaway, 2007, p. 73), several commentators 
suggest that the tensions exist between the Orange Order and loyalist bands and that 
the bands have appropriated loyalist culture. Bell (1987), for example in his 
discussion of the role of bands in loyalism explains that contemporary loyalist culture 
has become the preserve of the bands and not the Orange Order (p.163).  A point also 
made by Radford (2001, p. 41). Bell further points out that the process by which the 
bands supplanted the Orange Order’s influence especially among the loyalist working 
class is (174) is reflective, among other things of historic tensions between working 
class loyalism and what he describes as the  “aristocratic and bourgeois elite”  (p. 
166) that traditionally controlled Orangeism.  
 There is a further tension between the bands and the Orange Order that is 
useful to highlight and which has consequences more directly for the relationship 
between policing and Orangeism. The Orange Order although it hires bands for its 
events accept no responsibility for the behaviour of either the bands or their followers 
at Orange Order events. They may condemn this behaviour should it be illegal or 
offend against the conditions of engagement. Later in the thesis senior police officers 
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will highlight this as a failure by the Orange Order leadership to accept the sometimes 
inevitable consequences of their events and hiring bands some of whom are claimed 
to have paramilitary associations (Radford, 2001, p. 42). Kennaway (2007) in 
referring to the relationship between the bands and Orange Order suggests it is “where 
the duplicity and the inertia of the Institution is most exposed” (p. 72). 
 
1.7 Drumcree and the Parades Commission 
The developing themes of increased Orange Order militancy and RUC 
robustness came to a head outside Drumcree Church of Ireland Church in Portadown 
during a series of July parade confrontations beginning in 1995. These confrontations 
were seminal in the evolution of the RUC and Orange Order relationship and continue 
to have implications for the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order.  
The significance of the dispute is summarised well by the then Chair of the Parades 
Commission who characterised Drumcree as, “The touchstone, the litmus test, the line 
in the sand” (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 78).   
Drumcree was significant for a number of reasons. First Portadown is 
regarded as the “Vatican” of Orangeism where the right to march has been fought for 
since 1807 (Ruohomäki, 2010, p. 176) (Kennaway, 2007, p. 74).  Second it is claimed 
as the oldest Orange parade and is not far from the place of Orangeism’s birth 
(Benington & Turbitt, 2007, p. 379).  Third it is the first place where residents groups 
began to confront Orange Order parades  (Dingley, 2000, p.55) (Kennaway, 2007, p. 
76) and Portadown became a locus for Sinn Fein to fight their “proxy war” 
(Kaufmann, 2007, p. 149) via the parading issue.  The wider unionist community of 
the time and Orange Order suspected these residents groups of being fronts for 
IRA/Sinn Fein (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 158)  (Bryan, 2001, p. 45) and foot soldiers in he 
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republican cultural struggle against unionist interests (Montgomery & Whitten, 1995, 
p. 34) (GOLI, n.d.-a) (D. Cairns, 2001, p. 100) (Bryan, 2006, p. 608) (James W 
McAuley et al., 2011, p. 81).   Finally the initial disputes from 1995 – 1999 took place 
against the background of the PIRA ceasefires of 1994 and 1997 and the 1998 Belfast 
(Good Friday Agreement), which for a sizeable part of the unionist and loyalist 
community, and certainly the Orange Order (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 149) accelerated a 
process of alienation from the state (James White McAuley, 1996, p. 128) (Evans & 
Tonge, 2007, p. 158) (James W McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 41) (Mitchell, 2003, p. 
615). For these reasons the Orange Order saw Drumcree as an unparalleled test of 
their right to walk the Queen’s Highway. The Orange Order regards this right as 
crucial to its history, symbolic existence and culture (Pehrson et al., 2012, p. 112), 
tradition  (Southern, 2007, p. 166)  (David Cairns & Smyth, 2002, p. 144) 
(Kennaway, 2007, p. 70), identity (Bryan, 1997, p. 383) (D. Cairns, 2001, p. 96),  
Christian witness  (Bryan, 2001, p. 43) (Racioppi & See, 2000, p. 2), commemoration 
(Edwards & Knottnerus, 2010, p. 4) (Conlan, 2001, p. 559) ,  britishness  (GOLI, n.d.-
c) and social/familial  relationships (Montgomery & Whitten, 1995, p. 9) (Dingley, 
2002, p. 47) (James W McAuley et al., 2011, p. 158) (Wilson & Stapleton, 2005, p. 
635).   
At the heart of the confrontation was the Orange Order’s wish to return from 
Drumcree Church to Carleton Street Orange Hall by the Garvaghy Road, a main route 
into Portadown close to nationalist housing estates. Nationalist residents who 
protested in considerable numbers objected to the return route that had been used 
since 1986.  In 1995, 1996 and 1997 the RUC permitted the parade (Kaufmann, 2007, 
p. 161 & 175 & 181) following protracted stand-offs between the RUC, the parade 
and counter protesters and high levels of violence across Northern Ireland. Turbitt 
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(2007), a former RUC commander describes Northern Ireland in July 1996 as “fast 
approaching anarchy” (p. 380). Since 1998 the Parades Commission  (Dingley, 2002, 
p. 59) (Benington & Turbitt, 2007, p. 380),  has not permitted the Orange Order to 
complete the return route. Although the violence waned over time the Garvaghy Road 
remains closed to the Orange Order despite weekly applications to the Parades 
Commission to complete the return leg (PC, 2014a, p. 4). To this day the Orange 
Order seeks to complete the parade every Sunday and is prevented from doing so by a 
Parades Commission determination and a very small PSNI presence. 
  As well as the Drumcree disputes placing the RUC and the Orange Order in 
direct and violent confrontation it had internal consequences for the Order.  Most 
notable was the development of a hard-line element known as the “Spirit of 
Drumcree.” This Group, established in 1995 called for reform of the Order and 
harried Grand lodge, among other things, for a tough line on traditional routes, 
(Kennaway, 2007, p. 127 & 131) (Ryder & Kearney, 2002, p. 130). Kaufmann (2007, 
p. 200  & p. 201) suggests that despite soul searching in the Orange Order, 
particularly post 1998, the Spirit of Drumcree Group pushed the Orange Order to the 
right. Kennaway argues that Grand Lodge bowed to its “demands” (2007, p. 254). 
Despite the Group’s eventual demise it is argued by some any reformist sentiments 
expressed in reaction to the violence of three summers were silenced. 
  One of the most significant impacts of Drumcree was the formation of 
the Parades Commission in 1997 (O’Kelly & Bryan, 2007. P. 567). It became 
responsible for determining the route of sensitive parades and its decisions are 
possibly the most decisive factor in influencing the current PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship. The Commission was set up following the publication on 30th January 
1997 of the Independent Review of Parades and Marches (North Report) (Kennaway, 
	 43	
2007, p. 151).  Some argue the North Review was established by the Secretary of 
State in reaction to the poor handling of the 1996 Drumcree dispute by the RUC (B. 
P. White, 2000, p. 242). North recommended the creation of an independent body to 
consider disputed parade routes, counter demonstrations and promote mediation as a 
means of resolving disputes (B. P. White, 2000, p. 243)  (O'Kelly & Bryan, 2007, p. 
567) (Hamilton & Bryan, 2006, p. 151). The subsequent 1998 Public Processions Act 
sets out the Commission’s duties, the revised notification arrangements for parades 
("Public Procession (Northern Ireland) Act," 1998, p. 3) and the five criteria (Bryan, 
2006, p. 608) ("Public Procession (Northern Ireland) Act," 1998, p. 6), against which 
the Commission judges a parade application. The Commission’s Annual Reports and 
other publications set out its commitment to the concept of dialogue, engagement and 
negotiated settlement for parading disputes (PC, 2007, p. 1) (PC, 2011, p. 1) (PC, 
2013, p. 1). In their publication “Parading in a Peaceful Northern Ireland”, the Chair’s 
Foreword reads “Our commitment is that we will continue our efforts to initiate 
genuine dialogue and engagement so that disputed parades become a matter of 
history” (PC, 2008, p. 1). 
While there exists a range of views regarding the Commission’s success 
(Hamilton & Bryan, 2006, p. 155) (Jarman & Scullion, 2013, p. 10)  (B. P. White, 
2000, p. 249)  (O'Neill, 2000, p. 42)  (O'Kelly & Bryan, 2007, p. 569 & p. 577) the 
Orange Order, despite making a submission to “North”  (Kennaway, 2007, p. 152) 
opposed its formation from the outset  and continues to have no official contact with it 
(Kaufmann, 2007, p. 239). In a web-based article, “The Case Against the Parades 
Commission” the Orange Order details their opposition to the Parades Commission, 
an “unelected quango” and the Public Processions Legislation, 
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“It [the legislation] is undoubtedly aimed at curtailing our Parades and is 
a direct attack on both our faith (in as much as parades to and from 
Church are an extension of our public witness) and our culture. Once 
again the Government have either failed to understand the core of the 
problem or have taken the easy option of dealing with the generally law 
abiding population, possibly as part of the on-going confidence building 
measures for republicans” (GOLI, n.d.-a).   
The Commission is indeed unelected and the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland following open competition appoints the Commissioners. The 1998 legislation 
allows the Secretary of State to appoint up to 7 individuals, including a chair ("Public 
Procession (Northern Ireland) Act," 1998, p. 14), to serve as commissioners.  In the 
words of the 2006 Commission Chair, Commissioners “represent a broad range of 
interests and experience across Northern Ireland and beyond” (PC, 2007, p. 1). The 
parading year 2012 – 2013 provides an indication of their task. During this period 
4499 parades were notified to the Commission. 58% of these parades were of the 
loyal order and broad unionist tradition. Of the total figure only 225 (5%) warranted 
consideration by the Commission and restrictions were placed on 73% of these 
sensitive events. The weekly Drumcree parade in included in the figures for sensitive 
events (PC, 2014a, p. 4). 
Despite the 1998 legislation removing police from making decisions about 
parade routes it had a profound impact on the police and Orange relationship for two 
reasons. First the police became responsible for enforcing the decisions of a body the 
Orange Order viewed as a sop to republicanism, and for prosecuting those who 
breached legislation which in Orange Order terms is aimed at curtailing their cultural 
heritage and rights. Second the police were made not merely responsible for 
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upholding determinations but became part of the Commission’s decision-making 
apparatus. Police are required to present evidence to the Commission in closed 
session regarding parade routes. The Orange Order has often viewed the police role in 
this process with suspicion and some accuse police of partiality. The Commission 
decisions will be at the heart of the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order. 
 
1.8 Patten – A New Beginning 
In June 1998 the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland 
(Patten) was charged with the reform of policing.  Previous post ceasefire efforts by 
the RUC to respond to the more peaceful operational context had been structural and 
efficiency driven but did not confront the more radical challenges (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 
107) of issues such as cross community legitimacy (Goldie & Murphy, 2010, p. 38) 
(Gordon, 2008, p. 143) (Beirne & O’Brien, 2010, p. 148) (O'Rawe, 2002, p. 1033).  
As Patten set about his task the RUC was increasingly distant from unionism 
and those engaged in parading disputes. It is also argued the Orange Order had been 
on a rightward journey, increasingly marginalised from the state and hostile to efforts 
to curtail parading. The RUC however remained Protestant, visibly British through its 
symbols, and an organisation with which the Orange Order still had an emotional 
attachment. Patten stripped away those symbols to create a service representative of 
the wider community but a service which directly reflected none of the culture or 
symbols especially cherished by the Orange Order (Southern, 2007, p. 170). In 
describing the heart of the policing problem in Northern Ireland, Patten (1999) 
recognised the link between policing and political identity in Northern Ireland, 
“Policing has been contentious, victim and participant in past tragedies, 
precisely because the polity has been so contentious…the role of those 
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charged with keeping the peace has been contested..they have been 
identified by one section of the population, not primarily as upholders of 
the law but defenders of the State and the nature of the State itself has 
remained the central issue of political argument..In one political language 
they are the custodians of nationhood. In its rhetorical opposite they are 
the symbols of oppression. Policing therefore goes right to the heart of the 
sense of security and identity of both communities” (p.2).  
Broadly the unionist community were opposed to Patten (Hillyard & 
Tomlinson, 2000, p. 408) and many viewed its recommendations as an outrage 
(McGarry, 2000, p. 180).  David Trimble, leader of the majority Ulster Unionist Party 
described Patten as a “gratuitous insult” (McGarry, 2000, p. 180). Their previous 
experience of police reform in the Hunt Report was negative and previous suggestions 
that the RUC should take “brave decisions and move forward” had been rejected by 
them (Smyth, 2002a, p. 115).  Ian Paisley summed up the objections to reform, “the 
RUC had stood between us and those who would destroy us” (Doyle, 2010, 187). The 
Orange Order echoed these objections. Over 330 of their members have died as a 
result of the Troubles (GOLI, 02/06/2015). 
 Patten made 175 recommendations on the basis of 5 tests (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 
153) .  He took a twin track approach (Topping, 2008b, p. 779)  reform to systems, 
and also what Ellison (2007) described as reforms with “a more radical edge insofar 
as they seek to connect programmatically to the wider challenges in governance and 
security posed by late-modern society” (p.247). Patten aimed to place human rights at 
the heart of the policing task (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 18)  (Engel & Burruss, 2004, 
p. 498) and develop the concept of  “policing with the community” (Bayley, 2005, p. 
208) (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 40) (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 154) (Gordon, 2008, p. 146). 
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There is debate about how faithful the subsequent legislation was to Patten’s report 
(Ellison, 2007, p. 246 & 253) (Ryan, 2008, p. 97) (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 169) (Ryder, 
2004, p. 307)  (O'Rawe, 2002, p. 1041) and its effectiveness (Rolston, 2006, p. 143) 
(Ellison et al., 2012, p. 490), but equally there is a view that the reform process was 
transformational and broadly successful (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 184) .  
These far reaching reforms touched many aspects of policing, including 
accountability (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p.28-39), devolution of policing and justice 
and normalisation (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 4 & p. 49). It was however the more 
symbolic parts of Patten on which the Order focussed. This included elements which 
had maintained the British and Protestant character of the force, the renaming of the 
RUC (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 99) (Hays, 2012, p. 571),  the imposition of the 
50/50 recruiting scheme to boost Roman Catholic membership (Ireland & Patten, 
1999, p.88), the creation of a neutral working environment (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 
100),  the removal of the royal oath  (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 20) and the 
requirement that PSNI officers who were Orangemen should declare this. Paragraph 
15.15 of the report (1999) reads, “We would prefer that public servants were not 
members of secret societies or organisations perceived to be sectarian such as the 
Orange Order.”  
 In common with much of the wider unionist community (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 
159 & 162) (A. White, 2007, p. 127)  (Southern, 2007, p. 170)  (Goldie & Murphy, 
2010, p. 38)  (Lawther, 2010, p. 458) the Orange Order was opposed to Patten (GOLI, 
2000b, p 1) (GOLI, 09/09/1999)  (GOLI, 02/09/ 2007). One of their principal 
objections was the betrayal of the RUC memory. Two statements sum up the 
sentiment, 
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“It is almost as if the lives of those officers who paid the ultimate sacrifice, 
the sufferings of those maimed and the devastation and pain of their 
families have been for nothing” (GOLI, 2000e, p.1). 
And 
“The Patten Commission spat in the face of those who have sustained 
injury while serving with the force….the RUC has very little to be 
ashamed of. On the contrary the force has a record to be proud of.. 
…Doing away with the badge of the RUC is preposterous” (GOLI, 2000d, 
p. 1). 
While it is difficult to reconcile these feelings with an organisation prepared to 
place police officers at risk by exercising their “right to march”, it is clear that the 
Orange Order had retained at some level their sentimental view of the RUC. This is 
all the more puzzling as the RUC since 1985 had shown willingness to curtail Orange 
parades. It may be the case that the Orange leadership were able to divorce the reality 
of their operational experience of the RUC and the willingness of the RUC’s senior 
leadership to deliver Patten’s reforms (O'Toole, 2010,  p. 57 ) (Constantine, 2010, p. 
80) (Orde, 2010, p. 99) from the imagined reality of a Protestant dominated force 
paying the ultimate sacrifice to defend the Protestant way of life. The loss of  332 of 
their so membership during the Troubles (GOLI, ND), often the softest of targets for 
terrorists, undoubtedly influenced this. 
 
1.9 Police Service of Northern Ireland 
 Commentary on policing and unionism continues in the post Patten era but 
there is less from which to draw conclusions about the PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship. This is possibly a consequence of the revised position of policing. It is 
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seen less as a problem than a solution, and the PSNI enjoys broad cross community 
support (Ellison, 2010, p. 250). Less than 100 of its members belong to the Orange 
Order (PSNI, 2014). Much of the commentary considers PSNI reform (Ryan, 2008) 
and Patten type themes with issues of police legitimacy (Ellison, 2007) (Byrne & 
Jarman, 2010) (Hays, 2012) (Gordon, 2008), human rights  (Engel & Burruss, 2004), 
accountability (Porter & Prenzler, 2012) and community policing to the fore   
(Topping, 2008a) (Topping, 2008b) (Service, 2012). The complex issue of the PSNI’s 
role in investigating Troubles related crime  and “the past” is also a focus for study 
(Orde, 2006).  
 Parading remains a key feature of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship. 
Since the foundation of the service there have been some significant episodes of 
parade related violence where the PSNI and Orange Order have been in direct 
confrontation.  Although the figure varies annually, in 2013/2014, 2766 loyal order 
and unionist parades took place.  Of this figure 491 were declared to be sensitive and 
88% had some restrictions placed upon them. The 2013/14 figures are skewed by the 
nightly Twaddel Avenue protests and the on-going Drumcree notifications (PC, 
2014b, p. 8). They do give a sense of the scale of opportunity for PSNI and Orange 
Order to come into conflict both on the streets and through tensions caused by the  
Commission’s evidence gathering process. It would be very wrong however to give 
the impression that every sensitive parade ends in disorder. This is far from the case 
and disorder remains exceptional.  
A useful example of tensions caused by parading issues is the Whiterock 
dispute of September 2005 when, following a Parades Commission determination, the 
parade degenerated into serious and sustained violence with PSNI and army coming 
under fire from blast bombs and gun attack. In the aftermath Chief Constable Hugh 
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Orde claimed the Orange Order was largely responsible for the violence (Kaufmann, 
2007, p. 294) (Kennaway, 2007, p. 262), as it had called for its members to walk 
along a banned route. Kaufmann (2007) talks about the reaction of the Orange Order 
to the disorder, suggesting the Orange leaders displayed “unprecedented 
equivocation” (p. 295) and that there was a strong sense among much of the Orange 
leadership blame lay with the heavy handed policing style (p. 296) (GOLI, 
10/09/2005).  He remarks that although many condemned the violence, shared loyalist 
aspirations overrode differences between Orange and non-Orange and “helped bend 
the [Orange Order] unequivocal traditional commitment to law and Order” (p. 297). 
The Belfast Telegraph remarked on 16th September 2005 “The attempt by Orange 
Order leaders to pin the blame on the PSNI is an insult to everyone’s intelligence. The 
Order’s credibility is at stake”. 
Earlier in the literature review there was discussion of the closeness of the 
relationship between Orangeism and Ulster Unionism, particularly during the period 
of the Stormont Government. In contrast with this relatively straightforward 
arrangement the post Patten relationship between elected Unionism and Orangeism is 
more complex. There remains an undoubted link between elected unionism and 
Orangeism. Many unionist politicians are members of the Orange Order or other loyal 
orders. Nigel Dodds, for example, MP for Belfast North, where the Twaddell dispute 
is played out nightly, is an Orangeman and he has been trenchant in his criticism of 
the Parades Commission decisions (Belfast News Letter, 10/0713). While this 
practical link remains it is undoubted that the influence the Orange Order once 
wielded in elected Unionism has declined considerably. The Orange Order no longer 
has access to Government in the manner previously enjoyed. Equally they no longer 
have an official place in the Ulster Unionist Party (McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 39). 
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The Orange Order severed its constitutional links with the UUP in 2005. Although its 
members, in the main, also shifted their allegiance to the anti Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement Democratic Unionist Party (McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 40), the Orange 
Order was certainly given no official status in the DUP. The DUP’s relationship with 
Orangeism is also complex and reflective of the Revd. Ian Paisley’s early brush with 
the Orange Order as moderator of the Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster (Smyth, 
1987, p. 10).  
The continuing presence of unionist politicians in Orangeism however has 
practical consequences.  First the Orange Order can lever political pressure in 
parading disputes as parading remains an electoral issue in Unionism. There was a 
“pan Unionist” political reaction to the Parades Commission 2013 Twaddell decision 
(Belfast Telegraph, 03/0713). Also, and for example, the DUP 2015 Westminster 
manifesto stated they want “A new start on parades including the abolition of the 
Parades Commission. We will work alongside the Loyal Orders to achieve this.”  
Second, and this is later spoken about by police interviewees, the existence of elected 
representatives who are members of the Orange Order extends the reach and influence 
of the Orange Order further into the wider unionist community. Senior police officers 
also referred in their interviews to being conscious that when speaking to unionist 
politicians they were also speaking to members of the Orange Order. 
  The Twaddell Avenue dispute of July 2013 followed a similar pattern of 
accusation and counter accusation, similar to Whiterock 2005. The Parades 
Commission prevented three North Belfast Lodges (the Ligoniel Combine), Earl of 
Erne LOL 647, Ligoniel True Blues LOL 1932 and Ballysillan LOL 1891, from 
completing their return route past the Ardoyne shop fronts in July 2013. This area had 
already been the scene of 12th July disorder in previous years following restrictions on 
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Orange Parades and counter protests by residents groups. In July 2013 the Parades 
Commission determination went further and for the first time the lodges were 
prevented from completing the return route. Following disorder on 12th July, Sir Matt 
Baggott, the then Chief Constable of the PSNI remarked that, 
“Some of their language [Orange Order] was emotive and having called 
thousands of people to protest they had no plan and no control and rather 
than being responsible I think the word for that is reckless” (BT, 13th July 
2013).  
The Orange Order while, condemning the violence, accused PSNI command of 
intemperate language, unfair criticism, a clear operational intent to deal firmly with 
disorder and policing verging on the political (GOLI, 2013e, p. 15). 
  While recognising the limitations of the academic literature on the 
PSNI/Orange Order relationship the Orange Order’s monthly newspaper, “The 
Orange Standard” provides a deep vein of material. The content of the Standard 
serves to underline the Orange Order’s previously noted opposition to Patten, the 
PSNI’s creation and to official contact with the Parade’s Commission, (GOLI, 2002a, 
p. 1)  (GOLI, 2000e, p. 1)  (GOLI, 2000b, p. 9) (GOLI, 2004a, p. 7)   (GOLI, 2009d, 
p. 10)  (GOLI, 2000c, p. 2) (GOLI, 2000a, p. 1) (GOLI, 2005b, p. 1) (GOLI, 2006a, p. 
1) (GOLI, 2011a, p. 1) (GOLI, 2011b, p. 5).   
 Against the background of these principled objections the Orange Order 
appears to assess the PSNI, or at least its front line, as performing reasonably well 
(GOLI, 2009d, p. 18),  “The PSNI do an excellent job and deserve the full support 
and backing of all law abiding citizens” (GOLI, 2006b, p. 3). While recognising PSNI 
operational efficiency, a regular theme is PSNI’s under-resourcing, a legacy of Patten, 
(GOLI, 2004b, p. 2) (GOLI, 2009c, p. 16)  (GOLI, 2009c, p. 16)   (GOLI, 2010a, p. 
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18)  (GOLI, 2002b, p. 11)  (GOLI, 2004b, p. 2)  (GOLI, 2006b, p. 3) (GOLI, 2009b, 
p. 16) (GOLI, 2009d, p. 18).  Criticism of the front line is rare, although the Standard 
occasionally observes the lack of security afforded to isolated Orange Halls (GOLI, 
2007c, p. 1) (GOLI, 2008, p. 18), and the inability of the PSNI to detect offenders 
(GOLI, 2013c, p. 1). 
 Although the Standard is positive about front line policing, it expresses an 
increasingly negative tone about PSNI command. The criticisms do not fall into neat 
categories but reflect a view that command is a pawn of the Parades Commission and 
complicit in their anti-Orange decision making (GOLI, 2005c, p. 5) (GOLI, 2009a, p. 
4)  (GOLI, 2013b, p. 1). The comments of Robert Saulters, former Grand Master 
usefully sum up the view, 
“It is sad that the PSNI are controlled by such a bunch of misfits. 
[Parades Commission] We in the Orange Institution always did have 
respect for law and Order. However since the appointment of a new chief 
constable as an extension of the political process in Northern Ireland, it is 
plain to be seen that the position of the Chief Constable was an 
appointment made in Downing Street…. There you have it the police are 
puppets to seven members of an unelected quango” (GOLI, 2005a, p.2). 
In addition an accusation is made that PSNI command has taken a decision to 
move against the Order and the wider loyalist community. In 2007 The Orange 
Standard again commented, 
“Then we have the PSNI who replaced the RUC. The Chief Constable 
keeps telling us they are undermanned except, of course, when they want 
to wash down or beat up a few Orangemen on parade. Then he has plenty 
of personnel to deal with the situation” (GOLI, 2007a, p. 2). 
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In August 2013, the Orange Standard commenting on the summer disorder argued, 
“The police have no political role and never should have, as Northern 
Ireland is a democracy. However some of the comments from senior 
officers are coming close to the line of political comment if not actually 
crossing it. What circumstances have brought about this situation 
whereby senior police feel it is appropriate to belligerently focus on the 
Orange Order?”  (p. 15). 
They suggest PSNI’s dealings with the Orange Order have led to a loss of confidence 
among unionist and loyalist people (GOLI, 2013a, p. 16) (GOLI, 2013b, p. 1)  (GOLI, 
2013d, p. 4) (GOLI, 2014, p. 1), “The reality is that the PSNI no longer commands 
the respect of a large section of the urban Protestant community in Belfast” (GOLI, 
2014, p. 2).   While the comments should be put in the context of two difficult 
summers and a toxic situation in North Belfast they reflect a sense of frustration with 
PSNI command. The frustration is not simply with regard to operational decisions, 
but reflect a view from some that the PSNI willingly serve the Parades Commission 
and are part of an anti Orange and anti parading axis (GOLI, 2013e, p. 15). 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
 In conclusion specific consideration of the relationship between the PSNI and 
the Orange Order is largely absent in the written material. This extends also to 
detailed consideration of the RUC and RIC relationship.  There are however a number 
of important themes to draw from which provide a context for the question “What is 
the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order 
since 2001”. In addition these themes provide material from which to shape the 
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questions put to the three interview samples during the research phase.  The key 
themes are: 
• Orangeism	was	borne	out	of	sectarian	adversity	and	had	an	uneasy	relationship	with	State	and	policing	until	the	late	19th	century;	
• Policing	in	its	early-organised	form	in	Ireland	was	established	to	be	non-sectarian.		It	was	demographically	representative	of	its	community;	
• With	the	advent	of	Home	Rule	proposals	the	unionist	establishment	brought	Orangeism	into	the	mainstream	of	politics	and	increasingly	viewed	it	as	a	resource	to	maintain	the	unionist	hegemony;	
• On	partition	the	Orange	Order	gained	considerable	political	influence	and	was	able	to	rely	on	both	Government	and	police	to	maintain	their	position	and	ability	to	parade.	Policing	became	overwhelmingly	the	preserve	of	protestantism	and	unionism;	
• Direct	rule	and	military	deployments	progressively	altered	the	relationship	between	Orangeism,	the	state	and	policing.		The	RUC	and	Orange	Order	entered	into	a	complex	relationship.	On	one	side	of	this	relationship	was	increasing	confrontational	driven	by	parading	disputes	and	the	rightward	move	of	Orangeism.		On	the	other	side	of	the	relationship	was	the	emotional	tie	between	Orangeism	and	the	RUC.	The	Orange	Order	viewed	the	RUC	as	their	bulwark	against	republicanism;	
• Patten	sought	to	create	neutral	and	normal	policing	in	Northern	Ireland.	Orangeism	was	opposed	to	Patten’s	reforms	and	the	creation	of	the	PSNI.		The	ghost	of	the	RUC	would	haunt	the	relationship	between	the	PSNI	and	the	Orange	Order;	
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• Parading	would	remain	at	the	heart	of	the	relationship	between	the	PSNI	and	the	Orange	Order	against	a	background	of	increasing	loyalist	anger	and	their	failure	to	benefit	from	the	emerging	political	settlement.		
These themes and some of the key dates are depicted in the table overleaf. 
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1.11 Table 01 – The Relationship between policing and the Orange Order 
Date Key Event Significance 
1795 Formation of Orange Order Order formed as a result of sectarian conflict. Builds on 
Williamite commemorative tradition. 
1799 Unlawful Societies Act 1st Government attempt to control Orangeism and indicator of 
tensions between State, Orangeism and law and order. 
1836 Formation of Irish Constabulary (later RIC) Constabulary established as a non-sectarian force and 
representative of community. 
1850 Party Processions Act Further Government attempt to control Orangeism and 
indicator of tensions between State, Orangeism and law and 
order. 
1886 1st Home Rule Bill Orange Order began to be viewed as a political resource for 
Unionist establishment.  
1920 Formation of Ulster Special Constabulary Overwhelmingly protestant auxiliary police force. Will a to the 
protestant and unionist character of later RUC. 
1921 Partition of Ireland Creation of Government in Northern Ireland heavily influenced 
by the Orange Order and its values 
1922 Formation of Royal Ulster Constabulary Despite initial efforts becomes an overwhelmingly protestant 
force closely aligned with Stormont Government. 
1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act Far reaching legislation provided to RUC to assist maintain the 
political status quo 
1956-62 IRA Border Campaign Ill-fated terrorist campaign. Reinforces character of RUC as 
bulwark against the republicanism and the Irish republic. 
1963 Terence O’Neill becomes Prime Minister O’Neill’s reforms and curtailing of Orange parades begins to 
cause tension between Unionism and Orangeism. 
1967 Formation of Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association 
Beginning of sustained civil strife in Northern Ireland. Leads 
to further parading bans on N. Ireland impacting on Orange 
Order also and its relationship.  
1969 Military deployed to N Ireland RUC lose primacy for security and public order to military. 
1969 Hunt Report on RUC 1st police reform efforts in NI. Seek to remove paramilitary 
duties of police. Reforms not welcomed by Unionist 
Community. 
1972 Stormont prorogued. Direct rule imposed. Orange Order loses its influence in Government. Policing now 
subject to control of Secretary of State for NI. 
1974 Ulster Workers Council (UWC) Strike RUC response to loyalist strikers fails to win confidence of 
nationalist community. 
1976 RUC “Way Ahead” Report Begins process of “Ulsterisation” and return of security and 
public order primacy to police. 
1977 2nd UWC Strike RUC response to loyalist disorder robust and indication of 
growing resolve to tackle disorder from PUL community. 
1985 Anglo Irish Agreement Violent reaction from loyalism. RUC in forefront of managing 
disorder. RUC members attacked in own homes by loyalists. 
   
1985 Rioting in Obins St Portadown following RUC 
ban of Orange parade 
Strong statement of intent from RUC that they will no longer 
facilitate Orange Order parades without reference to 
community impacts and sensitivities. 
1987 New public order legislation introduced Legislation removes reference to customary parade routes and 
implied bias to Orange Order 
1995 Drumcree 01 Contentious parade Portadown. Opposed by residents groups. 
Parade facilitated following violent and protracted stand off 
between Orange Order and police. Regarded by Orange Order 
as a line in the sand.  
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1996 Drumcree 02 Contentious parade Portadown. Opposed by residents groups. 
Parade facilitated following violent and protracted stand off 
between Orange Order and police. Regarded by Orange Order 
as a line in the sand. 
1997 Drumcree 03 Contentious parade Portadown. Opposed by residents groups. 
Parade facilitated following violent and protracted stand off 
Orange Order and police. Regarded by Orange Order as a line 
in the sand. Last year parade permitted 
1998 Parades Commission comes into existence. Commission becomes responsible for decisions regarding 
parade routes and not police. Orange Order rejects the 
legitimacy of the Commission. Police become key part of 
evidence gathering process for Commission. Decisions of 
commission will become germane to relationship between 
PSNI and Orange Order. 
1998 Good Friday Agreement Begins process towards devolved Government in N Ireland. 
Loyalism increasingly at the margins of civil polity. 
1998 Drumcree 04 Parade subject to determination by Parades Commission. 
Return route denied to Orange Order.   
1998-
2015 
Weekly protests at Drumcree and annual 
application for return route. 
Violence dissipates over time. Weekly protest and annual 1st 
July parade now a set piece. 
1998 Independent Commission on Policing (Patten) 
set up.  
Begins process to create Police Service of Northern Ireland and 
neutralise and normalise policing. Orange Order rejects need 
for police reform. 
2001 Formation of Police Service of Northern Ireland PSNI formed to provide neutral and normalised policing. The 
RUC, iconic to Orangeism, is absorbed into new police 
service. 
2005 Whiterock Riots Severe disorder following Orange parade. Caused significant 
difficulties in PSNI and Orange Order relationship 
2005 PIRA decommissioning PIRA put weapons and munitions beyond use. Step towards 
acceptance of policing and justice arrangements.  
2006 St Andrew’s Agreement Effort to re-start the devolution process.  
2007 Sinn Fein sign up to policing PSNI makes strides to engage republicanism. On-going 
support of unionism loyalism is presumed. 
2010 Devolution of policing to Northern Ireland 
Assembly 
PSNI come under control of local Justice Ministry. 
2012 Flags Dispute Following Belfast City Council’s decision to flag Union flag 
on designated days outpouring of loyalist anger and protests 
Northern Ireland wide. Momentum maintained for 
approximately 6 months. Brings PSNI and loyalism into on-
going confrontation. 
2013 Parades Commission restricts return route of 12th 
July parade past Ardoyne shop fronts 
1st year return route denied to Orange Order. Significant 
disorder on 12th July 2013. Causes significant tension in PSNI 
and Orange Order relationship and becomes one of defining 
factors in relationship. 
2013- Nightly Twaddell Avenue Protests Orange Order protest Monday – Saturday regarding 2013 
decision of Parades Commission. PSNI and Orange Order in 
nightly, if set piece confrontation.  
 
 
 
 
	 59	
 
 
  
	 60	
Chapter 2 Methodology  
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter methodological issues are considered and a rationale is provided for 
the type of research undertaken. The chapter is divided into a number of sections.  
First, the aims and objectives of the research are considered and its contribution to 
knowledge. Second issues of ontology, epistemology and methodology are discussed 
and the choice of a qualitative paradigm defended. Third ethical issues are reviewed, 
including the challenges of insider research Finally the specific research method 
employed in the research grounded theory is discussed. This discussion includes 
consideration of issues such as sampling, data gathering, analysis and the strengths 
and weakness of the grounded theory approach.  
 
2.2 Research Question  
 Effective research begins with two things, a clearly formulated research 
problem, as Noakes and Wincup (2004) suggest “at its heart” (p. 14) and also a 
design. Robson (2011) suggests that “if you don’t give serious attention to the design 
of a research project you are likely to end up with a mess” (p. 4).  Bachman and 
Schutt (2001, p. 73) recognise the difficulties in formulating research questions and 
describe three steps in this process, identifying, refining and finally evaluating the 
question. Bryman (2012. P. 86) also recognises the differences between questions in 
the qualitative and quantitative contexts.  Helpfully Robson (2011, p. 62) in 
discussing what makes good research questions accepts that finding these is not a 
linear process but involves uncertainty and change during the research process. 
Following the identification of the research problem, the nature of the relationship 
between the PSNI and the Orange Order, some themes and later pilot questions were 
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developed.  The questions were based on an existing perception of the relationship, 
experience of working with the Orange Order and themes from the literature. These 
questions were then “tested” by colleagues with experience of the Orange Order and 
policing parades. This process was useful and some missing elements in the research 
were identified. At the start of the data collection process, three sets of research 
questions existed (Appendix B) Chief Constables, senior PSNI officers and Orange 
Order. Each question schedule went through a number of iterations in response to the 
research experience and also the data provided. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
Chief Constables should have been interviewed at the end of the interview process 
and the data provided by senior officers and Orangemen would have usefully 
informed these specific questions. Both practicalities and research inexperience 
prevented this.   
 
2.3 Aim and Objectives of Research 
 The aim of the research is to: 
• Critically	review	the	literature	pertaining	to	the	relationship	between	the	police	(RIC,	RUC	&	PSNI)	and	the	Orange	Order	in	an	effort	to	identify	themes	and	issues	to	inform	the	data	gathering	and	analysis	processes;	
• Examine	the	relationship	between	the	Police	Service	of	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Orange	Order	in	Northern	Ireland	by	conducting	interviews	with	senior	members	of	both	organisations	and	critically	analysing	the	data	in	the	manner	of	grounded	theory.	
The objective of the research is to 
• Make	recommendations	on	the	basis	of	the	data	gathered	to	both	the	Police	Service	of	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Orange	Order.	These	
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recommendations	will	be	framed	to	allow	the	Police	Service	of	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Orange	Order	examine	their	existing	relationship	constructively.	
  
2.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
 The literature reviews highlights the extensive academic consideration of 
policing issues and to a lesser extent unionist parading in the Irish context. It also 
highlights the absence of any academic reflection on the issue of the police 
relationship with the Orange Order, both RUC and PSNI. This research aims to fill 
the gap in knowledge and could prove to be the first study of this significant 
relationship in Northern Ireland. This is a relationship that is arguably critical to the 
maintenance of the peace process while also retaining the confidence of unionism in 
policing and justice arrangements. While it is not possible to be definitive, it is the 
researcher’s view that this research uniquely captures the views of the PSNI’s 
permanent chief constables from 2002 until today in a single place. Equally the 
researcher is not aware of another study that captures to such a degree the voices of 
both senior PSNI officers and senior members of the Orange Order.  
 
2.5 Identifying a Research Paradigm 
Although aware of its critics (Diefenbach, 2009, p. 876 & 877) (Bryman, 
2012, p. 405) a qualitative (Noakes & Wincup, 2004, p. 6) (Tewksbury, 2009, p. 39) 
(Feilzer, 2010, p. 6) paradigm  (Bennett, 2004, p. 9) (Feilzer, 2010, p.7).  (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994, p.108)  (Hagan, 2009, p. 8) was chosen to carry out the research.  The 
choice between a quantitative (Noakes & Wincup, 2004, p .5)  (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994, p. 8) (Worrall, 2000, p. 354) (Robson, 2011, p. 18) (Di Cristina, 1997, p. 186) 
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and qualitative paradigm was made on the basis of the author’s understanding of the 
ontological, epistemological, and methodological features of each paradigm and an 
assessment of which paradigm would most effectively meet the research aims.  In 
choosing a qualitative paradigm it is recognised that the paradigm is not simply 
characterised due to its under-estimated complexity (DiCristina, 1997, p. 187) and 
breadth (Denzin, 2009, p. 140 & 142) (Bryman, 2012, p. 383)  (Sandeleowski, 2003, 
p. 334) (Dey, 2003, p. 1).   
It is understood that the qualitative paradigm broadly represents a relativist 
ontology where reality is viewed as a social construction (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 
111) in contrast to the positivism (Noakes & Wincup, 2004, p. 26) or post positivism 
(Robson, 2011, p. 22) of the quantitative paradigm.  Knowledge (epistemology) is 
transactional  (Bennett, 2004, p. 100) and is influenced by the researcher (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 111).  Qualitative research has a dialectic or dialogical methodology 
and employs a deductive logic (Bachman & Schutt, 2004, p. 51).  It begins with 
specific data, which are used to develop a general explanation or theory to account for 
the data (Bachman & Schutt, 2004, p. 51).  This methodological approach has 
generated an extensive menu of research options (Wincup & King, 2000, p.30) (Jupp, 
Francis & Davis, 2000, p. 57) (Pogrebin 2003, p. 4) (Robson, 2011, p. 135) (Bennett, 
2004, p. 5) (Punch, 1994, p. 85).  
 Without wishing to crudely summarise the paradigms, the quantitative 
approach suggested a study based on a real reality that could be neutrally discovered 
on the basis of a theory to test.  Conversely, the qualitative paradigm proposed an 
approach where reality was mediated by some form of historical, social or personal 
context; its discovery was influenced by the researcher and led to the development of 
a theory or ideas.  In the context of a study of a relationship between two 
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organisations which is mediated and influenced by a large number of individuals and 
has a rich and complex history, the central planks of the quantitative paradigm did not 
resonate as an approach that would reach the heart of this very human issue.  
Tewksbury (2009, p. 56) summarises his qualitative preference by describing it as the 
“ballet line” where interpretation and emotion are valued above quantitative “line 
dancing” where a routine is followed to deliver a product. Although a comment for 
effect possibly, in the context of this research project it is a useful distinction. The 
choice of a qualitative methodology was not made on the basis of “methodological 
fundamentalism”  (Denzin, Lincoln & Giardina, 2011, p. 770). 
 
2.6 Ethical Issues 
 Similar to a variety of views existing regarding the meaning of both research 
paradigms, the world of ethics is also conflicted (Shaw, 2003, p. 13). Ethical 
principles in the social sciences emanated from those “formulated for biomedical 
research” (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, p. 262). As the particular ethical challenges of 
the social sciences have become apparent (Orb, Eisenhauer, & Wynaden, 2001, p. 93) 
a distinctive ethical voice has been sought for these disciplines There are however 
some ethical considerations central to both the quantitative and qualitative 
approaches, chiefly an intention to avoid harm. Guillemin & Gillam (2004) describe 
this as an “absolutely basic consideration” (p. 272). Orb et al (2001), write, “ethics 
pertains to doing good and avoiding harm” (p. 93). 
A range of ethical models exists and this research is governed by the 
University’s Code. It was guided by the overlapping principles (Robley, 1995 p. 46) 
of avoiding harm, securing informed consent, preventing invasion of privacy and 
transparency (Bryman, 2012, p. 135). These principles were adhered to by ensuring 
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both PSNI and Orange Order gave permission for the research on the basis of full 
disclosure of the author’s intentions and role as a serving PSNI officer. Permission 
was also sought and documented at the start of each interview and issues of 
anonymity were discussed. Some interviewees were content to go “on the record.” 
However strict anonymity was maintained and references to rank, role and geographic 
location removed. The inclusion of this information would have been interesting, 
particularly in localising some challenging aspects of the PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship, but it presented an unacceptable risk to the disclosure of identity. 
Interviewees were also alerted to the possibility of inadvertent disclosure due to the 
relatively small size of the senior ranks of both bodies.  
 Three Chief Constables were interviewed at the outset of the research. It was 
felt by the researcher it would be impossible to anonymise this data as the sample was 
small and very specific.  Interviews were carried out therefore on the basis of full 
disclosure of identity.  In two cases requests were made to view the chapter in 
advance of submission and this request was acceded to.  
 In terms of minimising harm to participants there was no particular concern 
regarding individual harm being caused. All of the participants were able to provide 
informed consent and capable of risk assessing participation in the project. Equally 
they are all to some extent public figures and used to managing the particular risks of 
public life in Northern Ireland. The greater harm issue, which became apparent as the 
research progressed, and reinforces the point that ethics is not a one-off process 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 199), was whether the research might undermine the relationship 
between the PSNI and the Orange Order, de-stabilise the parading environment and 
create conflict. Equally the researcher as a then District Commander needed to 
maintain a locally effective relationship with the Orange Order. The author has 
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engaged in senior level discussions with the PSNI as to how these wider risks might 
be managed and the research form the basis of constructive dialogue. There is an 
appetite in PSNI for constructive engagement with the Orange Order and it could be 
that this research will provide a stepping-stone towards this objective.  
The above ethical considerations reminded the researcher of the particular 
dilemmas (Coghlan & Holihan, 2007, p. 6) faced as an “insider researcher” (Drake, 
2010, p. 85) (Hellawell, 2006, p. 484) and some of the opposition to this practice 
(Brannick & Cohglan, 2007, p. 59).  As an insider there was the huge benefit of ready 
access to senior colleagues that arguably may not have been extended to outsiders. 
This benefit had to be weighed against two particular risks. The first risk as a senior 
member of PSNI was subjectivity and an inability to be appropriately distant from the 
organisation (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009, p. 55) (Taylor, 2011, p. 14). The second was a 
temptation to be risk averse in research because of a need to maintain a constructive 
relationship with an employer at the end of the research, especially in a disciplined 
context and indeed also a relationship with the Orange Order. On balance and while 
alert to the temptations referred to above, what is assumed to be unparalleled access to 
senior ranks in the PSNI outweighed those risks and has allowed the research to make 
a greater contribution to knowledge than might otherwise have been the case. Equally 
while an outsider to the Orange Order, the researcher’s position as a PSNI insider 
undoubtedly facilitated access to that organisation.  
 
2.7 Data Sample   
At the outset of the research the author had in mind a discreet sample for PSNI 
interviewees based on rank, role, experience and geography. There was less initial 
clarity regarding what might constitute an equivalent sample for Orange Order 
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interviewees.  This clarity was provided during a discussion with the Grand Secretary 
of the Orange who usefully proposed a particular group that broadly “matched “ the 
PSNI sample on the basis of rank, role, experience and geography. A total of 9 
Orange Order interviews took place and 13 PSNI interviews. A small number of 
Orange Order interviewees fell outside the initially proposed group. 
The constraints imposed by ensuring the anonymity of the participants make 
detailed discussion of the sample groups impossible. However it is possible to make 
some general observations about both the PSNI and Orange Order interviewees. The 
police officer interviewees are overwhelmingly male and from the Protestant and 
unionist community. Other than in one case they have all served in both the RUC and 
the PSNI and have in excess of 20 years service. They have all attained senior rank. 
The author recognises “senior” is an imprecise term but anonymity prevents further 
clarification. All of the police interviewees have held territorial command at points in 
their careers.  The Orange Order interviewees are all male and from the protestant and 
unionist community. They have been members of the Orange Order, including its 
junior branch, for a minimum of 35 years. All have attained senior rank within a 
variety of Orange Order structures and at time of interview retained these senior 
positions. All are members of at least one other loyal order. None have served in the 
PSNI, although 5 served in what were referred to during the Troubles as the “security 
forces.” 
 
2.8 Data Analysis and Grounded Theory 
Similar to other methodological issues a variety of data analysis approaches 
are possible (Dey, 2003, p. 1). Bryman and Burgess (2002) refer to Tesch’s (1991) 
distinctions in analysis (p. 6) and Srivastava and Hopwood (2009), refer to Miles and 
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Huberman’s (1984) assertion that “we have few agreed on canons for qualitative data 
analysis” (p. 77).  A grounded theory approach has been chosen to analyse the data 
and answer the question “What is the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange 
Order since 2001.”  The choice was not made on the basis of “methodological 
fundamentalism”  
Grounded theory remains a popular method for the analysis of qualitative data, 
although some conflict and confusion exists regarding its use. Bryman (2012), among 
others (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1466), suggests “there is little doubt there is considerable 
confusion currently about the nature of grounded theory” (p. 575).  In reaction to what 
was perceived as lack of rigour in qualitative research (Glaser & Strauss, 1995, p. 14), 
extreme positivism (Suddaby, 2006, p. 633), the sociological stance prevalent in the 
1960s, (Robson, 2011, p. 147), and the “embarrassing gap between theory and 
empirical research” (Glaser & Strauss, 1995, p. vii) Glaser and Strauss devised 
grounded theory underpinned by pragmatism and social interactionism (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990, p. 419).  Although they later apparently disagreed over its application 
(Suddaby, 2006, p. 638) (Robson, 2011, p. 147)  (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1483) grounded 
theory is credited by some as rescuing social theory (Glaser, 2002, p. 34).  
In essence a grounded theory is one that is induced from the data as opposed 
to preceding it. Cutliffe (2000) quotes Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) own definition of a 
grounded theory 
“A theory that will fit the situation and being researched and work when 
put into use. By fit we mean that the categories must be readily (not 
forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data under study: by work we 
mean that they must be meaningfully relevant and be able to explain the 
data under study. It is rooted in symbolic interactionism, wherein the 
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researcher attempts to determine what symbolic meanings, artefacts, 
clothing gestures and words have for groups of people as they interact 
with one another” (p. 1477). 
Grounded theory has a number of key features. It starts for many grounded 
theory exponents (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1479) with a recognition of the importance of the 
researcher in the research process, the requirement for reflexivity as data is gathered, 
interpreted and analysed  (Suddaby, 2006, p. 640), and an acknowledgment of the 
researcher’s prior understanding of the research area (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1479).  There 
is less agreement about the place of the literature review in grounded theory, even 
among the architects of the method.  Cutliffe (2000 p. 1480) outlines the various 
positions taken and contrasts the views, for example of Lincoln & Guba (1985), who 
advocate no literature review prior to data collection and Hutchinson (1993) who 
suggests that a literature review should precede data collection. Cutliffe  (2000) also 
refers to a third approach where the literature review is a two stage process, an initial 
review for the researcher to become sensitive to the concepts and a further review of a 
different corpus of material at the concept development stage.    
Sampling in grounded theory is described as either purposive (Robson, 2011, 
p. 148) or theoretical (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 420) (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1477). In 
neither description of the approach is there any notion of creating a random sample. 
Interviewees are chosen by the researcher to assist in the development of theory. The 
number of interviewees, the “how many” (Sherman & Strang, 2004, p. 215), is 
determined not by an arbitrary figure but a sample is considered to be complete when 
new interviewees  “are saying nothing new about the concepts being explored” 
(Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1477). Data gathering is typically, but not exclusively by means of 
interview (Robson, 2011, p. 149) (Bryman, 2012, p. 148). One of the few areas of 
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consensus in grounded theory is its iterative nature, data gathering and analysis is not 
a linear process, although the results may be presented sequentially (Suddaby, 2006, 
p. 637).  Weuetherick (2010) in reviewing Anslem and Strauss  (2008) quotes their 
description of grounded theory’s iterative nature “research is a continuous process of 
data collection, followed by analysis and memo writing, leading to questions, that 
lead to more data collection, and so on”  (p. 1). Others describe the research process 
as one of “constant comparison”  (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1488) (Robson, 2011, p. 489). 
Robson suggests this approach where the researcher makes several visits to the field 
to collect data, which is then analysed while further data is gathered until categories 
of analysis are saturated, is close to the dialogic process of the hermeneutic tradition 
(Robson, 2011, p. 148).  
There is also a degree of consensus regarding the process of data analysis in 
grounded theory. Similar to other qualitative approaches (Basit, 2004, p. 144) data is 
analysed in grounded theory by coding (Bryman & Burgess, 2002, p. 4). A three stage 
coding process is advocated, open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Corbin 
& Strauss, 1990, p. 423). The purpose of coding is to discover first concepts in the 
data and then develop the concepts into categories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 420) 
(Allen, 2003, p. 3) (Glaser, 2002, p. 24) (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1482). Robson (2011) 
neatly describes the coding process. During open coding the researcher splits the data 
into discreet parts and asks the question “What is this piece of data an example of?” 
(p. 489). It is essentially an interpretive process as opposed to summarising (p. 490). 
In axial coding the data that had been “effectively split apart” (p. 490) is put back 
together into categories. In the final stage, selective coding, a core category is created, 
“the central phenomenon around which the categories from the axial coding are 
integrated” (p. 491). This coding process leads to the creation of theory,  
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“Whereas other forms of qualitative analysis may legitimately ‘stop’ at 
the levels of description or simple interpretation, the aim of grounded 
theory is theoretical development” (Lacey & Luff, 2007, p. 10). 
As with any other research method grounded theory is discussed both in terms 
of its benefits and limitations. Those who advocate its use maintain it is a rigorous 
method (Glaser, 2002, p. 23) that has “rescued”  (34) social theory by that rigour and 
it allows the researcher to transcend the merely descriptive (p. 24). Corbyn and 
Strauss (1990 p. 420) describe grounded theory, as a method of “great discovery” 
made effective by the early analysis of data.  Robson (2011) refers to four particular 
strengths of the approach. First it provides explicit procedures for theory generation, 
second it is flexible while remaining systematic, third it is especially useful in applied 
areas of research and finally a wide range of exemplars exist of the method to assist 
the researcher (p. 147).  
 In terms of the limitations of grounded theory some, for example, point to the 
inherent difficulty of applying grounded theory well (Suddaby, 2006, p. 639) and its 
frequent misapplication (Glaser, 2002, p. 32). Bryman (2012) argues that “in spite of 
the frequency with which it is cited and the frequent lip service paid to it grounded 
theory is not without its limitations” (p. 574), which he then proceeds to articulate. 
First he argues that neutral observation, the requirement to suspend awareness of 
relevant theories  (p. 574) until a late stage in the research process is unrealistic and 
ignores the benefits that an awareness of  “existing conceptualisations” can provide to 
the researcher. Second that the method of constant comparison is made difficult due 
to the volume of data a researcher is required to analyse (p. 574). Third Bryman, 
among others (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1466) suggests that despite the corpus of material 
relating to grounded theory it remains in part ill defined (p. 574). He writes “there is 
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little doubt that there is considerable confusion currently about the nature of grounded 
theory” (p. 575). This lack of definition in the approach is compounded by the 
number of variants of grounded theory (p. 575). Bryman also argues that the coding 
approach can lead to the data losing its context (p. 575). Finally although Bryman 
accepts that many of the core processes of grounded theory have been “hugely 
influential” (p. 575) he also maintains “it is somewhat doubtful whether grounded 
theory in many instances really results in theory” (p.574). Robson (2011) refers to the 
various “challenges” to grounded theory coming from “the neighbouring fields of 
anthropology and cultural studies” (p. 492). 
Conscious of the suggestion that many researchers pay lip service to the 
notion of grounded theory, it is important to set out its application in this study. First 
the place of the author (Cutliffe, 2000, p. 1479 is acknowledged in the work not as a 
neutral bystander but as someone who brings to the research a previous knowledge of 
both the PSNI and the Orange Order, and a professional involvement with both 
organisations. Second a literature review was completed prior to the collection of data 
and data analysis. It is acknowledged that the place of the literature review in 
grounded theory is a contested issue. Dunne (2011, p. 113) says, “Within the field of 
grounded theory research, the use of existing literature represents a polemical and 
divisive issue, which continues to spark debate.”  The argument against a literature 
review in advance of data gathering and analysis is that it might prevent the natural 
emergence of categories, uninhibited by “extant theoretical frameworks” (Dunne, 
2011, p. 114) from the data. While not entirely dismissing this argument the author 
felt on balance that a full review of the literature provided a surer foundation upon 
which to base an exploration of the issues and formulation of the research questions. 
It is also case that as the research was novel, and as discussed in the literature review 
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there was no material to draw on which directly answered the question of the nature 
of the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order since 2001 there was less 
of a risk that the data analysis would be inhibited by the “extant theoretical 
frameworks” referred to above. Third sampling was more purposive (Robson, 2011, 
p. 148) than theoretical (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 420). Interviewees were 
purposely chosen on the basis of their positions in either the PSNI or the Orange 
Order. There is no notion of randomness in the sample.   
Fourth, the method of data gathering was interview (Robson, 2011, p. 149) 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 148), specifically semi structured interview (Robson, 2011, p.285), 
as opposed to the focus group approach Bachman & Schutt, 2011, p. 253) 
(Sandelowski, 2000, p. 338), structured interview Robson, 2011, p. 283) or 
unstructured interview (Bryman, 1984, p.78).  A semi-structured approach to 
interviewing was chosen on the basis that it would allow for an exploration of the 
issues with a degree of freedom but on the basis of a prompt of issues worthy of 
consideration. This approach is not without critics (Myers & Newman, 2007, p. 4) 
(Lillis, 1999, p. 84). Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed in full on the 
author’s behalf by two individuals who signed confidentiality agreements. The use of 
an analytic survey for the “why questions” (Oppenheim, 1992, p.12) was dismissed 
principally due to the challenges of response rates, and the inability to probe written 
responses (Barriball, 1994, p. 331).  
Fifth the data analysis process was not a linear one. Transcripts were reviewed 
on production in an effort to identify early themes in the research and the process of 
“constant comparison” (Cutliffe,  2000, p. 1488)  was begun.  The early analysis of 
the data also allowed for the suites of questions to be developed as the research 
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process progressed.  Six iterations of the questions for police interviewees were 
produced and four for the Orange Order interviewees.  
Finally data was coded manually, the author is aware that coding can also be 
managed by a number of software applications. Open coding, the splitting of data into 
discreet parts and the creation of initial concepts, was completed by using hand 
written tables that ground the data into gobbets. The axial coding was carried out by 
using type written tables that identified “detail” and “ themes” leading to the creation 
of  concepts in the research.  The final stage of the coding process, selective coding,  
where core categories are created to integrate the results of the axial coding was 
completed in a review of the tables produced for the axial coding process and core 
categories created as set out in the final presentation of the data. The grounded theory 
developed was more in the manner of what Bryman  (2012) describes as “substantive” 
(p. 574) in that it pertains to a specific social phenomena, the relationship between the 
PSNI and the Orange Order as opposed to a broader range of phenomena 
 
2.9 Conclusion  
One of the many contested areas of the methodological debate is that of the validity 
and reliability of research. Validity is about whether research is true and credible and  
not anecdotal (Silverman, 2013 p. 10).  Reliability is about whether another researcher 
using the same methods would draw the same conclusions.  Potentially because one 
of the criticisms of qualitative research is that lacks standard means of assessing either 
validity or reliability, in contrast to fixed design, (Robson, 2011, p. 154), some 
qualitative researchers have sought to differentiate the quality criteria for their work 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 394).  The rights and wrongs of this particular debate aside, the 
methodological choices made in this research have been to deliver a credible and 
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transparent product. Research choices have not been made due to methodological 
fundamentalism” but a conviction this study is better explained by a qualitative 
paradigm and method that creates “rich description”  (Bryman, 1984, p. 79 ) and 
allows theory to develop from the data. 
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Chapter 3 The Chief Constables 
3.1 Introduction 
During the 14 years of the PSNI’s existence (Switzier, C & Graham, B., 2009, p. 154) 
6 people have held Chief Constable rank.  Four held the rank substantively, Sir 
Ronnie Flanagan, Sir Hugh Orde, Sir Matt Baggott and the current incumbent, George 
Hamilton. Colin Cramphorn and Judith Gillespie held the rank temporarily. Of the 
four substantive Chiefs, Flanagan’s tenure was shortest. He oversaw the critical 
transition period between the RUC and the PSNI and the implementation, particularly, 
of the symbolic changes outlined in the Patten Report (Murphy, 2015, p. 20). Murphy 
(2015) describes Flanagan  as a personally significant figure for the RUC/PSNI who 
gave the organisation in transition a path to follow which “while difficult was still 
perceivable” (p.122).  It was Flanagan’s successors however who shaped the PSNI. 
These three Chief Constables have set the tone of the PSNI’s relationship with the 
Orange Order and held command at significant points in this relationship. 
The researcher although uncertain as to whether his request for interviews 
would be granted was pleased to be given easy access to Chief Constables Orde, 
Baggott and Hamilton. The interview of Orde took place during the last days of his 
presidency of  the Association of Chief Police Officers. Baggott’s interview was 
undertaken on his final day in PSNI.  Anonymity was discussed at the commencement 
of each interview. It was suggested to each Chief Constable that their comments 
should be attributable. Aside from the attraction of capturing the Chief Constables’ 
views publicly the proposal recognised that anonymising the responses would have 
been impossible. The proposal was accepted. 
Due to time constraints the Orde and Baggott interviews took place prior to  
other data collection. Although the data gathered from these interviews is valuable, 
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the interviews could have proved to be richer if undertaken at a later stage in the 
process and with the benefit of reflection on the material provided later by senior 
PSNI officer and Orange Order interviews. The researcher was also “finding his feet” 
as an interviewer and the style and manner of questioning was less incisive and 
consistent than it later became. The questions asked of Hamilton differ as they draw 
on his experience as a career RUC/PSNI officer. This interview also benefitted from 
coming at the end of the data collection. 
The interviews ranged over a number of issues relating to the PSNI and 
Orange Order relationship. Particular issues discussed included:  
1) What the English Chief Constables knew of the Orange Order on appointment;  
2) What the Chief Constables perceived the Orange Order stood for; 
 3) Their level of contact with the Orange Order and the importance they 
attributed to that relationship;  
4) Their general assessment of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship;  
5) Their impressions of Orange Order leadership;  
6) The rural and urban “divide” in orangeism;  
7) The impact of the Parades Commission on the PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship; 
8) The “Greening” of the PSNI (British-Irish, 2013).  
 
3.2 Prior Understanding and Knowledge of Orange Order 
Although the question was not asked the author was aware neither Orde nor 
Baggott were members of the Orange Order. That would have been a matter of public 
record on appointment. Equally while the issue of  faith was not raised, it is known 
Baggott holds evangelical Christian convictions (BCN, 2010).  Orde’s religious 
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background is not known but it is believed his views are either private or religion has 
not been a feature of his life. A comment made during the interview reinforced this 
suspicion (p. 4). It would not be unusual to be aware of the “church going” status of 
colleagues in PSNI. 
The matter of Orange Order membership and community background was 
explicitly discussed with  George Hamilton. Hamilton has never been a member of 
the Orange Order (p. 1). He describes himself as coming “from a Protestant 
community” (p. 1). At times during the interview Hamilton referred to his own faith 
as “personal” and reflected on what he perceived to be the relationship between faith 
and Orange membership (p. 1).  In the case of Orde and Baggott, there was nothing to 
suggest in their backgrounds either a positive or negative disposition towards the 
Orange Order. Equally there was little in Hamilton’s “Protestant” background or 
“personal faith” that would point to a predisposition for or against the Orange Order 
despite being a  Protestant male with distant familial connections to the Orange Order 
(p. 1) Hamilton’s background was broadly consistent with that of many of the police 
interviewees and the overwhelmingly protestant RUC he joined in 1985 (Brewer 
1991, p. 246).  
 The issue of Orde and Baggott’s prior knowledge of the Orange Order on 
appointment was explored. In both cases this was proved to be very limited and 
reflected the reality of other priorities for both chief officers on appointment, 
managing the Patten reforms for Hugh Orde and the resurgent dissident threat for 
Baggott. It also reflected what will be referred to later as the cyclical nature of the 
relationship policing and the Orange Order where crisis plays such a large part in 
determining that relationship. Orde was appointed in 2002 as the Drumcree situation 
was beginning to stabilise and Baggott in 2009, four years after Whiterock, and before 
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parading issues in North Belfast would become so challenging. Orde refers to an 
“overall awareness” (p. 1) of orangeism gained partly through his two years as a 
member of the Stevens Enquiry team (ACPO, 2011) and a passing interest in parading 
(p. 2).  Baggott reflected a similar lack of prior knowledge of orangeism, despite also 
having some previous professional exposure to Northern Ireland (p. 1). He suggested 
that he had to learn about the Orange Order  “on the hoof” (p. 1). 
 In addition to both Orde and Baggott’s limited prior knowledge of orangeism 
the Orange Order did not form part of their pre or early briefing. Orde talks about 
being briefed on the “money” (p. 2) and full briefing on the “Patten reforms and all 
that stuff” but no briefing on orangeism, 
“…the Orange in a way were just a law abiding, broadly law abiding, 
group of people who would not strategically cause me any particular 
issue” (p. 3). 
Baggott’s experience was similar and, like Orde, the lack of pre-briefing did not 
surprise him, as the “big issues at the time” were “dissident republicanism and 
resources” (p. 4). He suggested that orangeism did not “feature at all really on my 
briefings or indeed my strategic priorities.” (p. 3) and “there was a degree of 
optimism that to some extent the parades were starting to look after themselves (p. 4). 
He added in an echo of Reiner 1992 (p. 228), 
“My assessment was it was not on the radar of those that briefed me 
before I came here at all... Because the big threats for me were actually an 
upsurge in dissident republican terrorism and secondly the need to get 
the PSNI back to being sufficiently resilient to deal with that and prepare 
for the future”  (p. 3). 
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3.3 What Does Orangeism Mean? 
The researcher was keen to understand how the three Chief Constables viewed 
the Orange Order. Specifically if they understood orangeism in the same way the 
Orange Order does, as a religious fraternity (Manchester Orange, ND) or whether 
there was any fundamental rub between the Chief Constable’s understanding of 
Orangeism and the Order’s stated position.  No such fundamental disconnect was 
present but interestingly both Baggott and Hamilton expressed difficulties of 
reconciling certain aspects of Orangeism with their personal religious views. A view 
that was also expressed by some of the senior PSNI interviewees and at least 
considered by some Orange Order respondents as they accounted for the differences 
between rural and urban orangeism . 
Orde in his explanation returned to the theme of his limited knowledge and 
accepted that his interpretation was likely to be seen as “narrow” (p. 2). He described 
the Orange Order in historical terms, “a tradition going back to 1690” or “linking their 
tradition to 1690” (p. 2) and regarded it as “fiercely supportive of the Union” (p. 2). 
Orde also referred to the importance of the parading tradition (p. 2). Although the 
matter was not addressed specifically with Baggott he did in his interview register a 
difficulty with reconciling aspects of the behaviour of individual lodges and members 
with Orangeism’s christian claims,  
“And not so much as the Chief Constable, but as a Christian I have 
sometimes difficulty reconciling what is the biblical message about being 
under authority in the gospels.  So you're under authority, whether that's 
a Roman authority….. You may not like it but actually you are under 
authority here and the authority is the Parades Commission and the law.  
So any breaches of that is difficult to reconcile what that means and 
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secondly you know the way that people behave in terms of gentleness, 
sincerity, impartiality all those biblical statements from the Book of 
James, it's difficult for me to reconcile with some of the behaviour” (p. 
10). 
 Unsurprisingly Hamilton gave a fuller description of orangeism. He first 
described its role as “upholding the unionist identity” and later described Orange 
parading as the “public manifestation of the attempt to uphold a Protestant unionist 
tradition and identity” (p. 2). What was interesting was his subsequent assessment, not 
unlike that of Baggott’s of some “disconnect” (p. 1) between the religious claims of 
the Orange Order and his experience of them. He described the Orange Order more in 
terms of “community and identity and politics, rather than religion” (p. 1), while 
recognising orangeism being “anchored in the reformed faith”  (p. 3). 
 
3.4 Nature and Type of Contact with the Orange Order 
 The discussion turned to an examination of the amount and type of contact the 
Chief Constables experienced with the Orange Order and whether this contact was 
event driven or part of a process of strategic engagement.  In terms of amount of 
contact, variations become quickly apparent and reflected what was previously 
described as the operational priorities facing each Chief Officer. It also reflected, in 
Orde and Baggott’s tenure a lack of a strategy for engagement with the Orange Order 
until crisis points were reached.  Orde had  a hands-off approach to formal meetings 
with the Orange Order. He said “they certainly came to see me…I certainly remember 
meeting them fairly early on.” But equally that “they were not a group that sought 
many audiences” (p. 3). However he did recognise, as do the senior PSNI 
interviewees,  that the Orange Order had a long reach. and when he met PUL 
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stakeholders, it was inevitable that one of their number belonged to the Order, “One 
would meet people, members of the Orange Order all over the place” (p. 3). He also 
referred to informal meetings with the Orange Order describing these as “quiet 
conversations that I always said I would never compromise” (p. 5). The content of 
Orde’s formal meetings with the Orange Order were not discussed in detail but he 
alluded to their  nature, 
“. and I think a lot of people when I took over were quite angry, not that 
I’d taken over, they were in that mode where the Patten reforms, the 
peace process, the Belfast Agreement was seen as winners and losers.  
And I think the Orange would have seen themselves on the losing side of 
that, so I still sense quite a lot of angry, people were angry, not of the 
police necessarily, but of all the reforms” (p. 4). 
Baggott’s early experience of the Orange hierarchy differed from Orde’s less 
in terms of meeting frequency than content. The Orange Order sought out Baggott 
“very quickly” (p. 2). Their message to him proved to be concerned with their 
religious and cultural standpoint. This particular message was likely given in the 
knowledge of Baggott’s religious convictions, he described them as being initially 
“supportive” (p. 3) in those initial meetings and seeking to educate him about “what 
they stood for and their Christian heritage” (p. 2). As with Orde, at least in the early 
part of his tenure, Baggott’s meetings with the Orange Order were infrequent and no 
commitment was given to the Orange Order (p. 3) in terms of access.  However as 
issues concerning parading, flags and protest came to the fore from December 2012 
onwards, a crisis point was reached, levels of contact with the Order increased. As 
attempts were made to manage relationships with the PUL community during periods 
of increasing strain he noted that contact with the Orange Order became “more 
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regularised because of the disagreements and disputes particularly last year during the 
flag protests” (p. 3). 
Baggott was later to refer to “proactive” efforts to engage with the Orange 
Order and the adoption of a more strategic approach to engagement than had existed 
before, 
“I met with the Order at a very senior level on a number of occasions last 
year and this year and that will carry on with my successor.  So we have 
opened a door to meet with them to explain what we are doing and what 
we would ask them to help us with, and basically also to listen to some of 
their concerns” (p. 6). 
 While Hamilton has been in office for a relatively short period (p. 1) he 
outlined a more strategic approach to the Orange Order than either Orde or Baggott 
had adopted and an effort to involve himself personally in high-level discussions. He 
described that he initiated this process as one of  Baggott’s assistant chief constables 
(p. 2) in the summer of 2013  and  that in the first seven months of his appointment he 
had already met with “various senior officials from the Grand Orange Lodge” (p. 2) 
formally since becoming Chief, including the Grand Master. He described the 
rationale for formalising meetings with the Orange Order in the following terms,   
“That summer (2013) became quite troublesome and before the end of 
July I got agreement from the then Chief Constable that we would 
attempt to have engagement at a very strategic level between the PSNI 
and the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland.  And that was really the start of 
it”  (p. 3) 
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3.5 The Orange Order as Priority 
 Having discussed issues of the frequency and nature of contact with the 
Orange Order, the interviews considered what on-going importance the Chief 
Constables attached to the Orange Order. It was clear that the importance the three 
Chief Constables ascribed to the Orange Order varied. It is also the case that the 
importance of the Orange Order has increased across the tenure of the three Chief 
Constables and that is linked less to the involving the Orange Order and the PUL 
community more widely.  
 Orde did not ascribe a specific importance to Orange Order and there is little 
sense that his initial impression of the Orange Order as “a law abiding, broadly law 
abiding group of people who would not strategically cause me any particular issues” 
changed (p. 3). Though he also said, “one of the issues around the Orange really was 
the fact it was vulnerable to being hijacked. If you think of the riots of 2005, for 
example, that wasn’t anything to do with the Orange” (p. 3).  He summed up the 
priority issue as follows, 
“I don’t think I had an order of priority, the learning here is it’s good to 
talk and it’s good to talk to anybody who wants to make a difference to 
policing, which is the mantra I adopted very early on” (p. 5). 
Later Orde touched on what he perceived as the diminishing importance of the 
Orange Order. He described it as an “ageing organisation” (p. 11) and further as “not 
on its last legs but certainly getting smaller and older and one could argue therefore 
less relevant” (p. 23), a theme that will later be reflected by some senior PSNI 
officers.  His perception of the Orange Order  becoming “less relevant”  to the people 
the PSNI were policing was based on a view that it did not speak  for what he 
described as the “fractured and disenfranchised” (p. 20) loyalist working class. 
	 86	
Hamilton’s response was couched in terms of what he described as a 
“stakeholder analysis”  (p. 5). He described the Orange Order as “high interest, low 
influence” while recognising their significance as a policing stakeholder (p. 6). His 
assessment of the “low influence” of the Orange Order was based on three factors, 
first its limited influence in political unionism (p. 6), second the challenges the 
Orange Order leadership faces in exerting “much influence over the membership” (p. 
6) and finally a “generational shift” in Northern Ireland which is  reflected in a 
reduced interest in politics and the loyal orders generally (p. 6). He attributes their 
“high interest” to the policing of parades, and protest activity and all of that” (p. 6).  
 
3.6 The Organisational Relationship 
 Baggott and Hamilton were asked for their assessment of the PSNI and 
Orange Order relationship at the organisational level. Both pointed to a relationship 
that had a number of complexities and contrasted what they saw as the difference 
between the operational/tactical relationship. The tactical relationship was broadly 
positive with a clear focus on managing parades that were not contentious. The 
organisational relationship, in contrast had a number of challenges.  
 Baggott when accounting for  the organisational relationship and how it has 
changed during his tenure identified “tension” (p. 5) as characterising the relationship 
particularly towards the latter years. He cited two reasons for the tension. The first 
was  a reduction in the Orange Order’s influence politically. He said “I think the role 
of the Order in political life has become dissipated and reduced” (p. 6) . The second 
reason he provided was a perception that Orange Order causes had become connected 
with the wider concerns of the PUL community and paramilitarism particularly in 
Belfast, “But in Belfast where it has become connected, for whatever reason, with 
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other bands, with paramilitaries and the cause is bigger than simply one of an Orange 
Order” (p. 6).  While he expressed some confidence for the future of the relationship 
and denied it was a wholly reactive relationship (p. 15) he did acknowledge the 
importance of events in determining the organisational relationship  including the 
2014 Parades Commission determination on the Belfast 12th July parade, which he 
suggested,  
“will no doubt set the tone for the following year in terms of relationships 
and conversations and those sorts of things.  So we'll wait and see what 
events might do” (p. 14).  
In contrast to this organisational tension Baggott accepted that in many places 
the relationship between the PSNI and Orange Order had “never been better” (p. 7) 
and recognised that  “a huge amount of effort has gone into trying locally to make 
sure that there is an opportunity for constructive dialogue” (p. 15).  Hamilton 
similarly assessed that what he described  as the “tactical relationship” relationship as 
“probably quite close” (p. 7) one that is characterised by pragmatism (p. 7) and a 
mutual desire to get “the job done” (p. 7).  
Hamilton contrasted this mutually reliant tactical relationship with the 
strategic level engagement that he described in terms of challenge. He articulated this 
challenge in terms of a disconnect between where he perceives the strategic influence 
and agenda of the PSNI to be and that of the Orange Order’s. He characterises the 
Orange Order’s “influence and impact” at “a local level around bespoke events” (p. 7) 
as opposed to the  
“the more strategic piece about shaping the environment and making 
Northern Ireland a more peaceful, safe, confident place, more progressive 
and moving on and the sort of post-conflict stuff” (p. 7)  
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Hamilton exemplified the point by suggesting that the Orange Order’s reaction to his 
change programme would be a tactical one based on aspiration for engagement with 
new District Commanders. While he recognised this as “important” and “pragmatic” 
(p. 7) he also suggested,” it’s not about how we can either resolve the parading issues, 
or make policing better, or make community relations with the police better” (p. 7) He 
dismissed, “I would refute it” (p. 11)  the suggestion that PSNI command views the 
Orange Order as an “irritant” (p. 11) and instead characterised them as “pretty key 
stakeholders” representative of a “broad church”, albeit with internal organisational 
difficulties that has not moved significantly from their core functions into community 
capacity building, for example (p. 11).   
Hamilton  was asked whether he was frustrated by the on-going situation  
at Twaddell. While he acknowledged frustration in terms of what he described as 
“pure opportunity costs”  both in terms of the cost of the policing operation generally 
to the public purse and also in terms of the police’s ability to deal with, for example 
issues of “anti-social behaviour” and all the other quality of life issues”  which  
impact  “in the communities the Orange come from” (p. 12), Hamilton also 
acknowledged it is “just part of the reality of Northern Ireland” (p. 12). 
 Although Hamilton identifies challenges in the relationship he was also clear 
of  his personal commitment and  PSNI’s commitment to  managing that relationship 
positively. He said, 
“I think we just keep the door of engagement open and try to be helpful 
and certainly not be dismissive, and understand the perceptions that exist 
and try almost, conversation by conversation, and relationship by 
relationship, to demolish some of the myths that have grown up over the 
last, probably 10, 15 years”  (p. 11). 
	 89	
Of his personal commitment to that relationship he noted ,  
“I can tell you what I will do that might help to build confidence within 
the Orange Order, I’ll take them seriously.  It’s simple things like I do 
have an understanding of them, because of having grown up here frankly, 
which has to be to their advantage” (p. 10). 
 
3.7 Leadership 
 The Chief Constables’ perception of the general relationship between the 
Orange Order and PSNI was followed up by consideration of specific aspects of this, 
particularly the Chief Constables’ assessment of Orange Order leadership. 
Interviewees were questioned about the ability of Orange Order leaders to influence 
the membership and deliver coherent strategy. Throughout the interviews comments 
were made which reflected on the Chief Constable’s perception of the overall 
effectiveness of the Orange hierarchy. The general opinion of Orde, Baggott and 
Hamilton appeared to be that the Orange Order leadership can at times display 
weakness and inconsistency. It also had a limited influence over its membership. 
They also accepted the Orange Order is a diverse organisation that militates against 
strong leadership. In this regard they accepted that comparisons with a command and 
control organisation, such as police,  proved to be unhelpful. 
 Orde’s preliminary comments on Orange leadership were in the context of the 
2005 Whiterock riots.  He stated they “could have been stronger” (p. 3). He suggested 
the Orange leadership in blaming the PSNI for the violence were “not honest”, (p. 16) 
and that the behaviour of senior Orangemen  “almost gave permission to anyone who 
wants to fly the loyalist flag of convenience to riot, as they did for three days” (p. 16). 
He described himself as “bloody critical” of the Orange Order and attributed their 
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lack of honesty to a deficit of “grip” (p. 10).  A lack of grip that also extended to their 
ability to deliver strategy  across a diverse organisation (p. 10).  
 Baggott’s comments proved to be very similar. He accepted orangeism was 
not structured to deliver strong leadership because it relied “upon common values and 
standards” (p. 6).  He also believed that comparing levels of control between 
orangeism and PSNI was unrealistic (p. 8). Although Baggott couched his assessment 
of Orange Order leadership in terms of the difficulty a voluntary organisation faces he 
also stood by his comments of  July 2013 that the Orange Order leadership had been 
irresponsible  (p. 8) in their handling of the 12th July parade in Belfast and against the 
background of a politically febrile and tense atmosphere had failed to think through 
the implications of some of their actions (p. 9). He also reckoned that the Orange 
Order had lost control of the Twaddell situation (p. 9) that had become “wrapped up 
in other peoples causes “ (p. 9)  
 Interestingly Hamilton’s comments on the Orange Order leadership , in part, 
reflected that of his predecessors. His starting point was a recognition of an “honestly 
held passion amongst them in terms of the Protestant identity.”  However  and in an 
echo of the previous discussion of the Orange Order and PSNI’s organisational 
relationship he noted strategic challenges for the Orange Order leadership. He said 
that, 
“In one sense they know what they need to hold on to, which is British 
unionist identity, but I don’t think there’s a strategy around how that can 
be developed, how it can be made more progressive,…..I’m not talking 
about their values or their objectives (p. 4). 
He concluded his assessment of the Orange Order leadership by arguing that some of 
the traits of Orange leadership created a difficulty for him as Chief Constable, 
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“Well it concerns me in that it depends who you speak to at the top end of 
the Orange Order about how much faith you can put in their ability to 
deliver, not because they’re disingenuous people, I think they’re probably 
pretty authentic.  I mightn’t agree with them, but what they believe is 
genuinely what they believe.  I wouldn’t doubt their authenticity, but 
their ability to deliver, or speak with one voice, is very limited” (p. 4). 
 
3.8 The Rural / Urban Divide 
 One of the major issues considered with both PSNI and Orange Order 
interviewees was a perception of the Orange Order’s character. Was this significantly 
different between urban and rural contexts and could this be a factor in the PSNI and 
Orange Order relationship?  The issue is considered more in subsequent chapters. The 
matter was discussed with the three Chief Constables also. Their responses were 
consistent in characterising urban and rural orangeism as differing. Rural orangeism’s 
community and family focus was contrasted with some of the tensions evident around 
urban Orangeism. Orde spoke of a  “different approach between the urban and rural”  
and that rural orangeism was “far more community focused “  (p. 9).  Baggott 
described the difference as “big”  (p. 5) between Belfast and rural areas where parades 
retain a cross community dimension and where nationalists are “prepared to join in 
the festivities” (p. 5). He  suggested that in Belfast the, 
“cause is bigger than simply one of an Orange Order it actually becomes 
wrapped up around flag protests and bigger issues of resentment or 
isolation or feeling that people have lost ground” (p. 5). 
Similarly Hamilton said the “Urban Orangeman is a pretty different beast to the rural 
one. The mentality is different, its different dynamics apply there” (p. 4). He 
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suggested these different dynamics are a result, among other things,  of a shifting 
demographic in Belfast with  a reducing “footprint” for the “Ulster Protestant” 
community (p. 5.). Likewise Orde attributed to some of the difference between rural 
and urban Orangeism as a reality of the community tensions evident in Belfast.  
 
3.9 Concluding Questions 
Two further issues that are germane to the relationship between the PSNI and 
Orange Order relationship were explored with the Chief Constables, the police 
relationship with the Parades Commission and the “greening of the PSNI.”  
Orde and Baggott were asked about the police relationship with the Parades 
Commission, the significance of that relationship  and whether there was any 
substance in the view among some elements of the Orange Order that the police and 
Parades Commission colluded in limiting the Orange Order’s perceived right to 
parade. Both Orde and Baggott maintained that the police relationship with the 
Orange Order was professional. Orde, for example, argued that the PSNI’s 
relationship with Commission was a matter of “law”  (p. 22) and was conducted in 
such a way as to be “pretty open and pretty transparent” (p. 22). He also suggested 
any accusation he  as Chief Constable had a “cosy” relationship with the Commission 
was “predictable and simplistic” (p. 21). Interestingly and in contrast Baggott did not 
accept there was an  Orange Order perception that Police influenced the Commission 
(P. 11). Pressure of time prevented the question being put to Hamilton.  
 The final issue explored was the Orange Order view the PSNI has “greened” 
(British-Irish, 2013) and that in doing so has undermined its relationship not just with 
orangeism but the wider PUL community. Orde, Baggott and Hamilton all rejected 
the “greening” notion. Hamilton for example did not  accept “for a minute that we 
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have ‘greened’  (p. 8) . Orde suggested the accusation was as “inaccurate as some of 
their other statements” (p. 18) but also added that “if ‘greening’ ‘PSNI means we 
allow Catholics to join it in reasonable numbers….then yes I ‘greened’ and make no 
apology for it” (p. 18). In contrast to Orde’s robust rebuttal of the suggestion both 
Baggott and Hamilton accepted how such a perception might have been created. 
Baggott suggested that “inevitably there could be a perception that people who are 
outside the political life being brought in means you have given ground to them” (p. 
17). Hamilton’s explanation was similar and he accepted that the PSNI’s efforts to 
build a relationship with the nationalist and republican community, among other 
things, “would come together to give the impression to a unionist, or to an 
Orangeman, that we had been ‘greened’.  I can understand why the perception exists” 
(p. 8). 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
• On	appointment,	other	than	in	the	case	of	Hamilton,	the	Chief	Constables	had	a	limited	knowledge	of	Orangeism	and	they	did	not	regard	it	as	an	early	strategic	priority.	The	lack	of	strategic	priority	attributed	to	Orangeism	by	Orde	and	Baggott	was	reflected	in	the	absence	of	the	relationship	being	on	a	strategic	and	formal	footing.		
• As	crisis,	the	flags	dispute,	began	to	overtake	the	relationship	during	Baggott’s	tenure	George		Hamilton	as	an	Assistant	Chief	Constable	sought	to	formalise	the	PSNI’s	dealings	with	the	Orange	Order	and	has	continued	this	approach	as	Chief	Constable	with	what	he	describes	as	his	innate	understanding	of	Orangeism	due	to	being	a	locally	raised	Chief	Constable.	
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• The	three	Chief	Constables	regard	the	tactical	relationship	between	the	PSNI	and	the	Orange	Order	in	positive	terms.	In	contrast	the	organisational	relationship	is	regarded	as	presenting	greater	challenges,	some	of	which	the	Chief	Constables	attribute	to	the	nature	of	Orangeism	and	the	strategic	vision	of	its	leadership.	The	role	of	events	in	determining	the	organisational	relationship	between	the	two	bodies,	a	theme	that	will	be	developed	later,	is	highlighted	by	Baggott	in	particular,	although	he	rejects	the	notion	the	relationship	is	wholly	event	driven.	
• Rural	and	urban	Orangeism	is	differentiated	by	the	three	Chief	Constables	in	an	interesting	reflection	of	changes	in	Orangeism	apparent	in	the	late	nineteenth	century	(James	W	McAuley	&	Tonge,	2007,	p.	36).	
• The	notion	of	the	PSNI	greening	is	rejected	although	it	is	accepted	by	Baggott	and	Hamilton	the	circumstances	that	gave	rise	to	this	perception.		Hamilton	and	Orde	contend	that	the	PSNI’s	relationship	with	the	Parades	Commission	is	professional	and	legally	based.	They	reject	any	suggestion	of	an	inappropriate	“cosiness”	with	the	Parades	Commission.	
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Chapter 4 Police Service of Northern Ireland 
4.1 Introduction 
A series of ten interviews were undertaken with senior PSNI officers. To 
protect their anonymity each PSNI interviewee is described as “Respondent 1 – 10”.  
 The questions asked reflect those put to the Chief Constables. Other than 
demographic questions the following issues were explored; 
1. The understanding of orangeism; 
2. Contact with the Orange Order; 
3. Assessment of the Orange Order’s importance; 
4. Local relationships with the Orange Order; 
5. PSNI’s organisational relationship with orangeism;  
6. Specific issues of the relationship, the rural/urban divide, Orange Order  
leadership, the Parades Commission and the “greening” of the PSNI; 
7. Contrasts between the RUC and PSNI relationship with orangeism. 
 
4.2 Demographics 
 Demographic details were explored. This included community backgrounds, 
membership of the Orange Order, and family connections to orangeism. This was 
undertaken to identify potential positive or negative dispositions towards orangeism. 
The respondents were overwhelmingly from a male Northern Irish Protestant 
background. Inter-alia where the respondent was asked to describe their community 
background, the responses to this included: “very, very broadly [unionist”], 
“Protestant”, “middle class, Protestant, unionist” and “Protestant, unionist”. 
Respondent 10  was to describe himself as attending a Protestant school but being 
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“wholly areligious and apolitical” (p. 1). None of the respondents proved to be 
members of the Orange Order or any other Loyal Order.  
 Six of the respondents have family connections with the Orange Order. Two 
respondents were found to have fathers in the Order. Other respondents referred to 
familial connections with the Orange Order through marriage. For the majority family 
connections were not either strong or current. One respondent referred to a “strong 
family membership of the Orange Order” when he was young and another to a “long 
tradition of membership” but no “direct family connection.” It would be ill advised to 
draw too many conclusions from this.  It is reasonable to suggest that there is little in 
the respondents’ backgrounds to indicate a negative pre-disposition towards the 
Orange Order. The majority come from Protestant families where in many cases there 
a connection to the Orange Order and where there was likely to be an understanding 
of what orangeism stands for.  
 
4.3 What Does Orangeism Mean? 
Before finalising the questions they were circulated to colleagues for 
comment.  One suggested a question about what the respondents understand the 
Orange Order is,  to identify if any disconnection existed between how the Orange 
Order perceives itself and how senior PSNI officers view it.  The question was put to 
the PSNI officers and on one level the answers were not surprising.  In their 
descriptions of orangeism all were to use the term “Protestant” or “unionist.”  Many 
alluded to  the religious basis of orangeism.  Respondent 6 describes it as, “ …at its 
core a religious organisation…a fraternal organisation…and it looks to celebrate the 
reformed faith” (p. 3). Equally it is widely viewed as a historical and cultural 
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organisation that seeks to uphold certain values, including British identity and civil 
and religious liberty. Respondent  8’s  answers was  typical,  
“They are an organisation that is primarily… in fact exclusively made up 
from the Protestant community, who have both a cultural, historical and 
religious aspect to their ethos, commemorating things that happened 
many hundreds of years ago …they will say that they are a Christian 
organisation and, I have never read their actual rules of organisation but 
I would see a large part of their raison d’etre now is around the 
promotion of protestantism, the promotion of a certain religious outlook 
and also about trying, whilst it’s a worldwide organisation obviously its 
genesis is in Ireland, so the promotion of the retention of the link of the 
United Kingdom with the six counties in Northern Ireland” (p. 2). 
The Orange Order could place a greater emphasis on certain aspects of their 
existence.  However the PSNI explanations were not in fact significantly at odds with 
the Orange Order position. They also reflected broadly the views of Orangeism put 
forward by the Chief Constables.  
Also reflective of Hamilton and Baggott’s view was an opinion among some 
senior PSNI officers of what they perceived to be a gap at times between the stated 
religious principles of the Orange Order and its behaviour; or the behaviour of some 
members. Respondent 9 referred to this as a “say-do gap” (p. 3). Two of the responses 
(respondent 1 & 4) illustrated the point: Respondent 4, based on his assessment of the 
Order’s role in sensitive parading contexts, spoke of his “struggle”  (p. 27) with the 
Orange Order putting itself forward as a Christian organisation. Respondent One 
stated: 
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“I know from the banners that they carry the different scriptures and 
different pictures which relate to bible stories, so I know the background 
to it but I think that having worked with them for many years whenever I 
would be talking about them they don’t spring to my mind as being a 
biblically based organisation” (p. 3). 
Later in the Chapter the senior PSNI officers are asked about their personal views of 
the Orange Order, some of which are critical of Orangeism. It is interesting to reflect 
that the strength of these views are not reflected in the senior officer’s assessment of 
Orangeism and there is an evident degree of objectivity in their description of the 
principles of Orangeism.  
 
4.4 Nature and Type of Contact with the Orange Order 
 There was wide ranging discussion regarding the extent and type of contact 
the respondents have with the Orange Order. The amount of contact varied by 
location and typically depended on whether parading was controversial in a particular 
area. For example, and in the main,  those respondents who worked in areas where 
parades were not controversial had less contact with the Orange Order than colleagues 
who had to manage more sensitive events. Respondents 1, 3, 6 and 8 exemplified this 
point. Respondent 1 spoke of the relationship with the Orange Order being managed 
by his subordinates, particularly operational planning staff,  (p. 3)  due to the lack of  
what he called “interface issues” (p. 3).  Respondents 3, 6 and 8 responses were 
similar. In each case they delegated day-to-day responsibility for the relationship to 
more junior staff as locally there were few parading sensitivities. Respondent 3 spoke 
of the relationship thus, “because 99% of this is resolved in a routine way”  (p. 7) and 
also emphasised the critical role of operational planning staff in dealing with the 
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Orange Order, “99% of that is probably done through the Ops Planning Sergeant” (p. 
3). Respondent 3 noted that he had little contact with the Orange Order, 
Respondent 6 is also responsible for a location with a relatively benign parading 
environment and consequently has “very few direct dealings with the Orange Order.” 
He did  however and in reflection of the point made earlier that part of the reach of 
the Orange Order, historically and currently,  is the presence of many unionist 
politicians among their ranks that by meeting with unionist politicians this represented 
informal contact with the Orange Order, 
“I’ve had very few direct dealings with the Orange Order. I have indirect 
meetings with them because some of the politicians I meet also hold 
membership of those organisations so they are speaking with many 
voices, if you like, they are speaking with their political voice, they are 
speaking with their constituency voice but potentially they are also 
speaking from that as well” (p. 4). 
Respondent 7's approach to contact with the Orange Order contrasted with 
colleagues. Respondent 7 spoke of a conscious decision to engage with the Orange 
Order in spite of a very benign parading context. He described the contact thus, “I’ve 
couldn’t tell exactly how many, but I’ve met with practically all the Districts’ sort of 
hierarchies” (p. 7).    
This general lack of senior level contact in areas where parading is  
non-contentious contrasted with those where parading remains a policing challenge. 
Several respondents have experience of policing one particular area at points in their 
careers and referred to high levels of contact with the Orange Order. A number of 
factors characterised this contact. It is year long, although the pitch increases in the 
summer and it tended to be event focused. Respondent 4, who was very clear that 
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responsibility for managing relationships with the Orange Order and setting the tone 
of that relationship sat with him (p. 8)  described his approach,  
“So building a relationship is a constant thing.  When we get through the 
main part of the summer marching season, I have sought to sit down with 
representatives at that level that I described to have a bit of a review 
around how the summer went and to look at where things are at the 
minute and begin to sort of tease out where we’re going forward” (p. 5). 
In addition to the contact being year long, tactical and granular there are  clear 
frustrations in the process. Respondent 10 discussed a lack of engagement prior to the 
2013 parading season and said, “I was… saying you really need to come and have a 
conversation with us and there was no engagement” (p. 9) and at other times he 
experienced “complete disengagement” as they “just wont come in and speak to us” 
(p. 8). Respondent 9, albeit discussing his perception of the situation 3 years ago, 
echoed these concerns and stated , “I think the only time the Orange Order really 
wanted to have a conversation was whenever things went badly” (p. 7). He did not 
believe the relationship was “built on trust” and they “tend to come to dialogue and 
engagement not in an open way” (p. 5). Respondent 2’s frustrations were related to 
this. He suggested that parading disputes inevitably got escalated to senior command 
levels as “certain people would only speak to certain other people” (p. 6). He also 
contrasted unfavourably parading disputes with other aspects of his role and described 
these as at times “all consuming”  and that few other of his duties “drag you to that 
kind of level” to the detriment of “virtually everything else” (p. 7). 
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4.5 The Status of the Orange Order 
 Once the level of contact between senior officers and the Orange Order had 
been discussed, the interviews went on to consider the importance senior PSNI 
officers attributed to orangeism and their view of its place within unionism and 
loyalism.  
All of the respondents attributed some significance to the Orange Order. 
However a number recognised a change in PUL power dynamics and the declining 
size of the Order. Respondent 3, for example and not unlike an Orange Order 
interviewee, suggested the PSNI would get more “bang for their buck” with the 
loyalist bands than with the Orange Order (p. 41) and Respondent 8 suggested 
orangeism has “not got the prominent position it had in the 60s, 70s and 80s” (p .6). 
Others noted that importance fluctuated according to the time of year and events. 
Respondent 5 said, “I think the priority attached to them will fluctuate depending on 
the prevailing circumstances” (p. 7). 
 In discussing the status of Orangeism responses fell into two broad categories. 
Some stressed the Orange Order’s importance strategically in terms of its position in 
Northern Ireland and unionism and others in terms of its on-street presence. 
Respondents 1, 6 , 7  and 8 attribute a strategic importance to the Orange Order. 
Respondent 1 stated: 
“So I think as far as the unionist side of the community are concerned the 
Orange Order are very important because it means a lot to those people 
and therefore it has to mean a lot to us” (p. 8). 
Respondent 6’s view was similar to this. He talked about the Orange Order’s “quite 
pervasive reach”  within the PUL community and their emotional significance to that 
community. With Respondent 7 (p. 6) he also suggested that the Orange Order 
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derived an element of their importance from their place as one facet of an increasingly 
“disengaged, disenfranchised, angry, grassroots loyalist community” (p. 12) .  
Respondent 7 with Respondents 5 and 8  placed a positive emphasis on this  
“reach” of the Orange Order  and suggested that  the PSNI’ relationship with 
orangeism created opportunities for engagement across the PUL community.  
Respondent 8 believed that,  
“I still think they are a big stakeholder and if they have 25 to 30,000 
members, that’s a right sizeable reach they have in to that loyalist 
unionist community. So I could see a benefit of us having a relationship 
with them to exploit that reach, and, if they can be a vehicle by which we 
understand the resentments, the issues, the concerns that are existing 
within that community and a vehicle by which we can try and assuage or 
deal with some of those, why wouldn’t we?” (p. 13). 
 Other respondents saw the importance of the Orange Order more in terms of 
policing challenges and managing risk. Respondent 2 described contact with the 
Orange Order as “critical” and a “10”  (p. 5) on a scale of importance. Respondents 4, 
5, 8, 9 and 10 echoed these views. Respondent 8 spoke of the policing demands in 
terms of their numbers and the “huge mobilisation of police” (p. 5)  on the 12th of 
July.  Respondent 4’s answer  was especially revealing and effectively illustrated the 
critical importance that orangeism is viewed with when parading issues are 
controversial. He stated that, 
“In X I think it’s right up there and I say that at a simple level because 
you know as well as I do - in actual fact the parading season and the 
marching season was never July and August as many people think. The 
parading calendar extended well beyond that for years, but particularly 
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in the context we’ve been operating in over the last couple of years, with 
the added dimension of protests coming out of the PUL community, with 
which certainly some aspects of the Orange Order are involved, the 
reality is, on a week to week basis, without ceasing, the Orange Order are 
involved in some way, shape or form of bringing people onto the streets, 
in a lawful and notified way, don’t get me wrong, but they’re bringing a 
lot of people onto the streets around parades and stuff.  So it’s a critical 
part of what we do, to the point, I’ll put it in a simple sense, I would want 
to be getting a sense on a week by week basis, not necessarily directly with 
me, but through the contact that I know other officers in the District 
have, not least the likes of Operational Planning, I want to know what the 
mood music is on a week to week basis” (p. 5). 
Respondent 9 who policed the same situation spoke about the Orange Order’s 
importance in terms of risk and the potential damage to community relationships of 
mismanaging parading issues. He spoke of  “huge” consequences (p. 9). 
Of those respondents who gave a score of 1 – 10 for the importance of the 
relationship with the Orange Order, only one described this as being low rising to 
medium towards the beginning of the summer. Other scores ranged from a “6/7” to a 
“10.” 
 When a question was raised about the on-going importance of the Orange 
Order in unionism, the responses reflected the themes explored above.  All of the 
respondents attributed a continuing significance to orangeism although some noted 
what they believed was a declining influence. The on-going importance is attributed 
to three factors. First was the presence of so many politicians in the Orange Order. 
Respondent 8 referred, for example to seeing “a lot of our prominent unionist 
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politicians” (p. 6) parading on the 12th July.  The second factor that has been referred 
to previously was the reach of the Orange Order into the wider PUL community. 
Respondent 6 described this as  based, on among things, familial connections. He said 
““Every Orangeman has a family, every Orangeman has friends and 
traditions come and traditions go but they are still a very large 
organisations and their outreach into that community is quite pervasive” 
( p. 12).   
The final reason provided for the continuing importance of orangeism in unionism 
was its symbolic importance. Respondent 10, for example,  described Orangeism as a 
“public manifestation”  of  a “large element of the loyalist and unionist tradition and 
identity” (p. 1).  
 
4.6 Local Relationship with the Orange Order. 
 The interviews considered the PSNI and Orange Order relationship at a local 
level. Senior officers were asked to describe the “type” of relationship they had with 
the Orange Order. Comments regarding the nature of local relationships were also 
made later in responses to other questions .  Other than in one context the PSNI and 
Orange Order relationship  at the local level was described in positive terms and the 
impression given of business-like relations, serviced by operational planning staff and  
focussed on delivering a policing service. Respondent 1 spoke of a “good working 
rapport along with our operational planning people” (p. 3), Respondent 3 argued that, 
“Relationships historically have been very good in this District because probably 
there are very limited if any contentious issues with marching”, and Respondent 5 
described a “static relationship” which is “positive” (p. 5).  
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 In two cases the respondents qualified their general view of a positive 
relationship. Respondent 5 also suggested that although the relationship was positive 
accessing the Orange Order at the appropriate level could be difficult, “I found this 
one a little bit more difficult just to try and hook into the kind of key people that I 
would recognise as being on a par with my position” (p. 4). Respondent 3, although 
recognising a currently “solid” relationship had an interesting perspective on one of 
the challenges he saw in managing that local relationship. In contrasting the 
relationship with republicanism he suggested that Orangeism dealt more in emotion 
than logic and that in negotiations with the Orange Order it was, at times a matter of  
“we’ll have to see what the tail says first before the dog can decide” (p. 29). 
 In contrast  to the positive relationships two senior officers described a very 
challenging relationship in one particular location. For purposes of anonymity the 
location cannot be identified, Respondent 9 described his experience of the 
relationship as “fragmented” “not healthy” (p. 7) and  without any sense of “shared 
endeavour” or “outcomes” (p. 7) , albeit his comments reflected the situation at least 
eighteen months before the date of the interview. Respondent 4 reflected on the same 
situation and recognised a similarly challenging situation that he intended to improve. 
He stated that, 
“I think the last number of years…there has been a significant downturn 
in the relationship between policing and the Orange and it’s been 
impacted by factors outside the Orange institution but which more 
broadly affect the PUL community… you know the flags and all of that 
thing, but clearly the relationship suffered big time. …one of my key 
objectives was rebuilding the relationships with the PUL community, and 
in particular the Orange Order” (p. 7). 
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 Another aspect of the local relationship with the Orange Order was examined. 
This related to the impacts of policing parades on delivering routine policing. All 
respondents, except one, noted frustration at the impacts of policing parades. 
Respondent 4 described the demands as “hugely resource intensive”  which diverted 
local policing , “away from those core issues which ultimately...my sense is, vast 
swathes of the community want us to deal with” (p. 13) .  Respondent 5 echoed the 
theme that policing parades lessens the service the rest of the community receive and 
added that policing of parades took up an  “an inordinate amount of time, money and 
effort with little positive outcome, either for policing, but actually for the community 
in general” (p. 24). Respondent 8 considered the cost issues in broader terms of the 
overall police budget but again reflected on the impacts of service delivery and 
referred to the “opportunity costs”  (p. 10) of parades, similar to Hamilton. He framed 
his response in terms of a preference of spending money on “cyber crime” and other 
real priorities for local communities” (p. 10) as opposed to parades.  
 Frontline staff were not interviewed as part of the data gathering. The senior 
officers were asked to reflect on the attitude of their frontline colleagues to the 
Orange Order. It is accepted that front line staff are likely to hold various views of the 
Orange Order affected by such factors as community background, operational 
experience and also location. Indeed these points were made in a variety of responses. 
A view was also expressed, Respondent 2 for example,  in response to the question 
that personal perceptions did not impact on the impartiality of PSNI officers and PSNI 
were adept at “neutralising”  (p. 18) the community background of its staff.  
The limitations of the question recognised its purpose was to identify common 
themes and assess the mood of the PSNI’s frontline, albeit interpreted by their senior 
colleagues. A general theme did emerge and 6 respondents pointed to a “weariness” 
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and “frustration” evident in their staff at the demands of managing Orange parades, 
particularly in Belfast. (Due to the requirements placed on the PSNI by the nightly 
Twaddell protests, officers from across Northern Ireland are deployed to deal with 
this on rotation). Respondent1, for example, described his staff as being “sick, sore 
and tired” (p. 17) of Twaddell deployments.  Both Respondents 6 and 5 focused on 
the professional disruption that routine deployments to Twaddell caused officers in 
terms of managing their routine workload. Respondent 6 described his staff as 
“frustrated” (p. 23) and Respondent 5 summarised his feeling by suggesting that  
“I’m not sure that it [Orange Order] would have a particularly favourable perception 
among the vast majority of officers” (p. 21). One of the most telling comments was 
made by Respondent 4 who believed that the nightly management of Twaddell 
reinforced the Troubles notion of the police in Northern Ireland as the third religion, 
neither Protestant nor Catholic. He also maintained that it is not lost on those police 
officers doing duty at Twaddell that “12 months ago people with Orange sashes round 
their necks were swinging swords at them” (p. 26). In a lighter vein Respondent 7 
referred to the detrimental impact on police of listening to “The Sash” for the “300th 
time being played badly” (p. 20). 
 
4.7 The Non-Parading Relationship 
 The researcher was involved with a meeting set up between senior PSNI 
officers and Orange District Masters in 2014.  The meeting was an opportunity to 
allow senior Orange figures to express any concerns about policing. It was also 
designed to provide a platform to discuss issues that were not solely parade focused. 
One of the architects of the event described it as being an effort to , “find a less  
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contentious space to try and have that engagement on or in” (p. 8). Engagement, he 
recognised, was typically defined by the contentious issue of parading.  Although the 
value of this initiative was not discussed directly with the respondents, they were 
asked if a relationship existed with the Orange Order at local level outside that 
demanded by parades. The responses pointed to a relationship that was defined 
overwhelmingly by parading. A number of respondents pointed to single-issue 
engagement with the Orange Order over issues such as arson attacks on Orange Halls 
and low-level engagement with neighbourhood policing teams. One example arose 
where a senior officer, Respondent 7, had been ”pushing” his staff to “go out and 
have a cup of tea with them [Orange lodges], go out and meet them”  (p. 7). He also 
described efforts to link in with various youth programmes run by the Orange Order 
(p. 15). 
 Other respondents pointed to an absence in their current roles of specific 
engagement with the Orange Order that was not event related. However some did see 
evidence of non-event specific engagement with the Orange Order through the 
Orange Order’s links into the wider PUL community. Respondent 4 initially 
suggested that his responsibility as a senior officer did not extend beyond ensuring 
events passed off peacefully (p. 4). However when he was challenged on this limited 
view of engagement he did accept that alongside operational challenges an 
opportunity could be created for engagement that was not simply about events. He 
added, 
“I fully accept the Orange institution is a significant body of people…and 
we have significant messages…which go beyond parading, whether it be 
crime prevention, whether it be simply about building strong 
relationships and building confidence in communities, so they’re a big 
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constituency and from that point of view, yes, I can understand and see 
that there are opportunities to get in front of people, that where you have 
that sort of gathering of people there’s good opportunities to get in front 
of them” (p. 6).  
Other interviewees who described their relationship with the Orange Order solely in 
terms of events also recognised a gap in engagement with the Orange Order. 
Respondent 5 said, “I think we probably haven’t tapped into that to the extent 
potentially we could” (p. 9). One of the architects of the initiative referred to 
previously saw it as being of limited success. He believed, “I am not sure it got 
traction outside Belfast”. He also accepted that the Orange Order and PUL accusation 
that the PSNI’s interest in them was limited to the summer was a “fair challenge.” 
 
4.8 The Organisational Relationship 
 Senior officers were asked to assess at the organisational level the relationship 
between the PSNI and Orange Order.  Their answers contrasted in the main, but not 
exclusively, with their assessment of a positive and business-like local relationship. 
Certainly three of the respondents were broadly positive about the organisational 
relationship but two, Respondents 1  & 4,  caveated these comments by making a 
distinction between the organisational relationship in the rural and urban contexts 
noting tensions in urban areas.  The other respondents were less positive in their 
assessment of the organisational relationship.  Four of the respondents were 
comfortable with the description of the relationship as fragile. Respondent 6 described 
it as “fragile” and “brittle” (p. 15).  Respondent 7 who  pointed out some strengths in 
the relationship also referred to its fragility and argued that “it’s a very, very fragile 
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relationship” (p. 11). Respondent 8 agreed, “fragile is maybe not a bad term” (p. 13. 
Respondent 9 was also comfortable with the term and said  
“I think the fragile word is a fairly good analysis…. there’s a perception 
that policing from within unionism, I think from my experience, that 
policing really doesn’t have any time, or doesn’t really get what we’re 
about, doesn’t get the legitimacy of us as an institution and we’re only 
doing this because you have to do it, and actually you don’t do it very 
well.  So that all lends itself to fragility, because there’s no confidence, 
there’s no trust” (p. 18). 
Although Respondent 5 did not use the term “fragile” he described the 
relationship as “not particularly positive” (p. 10) . He went on to stress the 
significance of Belfast and the Twaddell dispute in setting the tone for the 
organisational relationship as a whole. Respondent 10 picked up this same theme in a 
detailed analysis of the  PSNI relationship with the PUL community.  He stressed that 
the relationship is “defined by circumstances” (p. 6) and that attaching a label or 
description to the relationship has a “limited temporal value” (p. 6). He added that one 
of the defining features of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship  is “crisis 
management” and that the “10%” of crisis still defines the “90%” of “normal activity 
and normal engagement” (p. 1). When the respondents were asked whether the 
relationship was  improving or deteriorating, there was little consistency in the 
responses. On response stood out however and it contrasted the management of the 
PSNI and Orange Order relationship between Baggott’s and Hamilton’s tenure. 
Respondent 2 assessed the Hamilton as Chief Constable. He suggested that the 
relationship was in a “better place than it was” and described Hamilton as more 
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“open” to the Orange Order and prepared to  give them a voice, as opposed to his 
predecessor. 
 
4.9 The Rural/Urban Divide 
 The researcher has policed Orange parades in a variety of operational 
contexts.  On the basis of that experience the perception of a difference between the 
PSNI relationship with orangeism in its rural and urban contexts was explored along 
with the reasons for this. 
Without exception, a contrast was drawn between the rural and urban, 
particularly Belfast, manifestations of orangeism. Respondent 1 stated “I think you 
have the Orange Order in the country and the Orange Order in Belfast” (p. 2). 
Similarly Respondent 2 suggested “I would differentiate Belfast from the rest of 
Northern Ireland” (p. 3).  Respondent 7 described rural orangeism as “more akin to 
the Women’s Institute” and “So I actually see that there’s a big split now between 
what I call the Belfast Orange Order and the rural Orange Order” (p. 2). Respondent 8 
made similar comments and opined that “Belfast” may be “out of step” with rural 
Orangeism, a view held also by some of his rural Orange Order contacts. In the 
Literature Review reference was made to the influence of loyalist bands and the 
phenomenon of the blood and thunder bands. Both Respondents 6 and 10  in an echo 
of this described what he sees as the difference between rural and urban Orange 
events in the appearance, deportment and musicianship of the bands (p. 18). 
Respondent 10 spoke of a “discernible difference between “city and country bands” 
(p. 2) 
Not surprisingly a number of explanations were given to explain this 
difference. The tendency was to attribute it to the difference between rural and urban 
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environments. In the urban environment people were characterised as living “cheek 
by jowl” in areas scarred by the Troubles  and where sectarian tensions remained 
high. Here republican agitation around parades was also increasing and physical 
interfaces between communities remain in places delineated by peace walls. In 
contrast a sense of greater co-operation and mutual inter-dependence was seen in rural 
areas. Respondent 8 summed this up, 
  “….Then I think urban environment, high density of people, they live 
cheek by jowl, that sort of mistrust always existed around interfaces. You 
don’t really have interfaces in the rural community. I just think when you 
add all that together Belfast is just more difficult” (p. 8). 
 
4.10 Orange Leadership 
The PSNI view of Orange leadership was discussed in a number of questions. 
With echoes of the views of the Chief Constables, a leadership deficit was identified 
by a number of the respondents.  Some, again similar to the Chief Constables,  
recognised that orangeism’s voluntary nature and democratic structure precluded 
strong leadership, certainly of a type recognisable to senior PSNI officers.  The 
critique of Orange leadership was based principally on two observations. Some senior 
PSNI officers were critical of the perceived unwillingness of orange leaders to tackle 
militancy within its ranks and to take responsibility for those who associate 
themselves with parades, in bands or as spectators. Others pointed to a perceived lack 
of strategic capacity.  
Respondent 1 believed there is unwillingness among Orange leaders to tackle 
particularly the behaviour of militants and bands.  He described them as unwilling to 
“face down those what would be more militant” even though the bands are paid by the 
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Orange Order (p. 10). Respondent 10 reflected a similar view and pointed out PSNI 
had struggled to persuade the Orange Order of their responsibilities in accepting the 
consequences of parading. He maintained that the bands and onlookers are only on 
the street because of the lodges and consequently “So I don’t think its as 
straightforward as to walk away and a case of ‘mea culpa’ ” (p. 2). Respondent 9 
spoke of the Order’s “protectionism” and “defensiveness” which “actually gets in the 
way of accepting any sort of responsibility, or getting any others to accept 
responsibility” (p. 5). He later referred while discussing whether the Orange Order 
thought through the consequences of their decisions to a conversation with local 
Orange Order leaders in the 1990s. He said that,   
“I can remember a long time ago .. having a very difficult meeting with 
elements associated with the Orange Order in relation to taking the 
parade down X in the mid-90s when it was conveyed to me that if a police 
officer had to die as a consequence of getting the parade down to X, well 
that’s just the way it was.  Now that’s very powerful, but it’s also a 
reflection of the absolute sense of fundamental righteousness, without 
reference to actual consequence, and that has always stayed with me” (p. 
25). 
A lack of strategic capacity was identified by a number of respondents that 
resulted in the Orange Order being exploited by others in the PUL community. 
Respondent 8, for example,  referred to them as “strategically weak” and they have 
“placed themselves in corners through emotional decisions as opposed to well thought 
out decisions” (p. 22). He described  the Orange Order leadership especially in Belfast 
as “ordinary” men who find themselves in “positions of power” without the benefit of 
having been “leaders” or “managers” (p.23).  
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 Although the general tone of the senior PSNI officers is critical of  some 
aspects of Orange leadership, two interviewees took a different view. Respondent 4 
believed the Orange Order as part of a pan-unionist alliance displayed high levels of 
leadership to prevent disorder in July 2014. He also believed they had taken genuine 
strides to curtail the behaviour of the bands and parade supporters in contrast to 2013 
(p. 15). Respondent 6 had an interesting view concerning Orange leadership. He 
acknowledged the change between 2013 and 2014, suggested there are some “good” 
leaders within orangeism and that PSNI should encourage strategic leadership in that 
organisation. However he also raised a searching question for the Orange leadership 
as to what type of organisation they wanted. The question was this,  “I pose a question 
in my head what is more important to them, doing the right thing or preventing the 
split?”  (p. 28).  
 
4.11 The Parades Commission 
The author discussed with senior officers the PSNI’s relationship with the 
Parades Commission, and their impression of the Orange Order’s perception of this 
relationship. There was an interesting level of consistency in terms of the responses. 
Senior PSNI officers believed the Orange Order regarded their relationship with the 
Parades Commission with suspicion.  Respondent 1 stated they were “obviously very 
suspicious of that relationship” (p. 19). Respondent 5 said that “they feel that police 
are influential in that decision making process” (p. 5), and Respondent 6 noted that 
the Orange Order “probably” see PSNI and the Parades Commission as a 
“continuum” (p. 26). Respondent 9 added, “I still think they [the Orange Order] think 
it’s you come in, tell them what they want to know and then they make the 
determinations on that basis.” (p.21) and Respondent 10 “there is a perception at least 
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in some quarters that we have a cosy relationship” (p. 9). Respondent 7’s view 
contrasted that of his colleagues. He said “I think that they now recognise that the 
police and the Parades Commission is completely separate” (p. 23).  
 It is interesting that while the senior officers did not accept Orange Order 
suspicion was justified, Respondent 9 for example suggested for some  “that 
perception of cosiness fits the counter narrative” (p. 22), some demonstrated an 
understanding of why this perception may have arisen.  Respondent 4 suggested, “I 
think we became a wee bit arrogant and we didn’t live out the principles of openness 
and transparency” (p. 30). Another, Respondent 3,  recognised PSNI’s earlier dealings 
with the Parades Commission may have been less neutral than as currently 
demonstrated (p. 11). Respondent 10 maintained that the poor quality of some written 
submissions to the Parades Commission had not created confidence in the Orange 
Order (p. 10). 
Two Respondents also believed the Parades Commission have contributed to 
the levels of suspicion.  Respondent 5 described the Parades Commission 
determinations as “quite bland” and a “bit formulaic”  (p. 12) and some more 
“openness and transparency” in their decision-making would be helpful. In a telling 
remark Respondent 2 suggested that the Commission had, at times, avoided taking 
responsibility for its decision-making and sought to highlight the influence of the 
police (p. 20). 
In terms of improving the perception of the PSNI and Parades Commission 
relationship there was no consensus. There was however an acceptance by some 
officers that the evidential sessions at the Commission could become more open.  
Other respondents questioned how much further the PSNI  could go in seeking to 
reassure the Orange Order. Respondent 10 was asked if the relationship could be 
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made more transparent. He stated “I am not sure how we could because we have 
given them all the forms [PSNI  submissions to the Commission]” (p. 10) and 
Respondent 5 maintained PSNI had worked “incredibly hard” to explain the 
relationship. Two respondents provided an interesting insight into efforts to actively 
dispel suspicion.  They previously decided to provide protagonists in a parade dispute 
with an advance copy of the PSNI ’s written submissions to the Commission. The 
reaction to this illustrated well the challenges PSNI  face in managing community 
perceptions. As was noted, 
“I emailed them all the stuff in advance. I had a number,  small number 
come back to me and said right we get it now it has helped us counter 
some of this conspiracy theory in our community that you were in and 
part of this whole pan-Parades Commission, PSNI, green-front to stop 
Orange parades.  The difficulty is you create another type of conspiracy 
then because the next line you get back is that’s only the written and you 
went out to do oral briefings and what did you say to them in person”  (p. 
10). 
 
4.12 The “Greening” of the PSNI 
 In the previous chapter the view among some members of the Orange Order 
that the PSNI had “greened” (British-Irish, 2013) was put to the Chief Constables. A 
similar discussion was held with senior officers in the PSNI. None of the respondents 
accepted the pejorative elements of the “greening” notion or there had been a 
deliberate decision by the PSNI to turn its back on the PUL community. Respondent 5 
“absolutely refutes” the idea and agreed it was “very unfair” (p. 19).  Respondent 10 
claimed, “So I don’t accept his [Mervyn Gibson] description of it as a “greening” in 
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that it has been a purposeful tangible objective for the PSNI. We know that’s 
nonsense” (p. 7). 
Yet an understanding existed among some senior officers, similar to Baggott 
and Hamilton,  as to why this perception had developed. They believed that the 
unintended consequence of PSNI engaging the CNR community post-Patten, created 
a gap in the relationship with the PUL community.  There was also a view from some 
officers, Respondent 1 for example,  that the PSNI had taken the PUL community for 
granted.  Respondent 2 described the perspective as “understandable”  (p. 16). 
Respondents 4, 6, 7 and 9 went further.  They understood fully the imperative driving 
a focus on the CNR community, but Respondent 4, for example suggested 
consequently “we took our eye off the ball of loyalism” (p. 13) 
and Respondent 6, that as PSNI sought to build confidence in the CNR community 
that, 
“little did we realise that behind us loyalists were looking at us putting 
their hands in their pockets and turning around shrugging their 
shoulders and saying “they’re not interested in us anymore” (p. 20). 
One Respondent also discussed their “public” acknowledgment to “Mervyn 
and others” that the PSNI had presumed “a residual level of engagement and support 
from within the loyalist community” (p. 6). This respondent concluded by saying, “I 
accept the gap was definitely there and I accept at least in part we have to accept our 
responsibility for why the perception was created”  (p. 7). Respondent 9 when asked 
about the PSNI’s greening replied, “I think there’s something in it” (p. 15) and that as 
PSNI built confidence in the CNR community it did not “give enough credence and 
credibility to a loyalist sort of underbelly which was becoming increasingly 
disengaged until it was too late” (p. 16). 
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4.13 The RUC 
 The respondents were asked about the RUC’s relationship with the Orange 
Order and if this was in any way different to that experienced by the PSNI. Some 
were also asked if the Orange Order’s view of the RUC was unrealistic and seen 
through “rose coloured spectacles.”  The majority of respondents asked were content 
with the latter proposition.  Respondent 4 exemplified the view and suggested that the 
Orange Order  “golden” view of the RUC was symptomatic of a general feeling 
within the PUL community towards policing (p. 37). Others went further and as 
Respondent 6 argued the Orange Order viewed the RUC through a “haze of amnesia.” 
Respondent 10 identified  “short memory syndrome” as driving the Orange Order 
view of the RUC (p. 14). 
 The consensus from senior officers was that the PSNI’s relationship with the 
Orange Order was very similar to that experienced by the RUC, although two referred 
to a closeness between the two bodies that had now ceased. Respondent 10 compared 
his experience of orangeism in 1998 and 2013 and suggested the relationship was 
“every bit as bad, every bit as visceral” (p. 11). Other respondents, Respondent 5 for 
example, assessing the RUC’s relationship with the Orange Order focussed on the 
RUC’s firm stand against Orangeism post 1985 and as set out in the Literature 
Review the impacts of Hermon’s decision, “a turning point” (p. 30) to tackle 
contentious parades.  Respondent 5 and 9  also focused on the personal impacts of 
Orange Order decisions.  Respondent 5, while not accusing the orange Order of 
orchestrating violence, noted that the Orange Order  had  “conveniently forget of the 
impact of their decisions and their actions on the police” and added 
“because so many officers were directly, and their families, directly 
impacted, intimidated out of their houses, injured, cars destroyed. So I 
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think they have a selective memory when it comes to their relationship 
with the organisation and I think it’s a kind of history they’ve written for 
themselves that isn’t necessarily reflective of reality” (p. 31). 
Respondent 9 also spoke of the RUC officers “burnt out of their homes” because the 
police service “stood its ground” (p.31). 
 
4.14 Personal Reflections  
Senior PSNI  officers were asked to describe their personal feelings about the 
Orange Order and how they might feel if their children joined it. The questions 
prompted an interesting reaction from some Respondents who appeared 
uncomfortable in offering a response. One respondent declined to provide a personal 
view. Another said, “That’s the hardest question you have asked me, because I want 
to answer it honestly.” 
 The majority of respondents who provided an answer had reservations about 
orangeism. Respondent 7 stood out as the only officer to describe it positively. He 
believed orangeism had an “amazing potential for good” (p. 22) but also recognised 
the challenges of militancy in its ranks. Respondent 8 spoke of negative perceptions 
in society of orangeism and when asked if he shared those perceptions, said, “Well if I 
wasn’t in the police, I wouldn’t be in the Orange Order” (p. 19). Respondent 1 
couched his view of the Orange Order in terms of seeing no “need” (p. 19) for them. 
Two of the respondents described the Orange Order in terms of an organisation, 
among others, that excluded people. Respondent 2, for example described the Orange 
Order, among other groups as “exclusive and in some ways harmful” and they “divide 
the community for their own purposes” (p.19). 
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Respondent 3 echoed this view of a body that excludes “the vast majority of Northern 
Ireland” (p. 34) Respondent 5 framed his response in terms of the negative impacts of 
the Orange Order’s “insistence” on parading (p. 23) on communities. Respondent 6’s 
answer was more difficult to interpret. He maintained that he held no antipathy (p.25) 
towards the Orange Order and it is no different to other faith-based organisations. 
However he did suggest that orangeism, among other groups, contributes to a society 
(p. 25) where a “perpetual cycle of tension, strife and trouble” exists.  
 It is unsurprising there was no particular enthusiasm among the respondents 
for their children to join the Orange Order. Some in answering the question accepted 
this would be a personal matter for their children and they would be unwilling to 
interfere in this. Respondent 5 and 1 exemplify the point. Respondent 5 says, 
“Mightn’t like it, but people are free to make a choice around it” (p. 22). Interestingly 
though both respondents while recognising the freedom of choice for their children 
were clear none of them would take this step. Respondent 5, for example, noted his 
children’s view of orangeism was based on their perception of the impact the Orange 
Order had on their parent (p. 22). Respondent 2 advised he would be “deeply 
concerned because I can’t regard it as a valuable contribution to society” (p. 18).  He 
argued the Orange Order was a “divisive” organisation. Respondent 4 answered the 
question from the perspective of his Christian faith and said he “wouldn’t be that 
comfortable” with his children joining the Orange Order because he sees a 
disconnection between some of the Order’s activity and what “the Bible says” (p. 27). 
Respondent 6 described himself as “nervous, very nervous” at the prospect, and says, 
“let’s just be normal, normal’s good” (p. 25). Equally Respondent 8 baulked at the 
prospect of his children joining the Orange Order and said, “I would actively seek to 
discourage it” (p. 19). Respondent 9 took a similar view. He describes the Orange 
	 122	
Order as “in many ways schizophrenic” (p. 25) and until the organisation changes he 
would “probably not” want his children involved with it. Respondent 7 stood out 
among his colleagues again. While he would not wish his children to be part of the 
Orange Order in Belfast, outside of Belfast he would “not mind too much” (p. 21). 
 
4.15 Conclusion 
 
• The	senior	officers	interviewed	were	overwhelmingly	former	RUC	officers	and	members	of	the	PUL	community,	many	with	family	links	to	the	Orange	Order.	They	were	able	to	characterise	the	Orange	Order	in	terms	not	dissimilar	to	those	the	Orange	Order	may	use.		Their	community	backgrounds	reflect	those	of	previous	RUC	contemporaries.		
• The	level	of	parading	controversy	determines	levels	of	contact	between	senior	officers	and	the	Orange	Order	in	the	main.	Where	parades	are	controversial,	levels	of	contact	are	intense.	These	low	levels	of	contact	do	not,	in	the	main,	extend	to	conversations	outside	parading	and	are	managed	by	more	junior	officers.	There	is	an	absence	of	local	strategies	for	engagement,	either	in	terms	of	parading	or	issues	outside	of	parading.	
• Consistent	with	the	low	level	of	contact	if	parading	is	not	controversial,		the	local	relationship	between	the	PSNI	and	the	Orange	Order,	other	than	in	some	urban	contexts	is	positive	and	business-like.	Its	primary	focus	is	on	managing	large	numbers	of	trouble	free	events.		Operational	planning	staff	and	not	senior	police	officers	manage	the	local	relationship	typically.	The	urban	relationship,	as	will	be	echoed	by	the	Orange	Order	interviewees,	demonstrates	a	deficit	of	trust	as	it	seeks	to	manage	some	exceedingly	tense	on-going	parading	disputes.		Although	there	is	clear	
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evidence	of	efforts	to	build	trust	and	confidence.	The	one	negative	aspect	of	this	generally	positive	picture	is	the	professional	frustration	senior	officers	feel	at	the	opportunity	costs	of	policing	Orange	parades.	
• Although	the	local	relationship	is	benign,	the	organisational	relationship	is	more	challenging	and	it	is	characterised	by	the	controversial	events	as	opposed	to	the	routine.	The	senior	PSNI	officers	point	to	the	fragility	of	the	relationship	and	the	ability	of	individual	events,	particularly	those	in	Belfast,	to	dictate	the	overall	relationship	between	the	two	organisations.	No	mechanism	appears	to	be	in	place	between	the	PSNI	and	the	Orange	Order	to	prevent	the	extraordinary	overwhelming	the	ordinary	and	positive.	Feeding	into	the	fragility	of	the	organisational	relationship	is	the	perception	of	senior	officers	of	a	deficit	in	certain	aspects	of	Orange	leadership	and	a	perceived	unwillingness	to	take	responsibility	for	the	consequences	of	events	and	those	associated	generally	with	parades,	bands	and	onlookers.		A	further	factor	in	this	organisational	relationship	is	the	Parades	Commission	whose	decisions	create	the		single	and	highly	charged	events	that	become	emblematic	of	the	overall	relationship	between	the	PSNI	and	the	Orange	Order.		
• Senior		PSNI	Officers,	similar	to	the	Chief	Constables	understand	rural	and	urban	orangeism	to	be	different	entities	which	has	a	bearing	on	both	the	organisational	and	local	relationships.	This	sense	of	difference	reflects	late	nineteenth	century	changes	in	Orangeism	and	the	reality	that	there	are	few	actively	controversial	parades	outside	of	the	urban	context.		Orange	Order	interviewees	will	propose	a	similar	view	of	the	differences	between	rural	and	urban	orangeism.	
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• Senior	PSNI	Officers	do	not	accept	that	the	RUC	and	Orange	Order	relationship	was	much	different	to	that	experienced	by	the	PSNI.	They	have	no	nostalgic	affection	for	the	relationship	and	some	understand	the	Orange	Order	view	of	the	RUC	to	be	a	“rose	coloured.”		A	view	that	does	not	take	account	of	the	reality	of	history	and	various	parading	disputes.	Equally	a	view	that	does	not	take	into	account	the	reality	of	their	personal	experience	of	the	outworkings	of	some	Orange	Order	decisions.		The	senior	PSNI	officers	expressed	the	acuteness	of	some	of	these	personal	experiences	powerfully	in	a	number	of	reflections.				 	
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Chapter 5 Orange Orders 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Nine senior members of the Orange Order were interviewed. Together they 
have held a variety of offices in orangeism but also remain part of the Orange Order’s 
grass roots structure, the private lodge. The Order’s Grand Secretary facilitated the 
interviews. A number, 1 to 9, identifies each interviewee. To protect the anonymity of 
the interviewees no detail is given of either their office or their location. A series of 
questions were put to the interviewees. The questions reflect those put to the chief 
constables and senior PSNI officers.  
The Chapter is divided into a number of sections.  Following some 
demographic details, the themes below are explored by way of interview; 
1. Contact with PSNI  command; 
2. Local relationship with PSNI; 
3. The Orange Order’s organisational relationship with PSNI; 
4. Some specifics of the relationship, including the rural/urban divide, the 
Parades Commission and the PSNI’s “greening”; 
5. The contrast between the RUC and PSNI relationship with Orangeism; 
6. Personal reflections. 
 
5.2 Demographics 
Some demographic details were gathered. Respondents hold senior positions 
in orangeism and all previously held a range of offices at a number of organisational 
levels in the Orange Order. All have been members of the Orange Order for a 
considerable period. Respondent 5’s membership is the shortest, approximately 35 
years (p. 31). Respondent 3 joined the Orange Order in  1961 (p. 1). A number of 
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respondents joined the Order’s junior arm, including Respondent 8 who joined at aged 
7 (p.1). In terms of the senior offices held at time of interview, the duration of  tenure 
was typically less than 5 years. However two interviewees had been in post for 10 
years.  
 None of the interviewees are serving or former members of the PSNI. Five of 
the 9 had connections with what were described during the Troubles as the “security 
forces.” One is a former member of the RUC and another a former member of the 
Ulster Special Constabulary. A further two were part-time members of the Ulster 
Defence Regiment, later Royal Irish Regiment.  
 The interviewees were asked if they belonged to any other Loyal Order.  Five 
are members of the Orange Order, Royal Arch Purple (RAP) Order and Royal Black 
Preceptory (RBP). Three are members of both the Orange Order and RBP. One is a 
member of both the Orange Order and the Apprentice Boys of Derry.  Additionally 
five of the respondents have held office in both the Orange Order and RBP. One has 
held office in the RAP, RBP and Orange Order.  
 While the demographic data formed a small part of the overall interviews it 
proved to be instructive from a number of perspectives. First  due to their length of 
service all of the interviewees were able to draw personal comparisons of both the 
RUC and the PSNI. Second, all joined the Orange Order either during its “golden era” 
or when the organisation was numerically stronger, politically aligned to the majority 
Unionist Party and able to parade with fewer restrictions. Third, several served in 
security capacities where contact with the police would have been routine. Fourth, all 
belonged to other “branches “of Protestant fraternal orders and many have also held 
office in these. Consequently it is not unreasonable to suggest that the views 
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articulated by the Orange Order members may be representative of the parading 
orders generally.  
 
5.3 Contact with PSNI 
 Before discussing the detail of contact senior Orange figures have with PSNI , 
they were asked to name the PSNI District they lived in and its Commander. Only 
three were able to correctly name the District Commander. Of the others, two 
proffered no name and the other 4 the name of their local area commander.  
Respondent 3 referred to frequent changes in command (p. 3). At the time of 
interview each PSNI District was designated by a letter (A – H). Four of the 
respondents were able to correctly identify the PSNI  District they lived in. The other 
five described the PSNI  Area. In PSNI terms, the then Areas were a sub division of 
Districts.  
 All but one of the interviewees had some contact with the PSNI but the level, 
amount and type of contact varied greatly.  The data from the Orange Order 
respondents reflected that of the senior PSNI officers that contact with PSNI was in 
the main dictated by events other than in those few contexts where a conscious 
decision had been made to actively manage the relationship between the two 
organisations.  Respondent 1 spoke of an absence of formal contact with the PSNI  as 
contact is managed at “Private Lodge and District level” (p. 2). However he is 
satisfied that should contact be required that would be facilitated. Respondent 7’s only 
contact with police was through the submission of Parades Commission forms and in 
a local capacity (p. 4) He viewed meetings with senior PSNI officers as a Grand 
Lodge responsibility.  He was also confident that should contact with PSNI officers 
be required this would be facilitated (p. 4).  
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 The other respondents had more extensive and purposeful contact with PSNI . 
Two of the respondents, who are involved in the same particularly sensitive parading 
context, described senior level contact with PSNI.  Respondent 3, although he does 
not specify the amount of contact, referred to meeting ACC “Bill” Kerr and the 
current chief constable (p. 3).  Respondent 8 described his satisfaction with levels of 
contact. “right to the very top (Chief Constable) ”  but recognised this might be 
anomalous (p. 2). Respondent 9 also spoke of senior level PSNI contact. He 
described, “sort of getting to know local command” and also ready access to the 
District Commander (p. 4). Respondent 2 also described meetings with District 
Command in the “run up to the parading season” (p. 4). He was also content with the 
amount and ease of access to the PSNI . He noted that he was  “happy enough with 
the ease with which I am able to contact the police”  (p. 6).  
 For the other respondents contact with the PSNI  existed at Area Command 
level. Respondent 6 talked about meetings with Area Command twice a year to 
discuss parades. Similarly Respondent 4 talked about an annual meeting with Area 
Command and a satisfaction with the arrangement and also with levels of contact (p. 
3). Respondent 5 spoke of his engagement strategy with the PSNI that was managed 
at Area Command level and included pre event meetings and post event debriefs (p. 
9). In a similar way to other Orange Order interviewees,  the importance of telephone 
contact with the PSNI  was emphasised.  Respondent 5 described it as getting on “the 
blower” (p. 8).  
 
5.4 Local Relationship with the PSNI 
 The Orange Order respondents were then asked to describe their relationship 
with local PSNI  command. Again their answers reflected those provided by the PSNI 
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officers. The typical answer was that local relationships were good, focused on 
managing large numbers of mostly uncontested parades. Where these parades became 
controversial this positive local relationship became strained and difficult. 
Respondent 1 who based his answer on talking with “large numbers of people right 
across the county” stated that “relationships with the PSNI, good” (p. 8). Respondent 
4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 share this perspective of a good local relationship being in evidence.  
Respondent 7, while noting later diminishing PSNI  attendance at small parades 
commented that “we have always had a good connection with the RUC/PSNI” (p. 6). 
Respondent 9, talked about “a very strong relationship” and “we work very well with 
them” (p. 3). Respondent 4 was asked to summarise the relationship with local PSNI  
and described it simply as “good” (p. 4).  
 Respondent 5 provided an interesting narrative on his relationship with local 
PSNI .  He discussed a decision approximately10 years ago in his area to move the 
parading situation beyond tense relationships with local PSNI  and communities. 
Meetings took place with PSNI  that were described at times as  being “frosty” (p. 6). 
While the meetings with PSNI  covered a range of issues, key to the local strategy he 
outlined was the development of a more proactive approach to marshalling events by 
the Orange Order (p. 5). He noted that the consequence of the decision by Respondent 
5 and colleagues to re-calibrate the local parading environment has considerably 
improved the relationship with the PSNI . Respondent 5 went on to comment, “The 
relationship is very good at the moment”  (p. 8) and “Now I can hold my hand up to 
say they [PSNI] definitely work with us ” (p. 9).  
 Interestingly in the course of the interviews three senior Orange figures from 
rural areas mentioned locations to which they would not take main parades to. 
Respondent 4 mentioned moving a parade “rather than fire the situation” (p. 3). 
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Respondent 9 mentioned locations he would avoid. [The annual 12th July parades are 
usually rotated around the various Orange Districts in a county].  He was also clear 
that his variety of orangeism was not “an organisation that parades to confrontation” 
(p. 14). The rationale for these decisions was not based wholly on the community 
composition of an area. It was also about the capacity of the local infrastructure to 
host a large event.  That accepted, it is possible to detect willingness in some parts of 
the Orange Order to avoid local confrontation both with opponents of parades and 
also the PSNI  who have to manage the potential confrontations.  
 Three of the respondents made a more negative assessment of the local 
relationship with the PSNI. Respondent 2 noted “on the face of it I think it is a good 
relationship” (p. 7). He, however, then described a lack of trust in the local 
relationship with senior command particularly around the transparency of their 
dealings with the Parades Commission and accused PSNI command of a lack of 
transparency . He commented that,” you tell the Parades Commission that the parade 
basically shouldn’t go ahead” (p. 7). 
 In their assessment of the local relationship Respondents 3 & 8 referred to the 
same location. Respondent 3 was complimentary of one sergeant “he’s like the old 
RUC” but this positive impression did not extend to the rest of his dealings with PSNI 
(p. 1). He stated that the relationship with local PSNI  had gone down to “zero” (p. 
12), was worse than the relationship during the 2005 Whiterock disturbances and this 
was a consequence of the “lies” that PSNI among others had told the Orange Order  
(p. 12). Much of  his assessment was based upon a reaction to July 2013 and the on-
going Twaddell impasse .  Respondent 3 also believed that PSNI  had failed to protect 
the Belfast Orange Order parade in July 2013 (p. 16).  Earlier he also complained 
about what he regarded  as excessive use of evidence gathering by the PSNI and the 
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risk that the material gathered could fall into the hands of paedophiles (p. 9). He said  
“It used to be pack your shield and your helmet.  Two years ago it was pack your 
camcorder “ (p. 9).   
 Respondent 8 commenting on the same relationship proved to be more 
positive. He said of the relationship with local senior PSNI officers it was 
“reasonable, has been good. It has been difficult at times” (p. 3). He also referred to 
the attack on the parade in 2013 and described this as a “blip” in the relationship. 
Later in the interview Respondent 8 made some interesting comments on how he saw 
local relationships between the PUL community and the PSNI having changed more 
generally.  He referred to both a lack of local policing and an absence of continuity in 
neighbourhood policing. He contrasted his previous experience of community 
policing with today’s model and noted the absence of neighbourhood police officers 
prepared to commit to communities for long periods and making “that connection” 
with communities (p. 47). 
 
5.5 Impacts of Parades on Local Policing 
 The impact of parading costs was discussed with the interviewees. Senior 
PSNI officers had noted the opportunity costs of policing Orange Order events at the 
expense of other policing priorities of importance to the wider community. Not 
surprisingly, although not uniformly, the Orange Order interviewees argued these 
costs and impacts were the reasonable price of securing their heritage. Respondent 1 
believed the cost of parades was directly attributable to republicanism, the “bottom 
line is the republican movement is trying to bankrupt Northern Ireland” (p. 36). 
Respondent 3 described the costs “as the price of democracy”  (p.5), Respondent 2 
said, “we have a parading tradition, so society just has to pay for that” (p. 41). 
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Respondent 8 argued that “because its part of our culture and what we do” (p. 50). 
Respondent 8 also maintained that a focus on the cost of policing parades was a “red 
herring” (p. 51) and measuring the cost of parades against health care, for example, 
belied the complexity of relationships in Northern Ireland and focused unduly on one 
community. Respondent 7’s while registering a concern about the impacts of parades 
policing suggested that, for example, the Twaddell situation might be purposely over-
policed and overtime generation was an element in the policing arrangements (p. 32). 
 Respondents 4, 6 and 9 provided a contrasting note. They identified concerns 
about the ability of local PSNI to deliver a service against the backdrop of parading 
demands. Respondent 6 referred to Twaddell arguing, “in the current situation that 
money could be used for a lot of other purposes” (p. 16). Respondent 9 echoed this 
and commentated that cost was a “big issue” and questioned whether the cost of 
policing parades, especially Twaddell, may have led to a reduction in police coverage 
and estate (p. 31). Respondent 4 also spoke of the impacts of parading (Twaddell)  on 
police numbers, and the general “cost to communities and the province” (p. 9). 
It is interesting that both Respondents 5 and 9 proposed changes to 
marshalling arrangements to permit the Orange Order greater responsibility over their 
own events to minimise costs for the PSNI.  
  
5.6 The Non-Parading Relationship 
The final element of the local relationship discussed was that which went 
beyond parading. As with the PSNI interviewees there was little evidence of a 
meaningful relationship other than through the management of events and no coherent 
strategy to develop such a relationship. Respondent 9 was the sole interviewee to 
allude to a non-parading relationship. He noted that this had developed to “some 
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extent” (p. 16) with local “workshops on road safety” but admitted, “maybe we have 
not done as much as we could do” (p. 16). The only other non-parading contact was 
on a single issue.  Two interviewees referred to meetings about Orange Hall security. 
None of the interviewees were opposed to the notion of a relationship outside of 
parading.  Some, for example Respondent 4, positively welcomed the proposition.  
The only respondents that sounded any caution were 3 and 8. While 
Respondent 3 welcomed contact with PSNI, he added, “we don’t trust them” (p. 19). 
Respondent 8 had a different position. First he argued that the parading relationship is 
the defining one and any activities not linked to parading still must take cognisance of 
that. Second he suggested that particularly in rural areas, some of the wider services 
PSNI offer to the community such as crime reduction, internet safety and the like, 
should not be offered to the Orange Order per se but the wider unionist community (p. 
22).  Linking his narrative to the unwelcome changes in policing and the PSNI 
withdrawal from their communities, he finally concluded that,  
“Yes I want the police to be part of that and involved in all that, but not in 
the sense we’re in the barracks and they’ll come and deliver that for you, 
but as part of that community.  I know it’s hard if you’re not living in 
that community and police have traditionally withdrawn, still have to, to 
Bangor and areas like that, but as a matter of partnership, but not as a 
matter of we will deliver, we will come in, drop in and do that” (p. 22). 
 
5.7 The Organisational Relationship 
 The organisational relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order was 
discussed specifically in the interviews and comments were made throughout the 
interviews that referred to this issue also. Similar to some of the PSNI interviewees, 
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the Orange Order interviewees painted a picture of a fragile relationship, with lower 
levels of trust, particularly in the urban context. And again the picture of a generally 
positive and uncomplicated relationship at local level was not reflected in their 
assessment of the organisational relationship. In assessing the relationship between 
the PSNI and the Orange Order, the Orange Order interviewees referred to a number 
of factors that presented challenges for the relationship,  perceived political 
interference in policing, “persecution of the unionist community” and a change in 
policing style.  
In contrast to those who spoke of challenges in the relationship, Respondents 
4, 6 and 9 had a more benign view. Respondent 6 believed the relationship has 
deteriorated “slightly” over the years (p. 7) but also suggested the situation in Belfast 
and the rural areas was “absolutely different altogether” (p. 8). Respondent 4 shared 
this view (p 7). Respondent 9 had a similar perception. While  he acknowledged that 
the question was  difficult he argued that outside of the very few “flashpoints” the 
relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order was “pretty good” (p . 7). 
 The remaining respondents pointed to some difficulties in the relationship. 
Three respondents highlighted tensions during Baggott’s tenure. Respondent 3, who 
also alluded to political interference in policing, suggested Baggott did not understand 
in 2013 “what was on” (p.13). Respondent 1 described Baggott as “a typical 
Englishman who was manipulated by others” (p. 13). Respondent 2 added that 
Baggott’s appointment was political and that no “Englishman should hold the PSNI 
Chief Constable’s office (p. 21). Other respondents referred to the theme of political 
influence on policing. Respondent 1 said that “The Police Service is not allowed to do 
one thing unless they ask permission to do it” (p. 13). He suggested later that Catholic 
officers “feel that if they get a shield and a baton they can do the dirty work for the 
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republican movement” (p. 28).  Respondent 7 described the PSNI as “the puppet on 
the string” and their propensity to take action against the loyalist community was 
based on “I think possibly a fear of government” (p. 13). 
 The remaining issues that impacted on the PSNI and Orange Order centred 
broadly around policing style. A number of interviewees were critical of the PSNI 
uniform and the inappropriate wearing of public order equipment, in their view.  
Respondent 7 for example contrasted the six-foot RUC officers with their clean boots 
to unkempt PSNI officers with dirty boots and wearing baseball hats (p. 20). 
Respondent 2 and 8’s criticisms were more fundamental.  For Respondent 2 the PSNI 
was no longer a force but took the line of least resistance that included a 
disproportionate focus on policing the PUL community (p. 12). Respondent 8 referred 
throughout his interview to the state of the relationship between the PSNI and 
unionism. He came from the perspective the PSNI’s relationship with the Orange 
Order could not be separated from the relationship with the wider unionist 
community, a community  that he believed has neither understood nor accepted 
changes to policing in Patten, 
“The broad unionist community haven’t understood the changes and 
what they seen as a police force, was our police force, not in the sense they 
seen it as all Protestant, but ours as being we’re on the side of law and 
order and terrorism, isn’t.  All of a sudden they found it changed, they 
found people in it who could come from a nationalist background and 
aspired to a United Ireland” (p. 8). 
He also suggested that the standard of service has dropped and PSNI have become 
more like An Garda Siochana (p. 9). Much of Respondent 8’s analysis was based on 
an assessment PSNI had become more distant from the PUL community  and was no 
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longer “ a police force of the people in many ways” (p. 20) as the RUC had been. This 
distancing from the community was the result of a number of factors.  Chief among 
these was the view that PSNI is no longer a working class organisation but is now  
“seen as an academic force” (p. 20) whose officers’ attitude and manner of dealing 
with people needed to be changed (p. 44).  
 
5.8 PSNI Leadership 
The Orange Order interviewees were asked their views of PSNI’s leadership. 
They were asked what they believed PSNI senior command thought of the Orange 
Order. A range of views arose, but the more typical view was negative. One 
respondent’s view was not entirely clear and two were waiting to see what tone the 
new Chief Constable will set. At least one interviewee, Respondent 1, was confident 
that a local Chief Constable was preferable to an “Englishman” (p. 24).  
Respondent 6 did not believe PSNI senior command give the Orange Order “a 
bad press overall” (p. 16) while Respondent 7 believed that police command “maybe 
respects what the Institution stands for” (p.23).  
The others had a different view. Respondent 1 said “I’ve a funny feeling that if 
we could go away tomorrow they would lap it up” (p. 25) and Respondent 2 added 
“Their view would be would the Orange Institution not just go away and become an 
organisation that doesn’t really parade or only in certain areas” (p. 27). He described 
the Brownlow House initiative as possibly a “charm offensive by command” “because 
we’ve [police] made a bit of a cock up over the flags protest” (p. 27). Respondents 5 
(p. 28) and 9 (p. 26)  echoed the view that PSNI command would prefer to see the 
Orange Order disappear. Respondent 8 returned to his class based analysis of the 
PSNI and argued that PSNI command reflected the wider views of middle class 
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protestants that the Orange Order was a “pain in the backside” (p. 38). He did not 
argue that PSNI command was hostile to the Orange Order. 
 
5.9 View of Front Line 
 Orange Order interviewees had a more benign perception of the attitude of 
front line PSNI officers to them than that put forward by senior police officers. Again 
the answers reflect the central importance of events and context in determining  
attitudes and respondents. Respondents 1, 8, 9 recognised the front line view of the 
Orange Order depended on the local parading context and also the community 
backgrounds of officers. Respondents 7 and 5 believed front line PSNI officers see 
parades as simply part of their lot and partly an opportunity to earn overtime.  
Respondent 6 described feeling “respect” (p. 6) from the police towards the Orange 
Order. 
Respondent 3 had a different opinion. Discussing the matter he pointed to a 
breakdown in relationship between PSNI and the Orange Order at a particular 
location. He said that his “people” would simply no longer speak to police (p. 26). 
 
5.10 View of Law  
 In the course of the PSNI interviews some references were made to a 
perception that Orange Order leaders failed at times to take responsibility for the 
breadth of parade related problems. Orange Order interviewees were asked about the 
Order’s use of internal discipline, both its transparency and speed.  Some interviewees 
were asked also if they distinguished between breaking parades determinations and 
other criminal offences. Most of the respondents questioned did make this distinction. 
For some it was an issue of degree and the comparative severity of the offences. 
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Respondent 5, for example,  contrasted what he described as a “minor misdemeanour” 
with criminal damage or assault (p. 20).  
Interestingly three respondents with connections to challenging parading 
contexts made this distinction from a different perspective. Respondent 3 who 
described the Public Processions Act as “bad law”  (p. 6), stated he is willing to “go to 
jail” to prove a point around the legislation. Respondent 2 articulated the view that he 
would only abide by determinations as he saw fit. He referred particularly to those 
determinations imposed in the environs of churches. He argued, in contrast to the 
Parades Commission position, that a place of worship was only significant if a 
religious service was underway (p. 26). Respondent 8’s position was even more 
definitive. He argued that, 
“I wouldn’t discipline anyone who breaks a Parades Commission 
determination.  I have to say, I’ve been questioned myself under caution, 
never prosecuted, but I’ve had two friends prosecuted for delaying a 
parade for so many minutes and I have to say I would be totally against 
discipline, because I think the law’s unjust” (p. 30). 
 
5.11 The Urban / Rural Divide 
 The issue of a divide between urban and rural orangeism was discussed.  
Senior Orange figures were asked if they perceived a difference between rural and 
urban orangeism and if that played out in the relationship with the PSNI. Senior PSNI 
officers, and the Chief Constables, as noted earlier were clear this difference existed.  
It is informative that the views of the Orange Order interviewees had similarities with 
PSNI interviewees and again reflected both what was described earlier as the late 19th 
century move in Orangeism’s power base from the rural to the urban environments.  
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and the current lack of sensitivity in rural parading issues . Respondent 1while 
arguing that rural and urban Orangeism shared the same traits also said “the country 
man and the city man …they don’t live on the same planet and I’m not just talking 
about within the Institution, that is right across the board” (p. 8). Respondent 2 talked 
about rural orangeism being “more tolerant” (p 31) and felt that rural orangeism is 
more faithful to the true faith based nature of the organisation (p. 32), as did 
Respondent 6 (p. 8).  The explicitly faith based nature of rural Orangeism was also  
noted by a further respondent. This respondent suggested that managing the Twaddell 
situation, with its various influences, presented a risk for urban orangeism’s religious 
credibility. Respondent 7 also noted a difference in attitude between the city and the 
country while acknowledging the common bonds between all Orangemen (p. 9). 
Respondent 5 suggested these differences were evident in the contrasting styles of the 
Belfast and rural leadership of the Orange Order (p. 13). None of the Respondents 
who referred to the urban and rural differences went as far as to suggest the bonds of 
brotherhood were entirely broken with urban orangeism. However some did allude to 
challenges in the relationship. Respondent 5 noted for example, his distress at some of 
the behaviour of Orangemen in the “City” (p. 18).  
 Respondents 3 and 8 had a different view. Respondent 3 suggested that there 
are short-sighted elements in rural orangeism that did not see the creeping constraints 
on their cultural expression. He also recognised the contribution of country orangeism 
to defending particular Orange interests (p. 17). Respondent 8’s analysis proved to be 
more in-depth once again. He accepted that rural and urban orangeism looked 
different, “Very different” (p.14).  He also accepted one element of this difference 
might present itself as increased familiarity with PSNI and the appearance of a better 
relationship with them. He was however clear that while the impression of  “better” 
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relationships existed and there was a “sort of better attitude” (p. 17)  in rural 
orangeism this should not be misunderstood as “a better love for the police” (p. 17). 
He recounted his experiences of visits to rural Orange Halls and his surprise at the 
views expressed of police in rural Orange halls (p. 18) and this was not a particularly 
new phenomenon (p. 14). 
During the course of the interviews the Twaddell Avenue impasse was 
discussed which  at the time of writing has been running for nearly two years.  A 
nightly parade occurs at Twaddell Avenue. The parade is in protest at the decision by 
the Parades Commission in July 2013 to re-route the return leg of the 12th July parade 
for three North Belfast lodges, the Ligoniel Combine. Twaddell is undoubtedly one of 
the key factors in determining the PSNI and Orange Order relationship currently. The 
researcher was trying to understand whether country orangeism saw this as “their 
cause” or whether a lack of interest reflected a rural/urban divide, which played out in 
PSNI and Orange Order dynamics also. For a number of respondents Twaddell was a 
line in the sand. They were actively engaged in supporting the Ligoniel Lodges to 
complete the return parade. These respondents also testified to what they saw as the 
breadth of support for Twaddell from across orangeism.  
Of the other six respondents none had been to Twaddell. Some while they 
have not physically supported the protest, are wholly comfortable with it. Respondent 
7, for example, stated, “I would have no issues about going. I was down in 
Portadown” (p. 11). The other interviewees saw the situation differently. These 
suggested both a lack of physical support for Belfast and a need to resolve the 
situation, although they still maintained support in principle for the right to parade.  
Respondent 6 referred to only very small numbers attending from his area (p. 8),  
Respondent 4 referred to “elements” (p. 5) attending and Respondent 9 stated, “To be 
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quite honest if I was to organise a bus tomorrow to go to Twaddell I would not be 
sure if 1there would be any one on it except me” (p. 11). These same Respondents 
also suggested the need for a rethink of the current impasse. Respondent 6, for 
example proposed that, “Drumcree may have to be forgotten about, Twaddell Avenue 
may have to be forgotten about” (p. 9). 
 
5.12 The Parades Commission 
 The matter of the PSNI relationship with the Parades Commission was 
considered. The Orange Order interviewees were asked what they understood this 
relationship to be and the extent to which they trusted it.  Senior PSNI officers as 
noted made strong claims to the effect that despite some Orange perceptions, the 
relationship was professional and an appropriately distant one.  
 A number of the interviewees, surprisingly, gave the PSNI and Parades 
Commission relationship a “clean bill of health.” Respondent 4 believed the PSNI 
have no option other than to be honest particularly about contentious situation (p. 12). 
Respondent 6 was similarly positive and talked about having “a lot of trust in local 
police” to give neutral information to the Commission. Respondent 5 mentioned  a 
“fair bit of trust” in his experience of the PSNI and Parades Commission relationship 
although less at the grass roots level. He also described his experience of the PSNI 
assisting the local Orange Order to understand and have an insight into the workings 
of the Parades Commission (p. 16). Respondent 9 was broadly trusting of the PSNI 
and Parades Commission relationship on account of his local experience yet he 
understands that this level of trust might not be consistent across the Orange Order 
(p. 18). 
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  The remaining respondents  proved to be less trusting of the 
relationship. Respondent 8 interestingly believed that the Parades Commission has 
done the PSNI a disservice and has contributed to a lack of trust in them. He was an 
ardent critic of the Commission and suggested for the loyalist community its removal 
was as important as the disbanding of the RUC was for republicans. He  noted an 
improvement by the PSNI in dealings with the Commission but there was a clear 
sense that PSNI had been “caught out” in their dealings with the Commission and  
PSNI still need to be watched to prevent them “playing everyone against the middle” 
(p. 24). 
Respondent 3 suggested the PSNI “hide behind the Parades Commission” (p. 
8), as did the “Secretary of State.” He suggested the Commission is “answerable to 
nobody and they write their own law” (p. 8). Respondent 1 complained about the lack 
of transparency in both the written and oral processes of the Parades Commission.  
both  and the police’s complicity in this (p. 16). Respondents 2 & 7s views were 
similar and both expressed a view that the police skewed the presentation of their 
evidence to determine a desirable outcome from the Parades Commission (p. 7), 
particularly to avoid violence (p. 15) which Respondent 7 believed was more likely to 
come from the republican community (p. 16). When asked if he trusted the 
relationship, he responded by saying “no” (p. 15). 
  
5.13 The “Greening” of the PSNI  
 The last issue discussed referred to the “greening” of the PSNI and the 
comparative relationship between the Orange Order and the PSNI/RUC. It was the 
typical view of the Orange interviewees that the PSNI had indeed “greened”. 
Respondent 8 described the “greening” as being,  
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“the Feis up at Londonderry gets 2 Irish speaking policemen; we get 102 
cameras in our faces when we go out to a service on a Sunday with our 
bowler hats on when there’s no threat.  If you said you’re starting a GAA 
in the police, you’re wonderful, you’re laudable, and this is fantastic. If 
you said were you starting an Orange Lodge, it’s not promoted, it’s not 
talked about”  (p 12). 
He recognised why the PSNI has made a serious effort to build a relationship with the 
nationalist community yet he believed this has gone too far  and “you forgot about the 
community who has supported you traditionally and you were too eager to embrace 
the new community” (p. 12). Respondent 8 also believed that there is recognition at 
senior policing levels this pendulum had swung too far. Respondent 3 described the 
“greening “with a biblical reference, and that PSNI had treated the republican 
community like the “prodigal son” (p. 20). 
Other respondents described the PSNI’s “greening” principally in terms of its 
willingness to take action against the PUL community, in contrast to the CNR 
community. Respondent 2  described this in terms of the Protestant community being 
an “easy touch” (p. 35) for police . Similarly although Respondent 7 believed the 
PSNI give a “reasonably fair service”  he maintained in terms of dealing with both 
communities that “the easy way out [for the PSNI] would be to go against the Orange 
for you are not going to get the same backlash” (p. 28). Respondent 5, who was less 
inclined to be critical of PSNI generally, identified the same theme that unionism was 
easier to police than nationalism because of what he regarded as  the lack of respect 
for law and order in the Catholic community (p. 35). Respondent 9 was more 
ambivalent about the issue yet he recognised a “perception” of the PSNI’s “greening” 
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especially in  “difficult” areas (p. 29), a perception that he believed had not been 
assisted by PSNI recruiting officers from the Irish Republic (p. 29).  
Though the “greening” view was more typical  two respondents reflected a 
different viewpoint. Respondent 6 accepted the perception existed among “hard line 
people” (p. 17) but paid tribute to PSNI efforts to build confidence in the nationalist 
community that has “90% accepted the PSNI” (p. 17).  Respondent 4  disagreed with 
the assessment PSNI had greened and maintained from his “own experience on the 
ground” (p. 18) that it was without substance. 
 
5.14 The Relationship with the RUC 
 The interviewees were asked about the Orange Order’s relationship with the 
RUC and how this contrasted with the PSNI relationship.  Providing context to the 
discussion the Patten reforms were touched upon. The interviewees collectively found 
Patten reform’s objectionable on a number of levels predominantly the 50/50 
recruitment scheme and the symbolic changes to the RUC.  Respondent 3 felt Patten 
was “to placate the republicans” (p. 27) and his greatest objection was the to  “lawful 
discrimination.” Respondent 2 asked, “whatever happened to the best person for the 
job?” (p. 36). Respondent 6 referred to the 50/50 recruitment scheme as hurting the 
“most”  (p. 19)  and Respondent 4 spoke about the “laying off of the good” (p. 19). 
Respondent 8 pointed to the “hurt” caused by the symbolic changes to the RUC, 
“because people had died for the harp and crown and 336 of our members died” (p. 
46). Respondent 7 described the reforms as  simply “ridiculous” and as part of a 
process of appeasement towards republicanism (p. 29). 
 The negativity about Patten fed into a nostalgic narrative about the RUC and 
the Orange Order’s assessment of a positive relationship with the RUC. While 
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interviewees were, at times, critical of the RUC, for example Respondent 2 described 
seeing RUC officers beating “an oul’ boy” at Drumcree and goading Orange 
protesters (p. 40), there was a clear affection for the RUC.. This affection was for, 
among other things, a policing style that does not, according to the interviewees,  exist 
in the PSNI.  Respondent 3 stated the RUC, in contrast to the PSNI, “listened to you” 
(p. 28) and that he trusted them.  This trust extended even to the RUC’s  action at 
Drumcree as he believed the RUC was operating under military control in that 
situation (p. 31). For Respondent 1 the difference between the RUC and the PSNI was  
the extent of personal contact facilitated through a network of small local police 
stations that no longer existed (p. 34). He also wanted to return to the time when 
parades’ policing was different and managed by senior officers at the head of alcohol 
free parades equipped with their blackthorn sticks (p37).  
 Respondent 8 suggested that the change in the police’s relationship with the 
Orange Order and the wider loyalist community began at Drumcree and was 
cemented with Patten (p. 45). He believed the Orange Order relationship with the 
PSNI has become more bureaucratic (p. 10) and less practical (p. 21).  Throughout his 
interview he referred to changes in policing and particularly his perception of the 
PSNI’s move away from policing from within the community to a more distant model 
resourced no longer by “famers sons” but what he describes as “academics” (p. 10).   
 Others echoed these themes of a different type of service provided by the 
RUC. Alongside complaints about the height of female officers and general 
appearance (p. 20), Respondent 7 spoke of the understanding and respect the RUC 
had for the Orange Order. Respondent 6, in an echo of Respondent 8, believed that 
there was a greater continuity of service with the RUC and officers particularly in 
critical roles were left in post long enough to build a relationship with the community 
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(p. 20). Respondent 5 who discussed a closer relationship with the RUC also pointed 
to an ease of doing business with the RUC (p.38) , in contrast to PSNI. This was a 
situation brought about partly by the closure of police stations. (p. 39). 
Interestingly although Respondent 4 speculated whether the Orange Order 
would ever going to stop talking about the RUC (p. 20), he also pointed to a greater 
familiarity with the RUC and the easy relationship with it that many of the other 
Respondents had testified to also (p. 20). Respondent 9 raised similar issues about 
“local police stations gone, you no longer had the local sergeant and you lost a lot of 
that personally” (p. 21). When asked about the emotional connection between the 
RUC and the Orange Order he pointed to a relationship based on a shared aim to 
protect Northern Ireland. He described the RUC as “These are our boys and they 
would keep our country right” (p. 24). 
 
5.15 Personal Reflections 
 Personal reflections were discussed less with the Orange Order interviewees. 
Six were asked how they would feel about their children joining the PSNI. Of that 
number only one expressed concern at the prospect. Respondent 7 suggested he would 
be “delighted” and Respondent 4 talked of a police career as “grand” (p. 19). 
Respondent 8 who expressed “no issue” with the prospect hoped his children however 
would however have a “different attitude” to people and not be subject to the “class 
issue”  (p. 44) which he saw as besetting PSNI dealings with the loyalist community. 
Only Respondent 2 was opposed to the idea of his children joining the PSNI. He 
stated, “If they had been joining the RUC I would have encouraged them, no, 
definitely not” (p. 36). 
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5.16 Conclusion 
 
• The	Orange	Order	interviewees	were	long	serving	members	of	that	organisation	whose	length	of	service	allowed	them	to	draw	direct	comparisons	between	the	RUC	and	PSNI.	None	had	direct	professional	experience	of	the	PSNI	but	experience	of	the	RUC	and	other	“security	forces.”		All	belonged	to	other	loyal	orders	also.	It	might	therefore	not	be	unreasonable	to	claim	that	the	conclusions	of	this	thesis	extend	beyond	the	Orange	Order.	
• There	is	inconsistency	in	the	amount	of	contact	individual	Orange	interviews	had	with	the	PSNI	despite	the	similarity	of	their	roles.		This	was	attributed	in	the	main	to	the	absence	of	parading	controversies	.	Contact,	and	seniority	of	contact	appeared	dictated	by	parading	tensions.	There	are	a	few	examples	where	contact	is	regarded	as	an	element	of	proactive	management	of	the	relationship	with	the	PSNI.		There	is	a	general	confidence	in	the	PSNI’s	willingness	to	communicate	should	that	be	required	by	circumstances.	
• The	positive	local	relationship	referred	to	by	senior	police	officers	is	similarly		perceived	by	Orange	Order	interviewees	other	than	in	those	locations	where	parading	is	actively	controversial.	In	these	controversial	areas	significant	and	on-going	challenge	is	evident	in	the	relationship	although	there	may	be	some	signs	of	an	improvement	but	only	against	the	backdrop	of	two	years	of	reduced	levels	of	disorder	associated	with	parading.	
• Again	and	similar	to	the	senior	PSNI	officers	the	positive	nature	of	the	Orange	Order’s	local	relationship		with	the	PSNI	is	not		wholly	reflected	in	
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their	assessment	of	the	relationship	between	both	bodies,	which		is	largely	determined	by	reaction	to	events.		Although	these	events	are	extraordinary	and	limited	to	a	particular	geographic	location	their	significance	to	both	organisations	is	such	that	it	dictates	for	many	their	perception	of	the	overall	relationship.	It	is	also	clear	from	the	data	provided	by	the	Orange	Order	interviewees	that	they	also	judge	the	organisational	relationship	with	the	PSNI		both	in	terms	of		the	PSNI’s	policing	style	which	some	regarded	as	partisan	and	a	command	team	several	referred	to	viewing	orangeism	as	an	irritant.	
• Although	the	Parades	Commission	remains	objectionable	to	the	interviewees,	not	all	view	the	PSNI’s	relationship	with	suspicion.	Significantly	in	the	context	of	relationships	determined	so	much	by	events	those	interviewees	operating	in	difficult	parading	contexts	demonstrate	greater	suspicion	of	the	PSNI’s	dealings	with	the	Commission	and	also	a	willingness	to	breach	Parades	Commission	determinations	which	will	inevitably	bring	them	into	conflict	with	PSNI.		
• With	a	small	number	of	exceptions	a	difference	is	perceived	between	rural	and	urban	orangeism	a	difference	that	is	played	out	in	relationships	between	the	PSNI	and	Orange	Order.		Some	internal	tension	is	noted	between	urban	and	rural	orangeism.		
• Again	with	a	small	number	of	exceptions	the	PSNI	is	believed	to	have	“greened’	as	an	organisation	and	deliberately	distanced	itself	from	the	PUL	community.	These	perceptions	of	the	PSNI’s	greening	feed	the	Orange	Order’s	narrative	of	an	RUC	that	delivered	a	service	that	met	the	needs	of	the	unionist	community	with	whom	they		were	joined	in	a	
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struggle	to	maintain	Northern	Ireland’s	distinctive	character	at	a	high	and	personal	cost.		
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 In this final chapter the  question is answered, “What is the relationship 
between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order since 
2001?”  This question is answered in  a number of ways. Firstly how and to what 
extent the demographic make up of the senior levels of both organisations determines 
the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order. Second the place of events 
in dictating the relationship will be examined both at the local level and also at the 
organisational level. Included in this particular consideration will be discussion of  the 
consequences of the rural and urban divide in Orangeism for the relationship between 
the Orange Order and the PSNI. Suspicions of the PSNI’s relationship with the 
Parades Commission is a further element of this consideration, as the Commission’s 
decisions and determinations are germane to events and on street confrontations 
between the PSNI and the Orange Order . The question is finally answered by asking 
what the spectre of Patten’s reforms and the ghost of the RUC mean for the PSNI and 
Orange Order relationship as they seek to manage the present. 
 Alongside answering the research question a number of recommendations are 
made for both the PSNI and the Orange Order. These recommendations are proposed 
with the intention of placing the relationship between the PSNI on a firmer and more 
positive footing, to the point where the relationship has the capacity to weather crisis 
and the annual cycle of tension. The recommendations bring the researcher back to 
the place of his raison d’etre for embarking on the thesis. 
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6.2 Demographics and the Relationship Between the PSNI and Orange Order 
A limited amount of  demographic data was gathered during the course of the 
interviews. The data was gathered for a number of purposes. Principally it was 
gathered to identify if there was anything about the backgrounds of the interviewees 
which might determine more generally the relationship between the PSNI and the 
Orange Order: as groups of interviewees were they by background especially pre-
disposed for or against the PSNI or Orange Order?  
The data gathered from the senior police officers was unsurprising. They were 
overwhelmingly former RUC officers, male,  and from the Protestant and unionist 
community. Many had familial connections with the Orange Order although none had 
joined the Orange Order or any other Loyal Order as members of the RUC or the 
PSNI. The senior officers were able to competently describe what Orangeism stood 
for. Their backgrounds will have reflected in broad terms many former RUC officers. 
In terms of what this might tell us about the relationship between the PSNI and 
Orange Order, it would be ill advised to draw too many conclusions. Certainly it is 
reasonable to argue that there is nothing in their backgrounds to suggests a strong 
negative predisposition towards the Orange Order. If anything the senior police 
officers are from backgrounds where at the very least there is an understanding of 
what orangeism stands for and potentially a residual affection for an organisation that 
has a continuing long reach into the unionist community and a long historical legacy. 
The significance of the place that orangeism continues to hold in the unionist 
community was well made by one of the senior police officers (Respondent 6). 
Although the Orange Order may be ageing and declining in numerical strength it has 
a continuing influence and place in the unionist community, as part of their cultural 
history. He said  
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“It is interesting if you listen to middle class members of the unionist 
community and at times they can be quite scathing of the Orange Order 
and then something happens to the Orange Order and their attitude flips 
in a second, why are you doing that? that’s not right, hold on a minute my 
Grandfather was in the Orange “ (p.  12). 
It would be interesting to conduct this research in another 10 years when the senior 
command of the PSNI will be predominantly made up of PSNI officers as opposed to 
former RUC officers and assess their demographic make up and links to the Orange 
Order and whether this has any implications for the relationship with orangeism. 
The author was surprised by the lack of understanding of the Orange Order 
that Orde and Baggott brought to their roles as Chief Constables. In making these 
comments it is understood that both were appointed in a relatively short period of 
time and consequently had little opportunity to be briefed fully on the complex range 
of challenges they were about to face. Equally it is recognised as both took office they 
had some immediate priorities. Orde had to deliver the numerous Patten 
recommendations against the background of an incomplete political settlement and 
Baggott had to confront a resurgent violent dissident republican threat and financial 
constraints unknown to his predecessor. These two caveats accepted it may be the 
case, particularly during Baggott’s tenure when the flags dispute erupted and 
pressures in north Belfast parading became acute, if early ground work with the 
Orange Order had taken place and they had been perceived as a strategic partner, 
relationships between the two organisations might not have declined particularly in 
the context of the urban areas, the impacts of which leeched into the organisational 
relationship.  
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 A number of conclusion can be drawn from the demographic background of 
the Orange Order interviewees to assist answer the question what is the relationship 
between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Orange Order. Firstly similar 
to the senior police interviewees understanding of and connection to the Orange 
Order, some of the Orange Order respondents had a broad familiarity with policing. 
Although this familiarity was not especially current. The familiarity overwhelmingly 
was with the RUC and came through service typically in part time capacities in what 
were referred to during the Troubles as the “security forces”, the RUC reserve or 
Ulster Defence Regiment.  This familiarity should at least give some of the 
respondents an insight into the workings and complexities of policing, albeit in a very 
different and much more counter terrorist focused context.  
Second and more critically the senior Orange Order members interviewed had 
belonged to the Orange Order for a minimum of 37 years at the time of interviews. In 
some cases membership of the Orange Order had commenced in childhood with the 
junior Orange Order, (the Junior Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland) whose membership 
currently appears to stretch from 7 – 16 years old. They had indeed been Orangemen 
“Man and Boy.”  This length of service in the Orange Order creates two potential 
dynamics in how the senior Orangemen interviewed view the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland. In the first place as individuals and also senior representatives of the 
Orange Order they have a much greater chronological acquaintance with the RUC 
than they do of the PSNI.  Second they have all lived with the “Troubles”  and 
witnessed the levels of violence that existed especially during the 1970s and 1980s. 
As discussed previously the levels of security forces and Orange Order deaths during 
the Troubles created a strong emotional bond between the Orange Order and RUC, 
and the RUC became viewed as a bulwark against a United Ireland for the Orange 
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Order. The Orangemen interviewed undoubtedly reflected the depth of this emotional 
connection with the RUC. Circumstances have dictated nothing similar in their 
relationship with the PSNI; the political and security dispensations have both altered 
considerably.  
The other important factor relating to the length of service of the Orange 
Order interviewees is that for all of them when they first either became acquainted 
with Orangeism or joined the Orange Order the organisation was undoubtedly 
numerically stronger.  Equally the then Orange Order held levels of political and 
cultural influence that are unknown today. The trajectory of the Orange Order was in 
direct contrast to the Orange Order of today.  In addition some of these long serving 
members have either direct experience or at least close proximity to what was referred 
to in the Literature Review as the “glory days” of the Orange Order when their 
political influence was at its height and the aims and aspirations of Orangeism were 
closely reflected by Government and largely protected by the RUC (Haddick Flynn, 
1999, p. 331) (McAuley & Tonge, 2007, p. 39) (Boyd, 1972, p. 74) (Jarman & 
Scullion, 2013, p. 8)  (Wilson & Stapleton, 2005, p. 636) (Bryan, 1997, p. 381), 
Parading disputes were rare and the legal context of Northern Ireland gave Orangeism 
a favoured place. (White, 2000, p. 227) (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 39) (Bryan, 2000, 
p. 67) (Weitzer, 1995, p. 49).  (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 31) (Callaghan, 1973, p. 
90).  
It is also worth noting that all of the Orange Order interviewees were members 
of other loyal orders, Apprentice Boys, Royal Arch Purple, Royal Black Preceptory 
and some have held office in these orders. The cross over between the loyal orders in 
Northern Ireland requires much greater examination, particularly the extent to which 
the attitudes, for example to policing coalesce. That accepted, the extent of the cross 
	 157	
over between the loyal orders identified in this research might suggest it is not wholly 
unreasonable to suggest the views expressed by senior orange figures were likely to 
be at least representative of the other parading orders. In making these comments the 
author is aware that the on street presence of the various loyal orders is different, in 
both the extent of their annual parading and the style of that parading and both those 
realities remain a key factor in determining the relationship between the PSNI and the 
Orange Order. The Royal Black Preceptory, for example, is typically regarded as 
representing the most “respectable” of the loyal orders (Evangelical Truth, ND). 
 
6.3 “Events dear boy, events.” 
 In the Literature Review reference was made to the abiding nature of the 
Orange Order’s relationship with the RUC, sometimes in spite of the reality and the 
gravity of particular events. While the ability of the Orange Order to maintain an 
emotional attachment to the RUC in spite of crisis remains key to understanding their 
relationship with the RUC, it would be inaccurate to suggest events have no 
significance in this relationship. Indeed the Orange Order and RUC relationship is 
littered with hugely symbolic events, not least Obins Street in Portadown and 
Drumcree from 1995 onwards.  Both Orange Order and PSNI interviewees recognise 
this. Some of the police officers referred to the symbolic significance of Obins Street 
in 1985. For a senior Orangeman (respondent 8) the rot in the relationship between 
policing and Orangeism set in at Drumcree. 
While the place of events in determining the relationship between the RUC 
and the Orange Order cannot be ignored, with the advent of the PSNI events take on a 
wholly different importance and become germane to understanding how the two 
organisations relate to each other. The RUC has gone, the provisional IRA has gone, 
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Orangemen no longer walk behind the coffins of murdered brethren or security force 
neighbours shot on their farms or driving children to school. In the place of the RUC 
was a police service created as a result of political dispensation that the Orange Order 
was at the very least suspicious of.  This new police service was, in Orange Order 
terms, created to appease the increasingly influential republican political agenda. The 
cherished symbols that linked policing to the crown were removed. In the place of 
those cherished symbols were others that spoke of conscious neutrality.  The job 
opportunities that many young protestant men and women had availed of, like their 
fathers before, were no longer available to them in the numbers or with the same 
possible predictability. Orange Order members who were also members of this new 
policing service had to declare their membership to the Chief Constable. Patten  
(Ireland & Patten, 1999) had indeed made it explicit in paragraph 15.15 of his report 
that  
. “We would prefer that public servants were not members of secret 
societies or organisations perceived to be sectarian such as the Orange 
Order or the Ancient Order of the Hibernians; and we note that the Chief 
Constable has himself said that he would strongly prefer that members of 
the police service did not belong to Orange lodges” (p. 89).    
Thus as the PSNI came into being those elements which had maintained the 
relationship between the RUC and Orangeism were removed. Indeed the Chief 
Constable who was charged with delivering the changes was an Englishman who at 
his own admittance had little knowledge of the Orange Order and did not regard them 
as a strategic priority. What was left were personal relationships, the Orange Order’s 
conservative disposition inclined to be supportive of law and order, and events. And it 
was events that were to determine this relationship. The place of events is central to 
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the the chief constables, senior police officers and senior Orangemen’s explanation of 
both the local and organisational relationship between the PSNI and the Orange 
Order. 
The local relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is predominantly 
benign. The local relationship is characterised by both the PSNI and the Orange Order 
respondents as based on a collective wish to manage a large number of annual parades 
which are entirely free of trouble or tension (PC, 2008, p. 3) (PC, 2014a, p. 4) and 
many which require little or no policing other than to close a road or manage the 
dangers of traffic to participants. Such is the benign nature of this local, and often 
haphazard, relationship is that in most cases it does not require senior level 
interference or management from either senior Orange Order members or senior 
police officers. In the majority of cases senior police officers or their Orange Order 
equivalents leave the management of the relationship to local officials. In policing 
terms the relationship is driven by operational planning sergeants and constables who 
have the year long contact with Orange lodges and discuss the policing of their 
individual parades and assess whether tried and tested arrangements for particular 
local parades need amendment. This annual contact may be as simple as a short 
telephone call to discuss with the parade organiser any changes to previous 
arrangements. In Orange Order terms the bulk of the local relationship with police is 
managed by private Lodge secretaries and parade organisers not the senior 
Orangemen interviewed as part of this process. 
This is not to say that senior police officers and senior Orangemen in non-
sensitive parading contexts make no efforts to manage this local relationship. There 
was some evidence of senior level meetings. These senior level meetings also have an 
appearance of being haphazard in terms of frequency, the rank levels at which they 
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take place, and the purpose of the meetings.  These efforts to actively manage the 
local relationship are also not apparently underpinned by any particular strategy for 
engagement other than in a handful of cases where the benefits of considered 
engagement have been seen and seized.  This is simply because senior members of 
both organisations see a business like local relationship that functions effectively from 
year to year and requires no interference. Senior police officers often speak of 
managing threat, harm and risk; a benign parading environment presents neither 
threat, harm nor risk. It is also likely the case, and as discussed with the author in a 
recent discussion with an Orange Order official that Orangemen due to their 
conservative disposition when parading is routine are reluctant to “bother” the police 
and “waste their time.” 
The importance of the place of events in the local relationship is further evidenced 
by the reality that where parading is contentious the relationship between the PSNI 
and the Orange Order is wholly different to the relationship discussed above. In these 
few cases, overwhelmingly in urban areas, the relationship is characterised by two 
factors, intensity and tension. The intensity is present in the frequency of meetings 
between senior staff in both organisations, meetings which are not limited to the 
parading seasons but are often year round in recognition of the challenges faced and 
the risks involved in the relationship failing. It is worthwhile being reminded of the 
comments of one of the PSNI interviewees (Respondent 2) who described his 
described managing parading controversies as at times “all consuming” and that few 
other of his duties “drag you to that kind of level” to the detriment of “virtually 
everything else” (p. 7).  There are also clear tensions in this relationship. Both PSNI 
and Orange Order interviewees attest to this. They spoke of declining relationships in 
urban areas particularly in the last three years and losses of trust between both 
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organisations. The researcher was struck by the assessment of an Orange Order 
interviewee that the local relationship with PSNI in one urban location was worse 
than in 2005 following the Whiterock parade and subsequent serious rioting (Jarman, 
2006, p. 2). These declining relationships are on the basis of events, specific parades, 
the policing response and the response of orangeism.  
 Another factor that points to the place of events in determining the local 
relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order is the absence of a relationship 
outside of parading. The author in the research process identified one location where 
the PSNI and the Orange Order appear, albeit in very limited terms, to have 
transcended parading issues and have identified mutual issues of concern upon which 
to relate. There are of course occasions where local PSNI and local Orangemen 
discuss non-parading issues but these are single issues, such as attacks on particular 
Orange halls and the engagement starts and finishes with the single issue. None of the 
respondents questioned are opposed to the concept of a relationship outside of events 
but there appears to be little energy given to making this a reality. This may of course, 
reflect the shared perception that a local relationship characterised by routine parading 
simply does not need anything else. The author remains surprised that both 
organisations, nor their senior figures, do not view the need for a strategy for local 
level engagement particularly as one of the themes that has emerged from the data is 
that despite the reduction in the size of the Orange Order (Clarke, 2014), senior PSNI 
officers continue to regard the Orange Order as an important organisation whose 
reach remains long into the PUL community and larger than any other political or 
cultural group. One senior officer acknowledged the claim that PSNI interest in 
orangeism did not extend beyond the summer months was a “fair” challenge to PSNI.  
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The above observations lead the author to make the first recommendations 
Recommendation 01 - The PSNI and the Orange Order should develop a strategy for 
engagement at local level. The strategy should include managing parading issues and 
also finding areas of mutual concern upon which both the Orange Order and the 
PSNI can build a relationship.  The strategy should set out the level and type of 
contact required to make local engagement effective. This need is particularly acute 
in those areas where tension is apparent. Although in these areas parading will 
inevitably drive the relationship, a relationship wider than parading might provide a 
mechanism that prevents crisis overwhelming the local relationship.  PSNI officers 
should feel welcome to walk into lodge rooms. 
While the local relationship is posited in the main as benign it would be remiss to  
ignore the levels of frustration articulated by senior officers regarding the demands 
parades placed upon diminishing resources (Kearney, 2014) and also their perception 
of a “weariness” among frontline staff due to the requirements of managing, in 
particular, the current nightly Belfast protests. Further it would be wrong not to 
mention the view articulated by a number of Orange Order interviewees that parading 
costs and consequences simply had to be borne by PSNI and wider society as the 
price of democracy.  In practical terms this sense of frustration has few consequences 
for the current local relationships. The issue might occasionally raise its head if PSNI 
decide on the basis of a risk matrix to remove police entirely from a small and local 
parade and leave it to Orange Order marshalling and the Orange Order might register 
a small “protest”. It will be interesting however to note how as PSNI budgets become 
increasingly constrained if this might impact on their ability to police routine Orange 
Order parades as widely as the current practise and whether such a withdrawal of 
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service might impact on levels of contact and good will locally evident. In assessing 
local relationships as generally good the researcher is also mindful of comments made 
by Orange Order Respondents 2 and 8 that this particular study may be skewed by the 
choice of sample and the grass roots of orangeism may take a less benign view of the 
relationship with PSNI. Respondent 2 says “I think the vast majority of the ordinary 
membership, if they were coming to meet you, it wouldn’t be as pleasant a meeting” 
(p. 12). 
 
6.4 Events and the Organisational Relationship  
 There are obvious difficulties in trying to capture the organisational 
relationship as it is multi faceted and exists on a number of levels.  However analysis 
of the data again points to the significance of events in determining how both the 
PSNI and the Orange Order characterise their relationship with each other.  
 Between both groups of interviewees there are those who characterise the 
organisational relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order as good, or good 
in the main. These interviewees are in the minority and it is interesting to note that 
both the police and Orange Order interviewees caveat their description of a good 
relationship by distinguishing between the rural and urban contexts Specifically that 
outside of the urban parading context the organisational relationship is good. The 
rural and urban issue will be discussed in greater detail below. 
The other interviewees, both Police and Orange Order have less confidence in 
the organisational relationship, which provides an interesting contrast to the collective 
assessment of a positive and business-like local relationship, The word “fragile” 
typified the response provided by the senior PSNI officers. That fragility for some of 
the PSNI officers was caused because the relationship 
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Orange Order was driven was driven at the moment by the Twaddell or Belfast 
agenda, and had been since 2013. One of the senior PSNI officers described the 
situation in Belfast as “toxic” for the overall relationship between the PSNI and 
Orangeism.  Another PSNI interviewee provided some very insightful analysis into 
the state of the current relationship which between both organisations. This analysis 
highlighted the temporary nature of any description of the PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship because it is so prone to being affected by crisis and events. He argued 
that this trend was unlikely to change particularly against the backdrop of 2016, the 
elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the symbolism of that year. It is 
worth rehearsing this analysis in full. He said, 
“Don’t forget the relationship is defined by circumstances. We had a 
peaceful 2014 so people will define the relationship as okay because it’s 
against that backdrop. If you asked them in 2013, terrible, fragile, never 
been worse. And it depends what the summer is like this year and people 
will define it accordingly. This is a generational issue. This is not a year-
to-year issue, as year to year it will just be defined by events beyond our 
control. Marching season this year takes place after the Parliamentary 
election cycle and then we are preparing for the Stormont election cycle. 
All these things will have an influence on it so I think it is too simplistic or 
too inaccurate to say it has got better worse or indifferent. I think it is 
what it is, against a very difficult couple of years and a predictably 
difficult couple of years to follow.  And any label that is put on it at the 
moment has a limited temporal value.”  
And later,  
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 “It’s [the relationship] still defined by crisis management as opposed to a 
relationship where you can manage 90% of normal activity and normal 
engagement and normal things that are less politicised and less 
contentious and just get on with it. So that 10% still defines the 
relationship”   
 As discussed above the concensus among the Orange Order interviewees was 
that the organisational relationship with the PSNI was challenging and although they 
did not specifically articulate it is in contrast to what they experience as local 
Orangemen involved in local events. In capturing the Orange Order views of the 
organisational relationship there was less of a strategic narrative than that provided by 
the senior PSNI officers. It is also the case that in some respects there was less of a 
focus on the strategic impact of events than that provided by the PSNI officers; some 
did refer to the difficulties during Baggott’s tenure as Chief Constable and these were 
surely a reflection of specific parading tensions that became an increasing feature of 
the policing landscape from December 2012 and the flags dispute. In place of an 
understanding of the impact of events on the relationship between the two 
organisations much of the Orange Order narrative or assessment of the relationship 
focused on their perception of the standard of service provided by the PSNI. While 
the concerns were not consistent they broadly reflected a view of a PSNI service of 
declining standards, including appearance, which is less connected with their 
community and subject to greater political interference; for some Orange Order 
interviewees the PSNI regarded the PUL community as an “easy touch” in policing 
terms. One influential interviewee was very clear that the PSNI relationship with 
orangeism reflected that of the relationship with the wider PUL community. This is a 
community that had not understood the changes to policing undertaken since the 
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Patten report. This same interviewee also noted a worsening attitude among PSNI 
staff towards the community due to PSNI’s recruitment of better-educated and 
increasingly middle class staff.   
 While the place of events appears less important in the narrative of the senior 
Orangemen in assessing the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order, 
there were other factors discussed which continue to point to this importance. Key to 
these factors is the rural and urban issue in Orangeism. There was a very clear view 
expressed by the Chief Constables, senior PSNI Officers and the majority of senior 
Orangemen interviewed that the Orange Order was somehow different in its urban 
and rural manifestations and this difference plays out in the Orange Order’s 
relationship with PSNI. For the senior PSNI Officers this perception of difference is a 
consequence of their experience of policing Orange Order events across urban and 
rural contexts. The senior Orangemen, although not uniformly, contrasted rural and 
urban orangeism in terms of its tensions, authenticity, attitudes and religious 
adherence. None suggested the bonds of brotherhood have been broken between city 
and country but there was a suggestion of strain or at the very least a difference of 
emphasis between orangeism’s contrasting elements.  Even an Orangeman who 
suggested it should not be interpreted as a greater affection for PSNI accepted that 
county and urban Orangeism looked different.  
It is also the author’s view that the difference between rural and urban 
Orangeism was evident in the support for and approach to the Twaddell impasse. A 
nightly protest parade [except Sundays] has been maintained at Twaddell since the 
decision of the Parades Commission in July 2013 to re-route the 12th return route for 
three North Belfast lodges (GOLI, 2014) and this impasse is the single greatest 
influence currently in the PSNI and Orange Order relationship. The PSNI and Orange 
	 167	
Order confront each other nightly at Twaddell as the PSNI enforce the Parades 
Commission determination and stop the return route from being completed. The 
researcher was struck by the fact that other than those directly involved with the 
protests; only one interviewee had in fact travelled to Twaddell. Those who had not 
visited Twaddell did not entirely distance themselves from the protest but some 
certainly questioned the wisdom of the on-going protests and pointed to low levels of 
physical support among their own local structures for the protest. There are 
undoubtedly numerous reasons why the interviewees had not been to Twaddell. For 
the purposes of this study it was interesting to note that the leadership of a significant 
section of orangeism did not participate in demonstrations that currently defined some 
of the tensions between PSNI and orangeism (GOLI, 05/11/2013). 
There are likely many reasons for this rural and urban distinction in 
Orangeism. Some of this will be historic. In the Literature Review the influence of 
industrialisation and urban competition between Protestant and Roman Catholic was 
mentioned as being significant for the development of the character of urban 
orangeism. One of the reasons proffered by senior PSNI officers for the distinction 
between rural and urban orangeism was the inherent distinction between rural and 
urban living, especially in Belfast, where working class communities live cheek by 
jowl separated by what have become known as interfaces. These interfaces, 
particularly during the summer months can be the focus of tension and disorder as 
communities seek to “protect” their territory.  Interfaces and this acute community 
tension exacerbated by proximity is not a feature of rural life. While the historic 
developments in orangeism should not be ignored, nor the difference between urban 
and rural experience, it is the author’s view that one of the key reason for this 
difference is that rural parading is largely without incident and without tension. 
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Certainly some rural parades remain sensitive but this sensitivity has rarely in the past 
20 years resulted in disorder or protest or significant police deployments. Drumcree 
was likely the last cause celebre for the rural Orangeman. This brings us back to the 
importance of events. Rural orangeism has this different appearance, different tenor, 
and apparently better ability to relate to the PSNI due, among other reasons, to an 
absence of events that create tensions between the two organisations. The author as he 
interviewed senior Orangemen occasionally attended rural Orange halls in isolated 
country areas; these were a world away from the febrile atmosphere of Twaddell, 
confrontation and impasse. It is worth being reminded of PSNI Respondent 10’s view 
and summary “This is a Belfast centric problem reflecting very fractious Belfast 
centric interface and community tensions” (p. 10). 
This assessment of the importance of events in determining the relationship 
between the PSNI and the Orange Order leads the author to make a further 
recommendation. 
Recommendation 02 – PSNI and the Orange Order should develop a strategy 
for organisational or strategic engagement. While the primary purpose of the strategy 
is to manage the outworkings of parading issues it should seek to build a relationship 
that is grounded in others areas of mutual concern and shared endeavour. The 
strategic relationship should also contain a mechanism to prevent crisis 
overwhelming routine business. The strategic engagement should also confront the 
issue of the Orange Order’s “responsibility” for events, and for those connected with 
the events. This issue is discussed in further detail below. 
It is also the case that in some respects the issues of leadership identified and 
the role of the Parades Commission in being a key dynamic in the relationship 
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between the PSNI and the Orange Order supports the argument that events are central 
to understanding the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order.  
A range of leadership issues was discussed. There was the issue, for the PSNI 
Chief Constables and their senior staff, of the strategic direction of the Orange Order 
and the capacity of the leadership of a voluntary religious and cultural organisation to 
provide clear direction to its diverse membership. There was also an aspiration 
expressed by the PSNI that the Orange Order would enter some of the strategic space 
occupied by PSNI and others and discuss some of the “bigger picture” issues 
confronting their community and Northern Ireland more generally.  For the Orange 
Order interviewees although a range of views were expressed about PSNI leadership 
there was a perception among some that PSNI command viewed the Orange Order as 
a costly irritant that both PSNI and the wider Northern Irish society could ill afford.  
Orange Order Respondent 8 suggested PSNI saw the Orange Order as a “pain” (p. 
42). 
Alongside these comments about leadership there was a clear view expressed 
by a number of senior PSNI officers that the Orange Order’s leadership did not take, 
at times, sufficient responsibility for the outworkings of Orange Order events. In 
essence the judgment of senior PSNI officers regarding Orange Order leadership was 
based on that leadership’s reaction to events, handling of critically sensitive parades 
and management of the consequences of their own decision-making.  None of the 
senior PSNI officers suggested that the Orange leadership condoned violence or 
sought to create disorder. But they did suggest that the Orange leadership failed on 
occasions to make a connection between an Orange Order event and later disorder, 
even if Orangemen were not involved. One of the PSNI senior officers had talked 
about a tendency of the Orange Order to walk away from the sometimes-inevitable 
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consequences of certain events.  In discussing Orange Order disciplinary proceedings 
again there was a sense from some of the PSNI senior officers that it was slow, lacked 
transparency and failed to send sufficiently strong messages to Orange Order 
members involved in unlawful protest. The expectation appeared to be from some 
senior PSNI officers that Orange Order leaders should take responsibility for their 
own membership, for the bands paid to play by Orange lodges and for the supporters 
who were only on the streets because an Orange Order event was being held. Orde, 
for example, during his interview spoke of his anger in 2005 at the Orange Order’s 
reaction to the 2005 Whiterock Riots. Riots which some commentators suggest he 
held the Orange Order responsible for (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 294) (Kennaway, 2007, p. 
262), as it had called for its members to walk along a banned route.  
It is unlikely that there will ever be a meeting of minds between the PSNI and 
the Orange Order on the issue of responsibility for events and their outworkings. 
However this issue should form an element of their strategic conversations as per 
Recommendation 02. 
The matter of the Parades Commission also supports the idea that events are a 
key influencer in the Orange Order and PSNI relationship. As was discussed in the 
Literature Review the Orange Order has been opposed to the Parades Commission 
(B.P. White, 2000, p. 242 & 243) (O’Kelly & Bryan, 2007, p. 567) (PC, 2007, p. 1) 
since its formation was first mooted. It is opposed to the 1998 Public Processions Act 
(GOLI, n.d.-a)  (Kaufmann, 2007, p. 239) and maintains an official position of having 
no contact with the Parades Commission and taking no part in the Commission’s 
evidence gathering and decision-making process. An evidence gathering and decision 
making process in which the PSNI play a key part. So it could be argued that the very 
fact of the existence of the Parades Commission, the Orange Order’s opposition to its 
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decision making process, and the PSNI’s statutory responsibility to be part of that 
process creates a tension between the PSNI and the Orange Order.   
Added to that inherent tension caused by the existence of the Parades 
Commission is the decision making of the Parades Commission. The Parades 
Commission makes decisions that at times place significant constraints on Orange 
Order events. It is the PSNI that enforces these decisions of the Parades Commission, 
at times leading to direct confrontation between themselves and the Orange Order. In 
enforcing these decisions of the Parades Commission the PSNI become viewed in 
some Orange Order quarters as part of a process that denied them the right (GOLI, 
2005a, p. 2) (GOLI, 2005c, p. 5) (GOLI, 2009a, p. 4) (GOLI, 2013b, p. 1) to express 
Orange culture of which parading remains such an intrinsic part (Pehrson et al., 2012, 
p. 112) (Southern, 2007, p. 166) (Bryan, 2001, p. 43) (Montgomery & Whitten, 1995, 
p. 9). The final element of the Parades Commission dynamic for the relationship 
between the PSNI and the Orange Order is that although not uniformly there was a 
suspicion expressed by some Orange Order interviewees and more widely (GOLI, 
2013e, p. 15) that PSNI was not transparent or honest in its dealings with the 
Commission and it pursued an agenda that was detrimental to the Orange Order and 
fettered their perceived right to enjoy events without restrictions. The PSNI 
maintained, perhaps not surprisingly, their dealings with the Commission were 
transparent and some suggested that Orange Order accusations of bias less reflected 
reality than the Orange Order’s anti Parades Commission narrative (BBC News, 
2013)  (GOLI, 2005a, p. 2) (GOLI, 2005c, p. 5) (GOLI, 2009a, p. 4) (GOLI, 2013b, p. 
1). There was also evidence of some senior officers taking positive steps to reassure 
the Orange Order of the transparency of the PSNI position. 
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The importance of the Parades Commission dynamic in the event driven 
relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order leads the author to make a third 
recommendation. 
Recommendation 03 – PSNI should continue to reassure the Orange Order 
that its dealings with the Parades Commission are transparent and based on a 
position of strict neutrality. PSNI should also take opportunities to demonstrate 
evidence of this strict neutrality as outlined by a number of PSNI interviewees.  
 
6.5 The Ghost of the RUC 
 The final significant theme in understanding what is the relationship between 
the PSNI and the Orange Order is that of the ghost of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.  
The ghost of the RUC haunts the current relationship between the PSNI and the 
Orange Order in a number of ways. In the first place the Orange Order has a 
continuing affection for the RUC, affection clearly evident in the interviews with 
senior Orangemen who talked about the “old RUC.” Equally there is an emotional 
attachment to the RUC that is absent in the Orange Order’s relationship with the 
PSNI. This emotional attachment is profound although at times it appears to run 
contrary to the realities of the history of both organisations.  
Chapter one discussed in detail the relationship between the Orange Order and 
RUC. It noted from the RUC’s formation and until the end of the Stormont 
government a close relationship existed between both bodies, cemented by the 
Unionist Party (White, 2000, p. 227) (Bryan, 2000, p. 61) (Lawther, 2010, p. 457) 
(Murphy, 2013, p. 10) (Ryder, 2004, p. 33) (Nagle, 2009, p. 138). It is also noted how 
this relationship changed due to, among other things the imposition of direct rule 
(Bryan, 1997, p. 382) (Bryan, 1997, p. 382) (Warner, 2005, p. 17), the conscious 
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decision of Newman and Hermon (Jarman & Bryan, 1997, p. 67) (Ryder, 2004, p. 
250) (Bryan, 2001, p. 48) (Hermon, 1997, p. 171) to tackle parading issues, and the 
Drumcree dispute from 1995 onwards  (James W McAuley et al, 2011, p. 78).  
Although the operational relationship between the two bodies undoubtedly 
changed and became increasingly confrontational, the RUC remained the Orange 
Order’s police force for a number of reasons. First they were viewed as a bulwark 
against the Provisional IRA and inclusion in an Irish Republic. Second the RUC had 
borne a high price for protecting the British way of life and this was a price shared by 
332 Orange Order members (BBC News, 2010)  (G.O.L.I. 02/06/2015).  It is 
interesting to note that in a recent press discussion of whether Martin McGuiness 
would attend an Orange Order parade, the Orange Order said that, while their annual 
demonstrations are open to the public, they had "over 300 reasons" why they would 
not invite the deputy first minister to attend (BBC News, 2016). This was a direct 
reference to the number of their members who had died during the Troubles. 
Not surprisingly the Orange Order strongly opposed and indeed resented 
Patten and his 175 recommendations (Mulcahy, 2006, p. 153) (GOLI, 09/09/1999) 
which removed in their terms British symbols (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 99) from the 
force, denied protestant young people jobs due to the enforced 50/50 recruitment 
arrangements (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 88) and proposed the compulsory 
registration of PSNI members of the Orange Order (Ireland & Patten, 1999, p. 90) 
(GOLI, 02/09/2007). One of the interviewees effectively summed up the Orange 
Order’s feelings about the creation of the new police service. He spoke in terms of 
“hurt.” 
Alongside this affection for the institution of the RUC that in Orange Order 
terms had stood shoulder to shoulder with them in the struggle to protect Northern 
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Ireland there was also a clear affection for the type of service that the Orange Order 
respondents believed the RUC had provided in contrast to that provided by the PSNI. 
The Orange Order respondents spoke of the smartness of RUC officers, their ability to 
transact business informally, their responsiveness and accessibility in small police 
stations dotted across rural areas and their measured approach to dealing with 
disorder. In contrast there was a perception among some Orange Order interviewees 
of scruffy PSNI officers, a bureaucratic and diminishing service to the public, a 
service no longer wedded to sustained community engagement and politically 
influenced policing.  
The Orange Order’s affection for the RUC was also clear in their perception of 
the PSNI’s “greening” (Mcauley, 2004, p. 206), the sense that the PSNI, unlike the 
RUC, had turned its back on the Orange Order and the wider Protestant, unionist and 
loyalist community in favour of nationalism and republicanism.  One element of this 
“greening”, a notion subscribed to by the majority of the Orange Order interviewees 
was an over-policing of the PUL community by the PSNI as they were regarded by 
PSNI as an easier policing option. Respondent 8’s comment that at the Feis [Fleadh] 
in Derry, PSNI supply 2 Irish speakers (Deeney, 2013), while Orangemen parading to 
church get “102 cameras in their faces” summed up the feeling well (p. 11) and the 
sense that the Orange Order has lost that relationship it once enjoyed with the RUC 
united in the common struggle.  
 Despite the strength of feeling expressed by the Orange Order respondents and 
the depth of the emotional bond they maintain with the RUC, and also evidence from 
the wider literature, it was very apparent the senior PSNI officers did not share the 
Orange Order analysis. These former RUC officer’s had no nostalgia for that 
organisation’s relationship with the Orange Order. Some characterised the Orange 
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view as one seen through rose-tinted spectacles; PSNI Respondent 6 described the 
Orange Order view of the RUC as seen through a “haze of amnesia” (p. 15).  Some 
reflected on the perceived consequences of Orange Order decisions on their personal 
lives. It is also clear that some of the strength of personal reflection expressed by the 
PSNI officers and reluctance to see their children join the Orange Order was informed 
by their experience as RUC officers and becoming part of what Hermon termed the 
“third religion” in Northern Ireland (Ellison, G. & Mulcahy, A., 2001, p. 250).  
 While the senior PSNI officers did not share the Orange Order analysis of its 
relationship with the RUC there was an interesting, albeit partial, meeting of minds on 
the perception of the PSNI’s greening. None of the PSNI senior officers accepted that 
the PSNI had greened in the sense that a conscious decisions had been made by the 
PSNI to turn its back on the PUL community. Some did however accept that as the 
PSNI sought to secure the peace and build very necessary and novel relationships 
with the nationalist and republican community, this may have been perceived by the 
PUL community as the PSNI turning away from its traditional support base. Some 
went as far as to suggest that the PSNI had taken the PUL for granted in the necessary 
pursuit of peace and community cohesion. 
 The ghost of the RUC and its implications for the relationship between the 
PSNI and the Orange Order lead the author to make a final recommendation 
Recommendation 04 - While it is unlikely both organisations will come to a 
common understanding of policing’s history, both should be prepared to discuss that 
history respectfully, honestly and in an acknowledgment of mutual hurt.  PSNI and the 
Orange Order should also seek opportunities to make their mutual respect for each 
other clear. 
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6.6 What is the relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order since 2001? 
This thesis was written with the clear aim of improving the relationship 
between the PSNI and Orange Order. This is because the relationship between 
policing and Orangeism in Northern Ireland is a relationship that matters. It matters 
because it remains an element in the on-going peace process and has consequences for 
the credibility and sustainability of Northern Ireland as a post-conflict society.  It also 
matters as it does not just speak of policing and orangeism but on some levels speaks 
of the wider relationship between policing and Northern Ireland’s two primary 
religious identities. Finally the relationship matters because it has implications for the 
public purse, for reducing police resources and indeed for those communities and 
individuals caught up in the eye of the various storms.  
 In drawing the thesis to a conclusion the relationship between the PSNI and 
the Orange Order is one where an understanding of events and historical context is 
key. Events determine the local relationships. Events determine the levels of contact 
between both organisations at local level and in most cases is the only basis for that 
relationship. In the main no other issues of mutual local concern have been identified 
between the PSNI and the Orange Order and no areas of common ground.  All but a 
few of these local events are lawful, peaceful and require a very limited police 
presence. As the events are peaceful, lawful and benign, both senior PSNI officers 
and senior Orangemen characterise the local relationship positively. Equally where 
the reverse is true and parading is controversial, its outworkings troublesome and 
significant police resources are required to manage parades, the relationship is 
characterised as challenging and stretching the bounds of trust. 
 Events equally have a significant bearing on the organisational relationship 
between the PSNI and the Orange Order and are key to understanding this element of 
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the overall picture.  In the case of the organisational relationship a very small number 
of events appear to overwhelm normal relations and the positive nature of the local 
and routine.  Events also help understand the rural and urban distinction in 
Orangeism, perceptions of Orange and PSNI leadership and the dynamic created by 
the Parades Commission. It is difficult to explain why this is the case and why one or 
two events have the ability to symbolise the relationship. It is more than likely 
because the relationship between both organisations is based on the here and now and 
the current as opposed to drawing on a more solid foundation that takes account of 
more than parading, and which has the strength to weather the storms of controversy.  
It is as though the organisational relationship has no resource to draw on beyond 
reaction to controversy, anxiety and confrontation. As long as this continues to be the 
case fragility will be the defining feature of the relationship between the PSNI and the 
Orange Order.  
 Historical context is also key to answering the question what is the 
relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Order. The ghost of the RUC haunts 
the relationship. The Orange Order retains a deep emotional bond with the RUC. It 
retains a profound affection for what they regarded as their police force that engaged 
in a deadly struggle to preserve a particular way of life. A struggle that so many of 
their Orange brethren paid the ultimate price for also. In the place of the RUC, is the 
PSNI, a police service foisted upon them in a political deal they did not support; a 
police service that apparently retains few, if any of the hallmarks of policing that the 
Orange Order cherished in the RUC. 
 The relationship is far from hopeless. In the main it works and works well. It 
delivers safe, lawful and peaceful parades across vast swathes of Northern Ireland 
with an absence of community tension. But this relationship will only be transformed 
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when it develops the ability to rise above the occasional, the controversial and the 
extreme.  
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Appendix A Search Terms 
1. Royal Irish Constabulary  
2. Royal Ulster Constabulary  
3. Ulster Special Constabulary (“B” Specials)  
4. Police Service of Northern Ireland  
5. Orange Order 
6. Royal Black Preceptory  
7. Apprentice Boys of Derry  
8. Independent Orange Order  
9. Parades and Parading in Northern Ireland 
10. Parades and disorder in Northern Ireland 
11. Parades Commission Northern Ireland  
12. Parades Commission and Orange Order 
13. Parades Commission and Royal Black Preceptory 
14. Parades Commission and Apprentice Boys of Derry 
15. Parades Commission and Independent Orange Order 
16. Parades Commission and Police Service of Northern Ireland 
17. Orange Order and Residents Groups 
18. Royal Black Preceptory and Residents Groups 
19. Apprentice Boys of Derry and Residents Groups 
20. Independent Orange Order and Residents Groups 
21. Royal Irish Constabulary and Orange Order 
22. Royal Ulster Constabulary and Orange Order 
23. Ulster Special Constabulary (“B” Specials) and Orange Order 
24. Police Service of Northern Ireland and Orange Order 
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25. Royal Black Preceptory and Royal Irish Constabulary 
26. Royal Black Preceptory and Royal Ulster Constabulary 
27. Royal Black Preceptory and Police Service of Northern Ireland 
28. Apprentice Boys of Derry and Royal Irish Constabulary 
29. Apprentice Boys of Derry and Royal Ulster Constabulary 
30. Apprentice Boys of Derry and Police Service of Northern Ireland 
31. Independent Orange Order and Royal Irish Constabulary 
32. Independent Orange Order and Royal Ulster Constabulary 
33. Independent Orange Order and Police Service of Northern Ireland 
34. Nationalist objection to parades Northern Ireland 
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Appendix B Question Schedules 
B.1 George Hamilton 
1. Please can you state your name and position 
2. Are you content to be quoted in the thesis? 
3. Prior to your appointment as Chief Constable how aware were you of the 
Orange Order and how did you view them, as a political, religious or 
marching organisation or something else 
4. What was your first formal contact with the Orange Order – I am 
particularly keen to know if they sought you out and you felt the need to 
engage with them. Or indeed if you took a more proactive approach to 
them 
5. If you consented to meet them or proactively sought them out what was 
this an acknowledgment of and what were you seeking to do? 
6. In your initial meeting with the Orange Order can you recall the messages 
they gave you and equally what messages were you seeking to give them?  
7. At this initial meeting how did you assess the PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship – what was driving that relationship? And was there any sense 
that Orange order simply did not accept the PSNI as a police service they 
were comfortable with as opposed to their view of the RUC 
8. Is there a sense in which the Orange Order now views the RUC through 
rose coloured spectacles? 
9. How do you characterise the relationship between the PSNI and Orange 
Order during your tenure as Chief Constable. I am particularly interested 
to know whether you think this has improved or deteriorated and why 
	 184	
10.  There are presumably some low points in that relationship, can you point 
to any periods when you felt a more positive relationship with the Orange 
Order existed and why? 
11. It strikes me that one of the difficulties in dealing with Orangeism is that it 
is a very democratic organisation with little central control, when you 
spoke to senor orange leaders how confidence were you they could 
actually influence what was happening on the ground? 
12. Outside of parading what is the Orange Order’s interest in policing? 
13. With the existence of the parades commission how much is the PSNI able 
to determine its relationship with the Orange Order 
14. How do you assess the future of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship? 
15. What needs to change to make that relationship more productive or will it 
always be determined by events? 
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B.2 Sir Hugh Orde  
1. Please can you state your name and position 
2. Are you content to be quoted in the thesis? 
3. You were Chief Constable of the PSNI May 2002 – May 2009? 
4. Prior to becoming Chief Constable how aware were you of the Orange 
Order and what did you understand the Organisation as? 
5. As you were becoming Chief were you pre-briefed and was Orangeism a 
feature of this pre –briefing. If “yes” do you recall how it was framed?  
6.  What was your first formal contact with the Orange Order and who 
initiated this contact? 
7. What was the level of your ongoing contact with the OO? 
8. In the early part of your tenure how important did you see contact between 
the Chief Constable and the Orange Order? Where did they sit in the scale 
of priorities and why? 
9. In your initial meetings with the Orange Order can you recall the messages 
they gave you and equally what messages were you seeking to give them?  
10. At this initial meeting how did you assess the PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship – what was driving that relationship? How big a factor were 
the Patten reforms and the Parades Commission?  
11. Was there much in the Orange Order narrative about a comparison 
between the PSNI and the RUC?  
12. Was there a sense in which the Orange Order viewed the RUC through 
rose cultured spectacles? 
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13. What sense did you have of how the PSNI felt about the Orange Order? 
Clearly only maybe couple of hundred members sense any general pre-
disposition towards Orangeism. 
14. You pushed through the Patten reforms concern about the loyalty of OO 
police officers or sense OO attempt to undermine this through their 
membership? 
15. In general terms how do you characterise the relationship between the 
PSNI and Orange Order during your tenure as Chief Constable and what 
factors influenced that relationship?  
16. Following the riots in Whiterock in 2005 you made very public criticism 
of the Orange Order what impact did those riots have on your attitude to 
the Order and your ongoing relationship with them? 
17. One of the accusations the OO might make is that during your tenure the 
PSNI greened and you did not pay sufficient attention to loyalism and their 
consistency, how do you respond to that? 
18. A further criticism the OO makes of you is your relationship with the 
Parades Commission – characterise the PSNI as part of the same process 
to limit their culture. What was your understanding of the PSNI’s strategic 
relationship with the Parades Commission? 
19. Could PSNI have tried to build a relationship with the Parades 
Commission that might have given the Orange Order more confidence?  
20. It strikes me that one of the difficulties in dealing with Orangeism is that it 
is a very democratic organisation with little central control, when you 
spoke to senior orange leaders how confident were you they could actually 
influence what was happening on the ground? Perceive a rural/urban split? 
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21. In dealing with Orange leaders what strains did you perceive among them? 
22. How do you think the Orange Order would describe you as chief 
constable? 
23. Outside of parading what was the Orange Order’s interest in policing? 
24. Would you assess that while you were Chief Constable the relationship 
improved or deteriorate and why? 
25. In the round were the Orange Order a support or a barrier to the building 
of a peaceful and stable society in NI?  
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B.3 Sir Matt Baggott 
1. Please can you state your name and position 
2. Are you content to be quoted in the thesis? 
3. Prior to your appointment as Chief Constable how aware were you of the 
Orange Order and how did you view them, as a political, religious or 
marching organisation or something else 
4. What was your first formal contact with the Orange Order – I am 
particularly keen to know if they sought you out and you felt the need to 
engage with them. Or indeed if you took a more proactive approach to 
them 
5. If you consented to meet them or proactively sought them out what was 
this an acknowledgment of and what were you seeking to do? 
6. In your initial meeting with the Orange Order can you recall the messages 
they gave you and equally what messages were you seeking to give them?  
7. At this initial meeting how did you assess the PSNI and Orange Order 
relationship – what was driving that relationship? And was there any sense 
that Orange order simply did not accept the PSNI as a police service they 
were comfortable with as opposed to their view of the RUC 
8. Is there a sense in which the Orange Order now views the RUC through 
rose coloured spectacles? 
9. How do you characterise the relationship between the PSNI and Orange 
Order during your tenure as Chief Constable. I am particularly interested 
to know whether you think this has improved or deteriorated and why 
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10.  There are presumably some low points in that relationship, can you point 
to any periods when you felt a more positive relationship with the Orange 
Order existed and why? 
11. It strikes me that one of the difficulties in dealing with Orangeism is that it 
is a very democratic organisation with little central control, when you 
spoke to senor orange leaders how confidence were you they could 
actually influence what was happening on the ground? 
12. Outside of parading what is the Orange Order’s interest in policing? 
13. With the existence of the parades commission how much is the PSNI able 
to determine its relationship with the Orange Order 
14. How do you assess the future of the PSNI and Orange Order relationship? 
15. What needs to change to make that relationship more productive or will it 
always be determined by events? 
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B.4 Police (Final Version) 
 
1. Please state your name and role in the PSNI 
2. Are you prepared to be quoted in the interview or would you prefer to 
remain anonymous? 
3. Are you a member or have you previously been a member of the Orange 
Order or any other loyal order? 
4. What, if any, family connections do you have to the Orange Order? 
5. What do you understand the Orange Order to be? 
6. As a senior police officer what is the extent and type of your relationship 
with the Orange Order? Does this go beyond the summer months? 
7. If the extent of the relationship is limited, is it your expectation this 
relationship is managed by those working for you? And if “yes” have you 
given them any strategy for engagement? 
8. As a senior police officer how important do you view your relationship 
with the Orange Order and please explain your answer? 
9. If you view this relationship as important, how would you assess its 
importance in comparison to other key community relationships? 
10. If you do not view the relationship as important please would you explain 
why not? Has that importance of this relationship altered recently? 
11. How important is the Orange Order in the unionist community? 
12. What if any levels of frustration do you feel about having to police orange 
parades against the background of other demands? 
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13. How would you describe the relationship between the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland and the Orange Order in general terms? 
14. What factors impact on this relationship? 
15. Of the various factors that impact your relationship with the Orange Order 
how important is parading? 
16. Other than managing parading relationships, what is the nature of the 
relationship? If the Orange Order did not parade would the PSNI need to 
have a relationship with them? 
17. Has the relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland the 
Orange Order improved or deteriorated since the creation of the PSNI? 
18. If you have noted a change in the relationship what is your explanation for 
this can you account for this? 
19. If you have also served in rural/urban region how would you differentiate 
between the police/orange order relationships in both, if at all.  
20. The PSNI is accused by some as “greening” as an organisation and failing 
to take the needs of the loyalist community seriously.  If you assess this to 
be a fair assessment please explain why? 
21. Do you think PSNI needs to make greater efforts to explain Orangeism 
and loyalism to its staff? 
22. How would you describe the front line view of the Orange Order? 
23. How would you feel if your son or daughter became members of the 
Orange Order? Please explain your answer. 
24. On a personal level, how do you feel about the Orange Order 
25. What would you do to improve the relationship between the PSNI and the 
Orange Order? 
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26. What do you think Orange order thinks of PSNI and Parades Commission 
relationship and how important is this in determining the relationship ands 
is this an area for improvement 
27. What do you believe the Orange Order needs to do to improve its 
relationship with the police and how effectively do you think they manage 
this? 
28. What is your sense of the Orange order’s ability to control its 
membership? 
29. The former Chief Constable referred to the Orange Order as reckless 
following the events of 12th July 2013. How well do you believe the Order 
thinks through its actions in parading disputes? 
30. How willing do you assess the Orange Order is to discipline its members 
who become involved in parade related disorder? 
31. How willing do you believe the Orange leadership is to accepting 
responsibility for the actions of its members and others? 
32. Should the police charge for managing Orange parades? Please explain 
your response 
33. How do you assess the future of the relationship between the PSNI and the 
Orange Order and what might determine this? 
34. There is a tendency in the Orange Order to view the RUC as their police 
force. What was your experience of the RUC/Orange Order relationship 
and how does it differ between the current police /orange order 
relationship? 
35. Is there anything else you would wish to add about the police and orange 
order re 
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B.5 Orange Order (Final Version) 
 
1. Please state your name and your position in the Orange Order? 
2. How long have you been a member of the Orange Order for? Are you a 
member of any other loyal Order 
3. Are you a member of the Police Service of Northern Ireland? 
4. Were you a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary? If yes for how long 
and in what capacity? 
5. Are you aware of what police District you live in and the name of the 
District Commander? If “yes” please can you tell me?  
6. What is the nature and extent of your ongoing contact with members of the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland? (Summer only?) 
7. How content are you at the level at which you access the PSNI and the 
ease with which you access the PSNI? 
8. How would you describe your relationship with local senior police? 
9. How would you describe the relationship between the Orange Order and 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland generally? 
10. What factors influence this relationship? 
11. How important do you believe the parading issue is in influencing the 
relationship between the Orange Order and the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland? 
12. Other than parading what do you believe the key factors to be in the 
relationship between the PSNI and the Orange Institution? 
13. What do you want from the PSNI? 
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14. What do you believe to be the relationship between the Parades 
Commission and the Police Service of Northern Ireland? 
15. How much do you trust this relationship? 
16. What more could either the PC or the PSNI do to reassure you about the 
nature of the relationship? 
17. How effective do you feel the Institution is in disciplining brethren who 
may be prosecuted for parade related disorder and how clear do you feel 
the leadership is in condemning breaking of the law? 
18. In July 2013 Matt Baggott accused the Orange Order of being reckless in 
bringing people onto the streets at Twaddell? How do you feel about this 
comment? 
19. If you had to assess the relationship of the Orange Order and the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland during the past ten years, would you assess 
this as an improving or deteriorating relationship? 
20. What is your sense of the attitude in the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
to the Orange Order and why? 
21. How do you think the PSNI leadership views the Orange Order and how 
do you regard the levels of access afforded to the Institution by the PSNI 
generally? 
22. How do you think front line officers who police parades feel about the 
Orange Order? 
23. How could the Orange Order improve its relationship with police? 
24. How could the police improve its relationship with the Orange Order? 
25. Do you hold a different opinion of PSNI front line officers than your 
opinion of its senior leaders? If “yes”, please would you explain why? 
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26. The accusation is sometimes made that the PSNI has “greened” and has 
lost interest in the Protestant Unionist and Loyalist (PUL) community? 
What is your view? 
27. How would you feel if your son or daughter joined the PSNI? 
28. What did you feel about the Patten reforms on policing? And how do you 
think these impacted on the Orange Order’s relationship with police? 
29. If you objected to the Patten reforms which reform did you most object to? 
30. What is the difference between rural and urban Orangeism and if there is a 
difference does this extend to the attitude to police? 
31. How much does what is happening in Belfast impact on wider Orangeism? 
32. What do you think the impact of policing parades is on the ability of the 
PSNI to do its routine tasks such as preventing crime? 
33. Should the police charge for managing Orange parades? Please explain 
your response. 
34. How would you describe the Orange Order’s relationship with the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary and how does this contrast with the relationship with 
the Police Service of Northern Ireland? 
35. Is there anything else you would like to add about the police/orange order 
relationship? 
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